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All integrative processes are directive. At every step from lower 
to higher levels something new is added. The higher patterns are not 
made by simple additive assembly of the properties of the lower, and 
the laws of their operation are not identical with those of the lower. 
This is as true of chemical reaction as of the creative imagination of 
a philosopher or a poet. 
C. Judson Herrick, The Evolution 
of Human Nature (1956) 
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INTRODUCTION 
The main body of this dissertation consists of a complete manu-
script, Reward Effects and Response Latency in the Process of Inter-
nalization, based on the doctoral thesis research of Sylvia T. Buse. 
Materials, which, according to Oklahoma State University thesis 
format, are generally included in the main text of the dissertation 
(e.g., the literature review) are include~ in the appendices. The 
appendices also include the raw data, varied statistical analyses, 
and supplemental materials such as letters to the subjects, and forms 
for recording subject data. 
A preliminary report based on the results of Experiment 1 was 
presented at the American Psychological Association, Los Angeles, 
California, 1981; and a subsequent report, based on aspects of both 
Experiment 1 and 2, was presented at the Southwestern Society for 
Research in Human Development, Galveston, Texas, 1982. 
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the Process of Internalization 
Sylvia T. Buse 
Southwest Missouri State University 
John C. McCullers 
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This article is based on the Ph.D. dissertation research of the 
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Abstract 
Two experiments are reported that attempted to replicate and extend 
Leont'ev's (1932) research on the role of external sign utilization 
in the development of the internal control of behavior. The aim of 
Experiment 1 was to disentangle the effects of rewards from those of 
external aids. Subjects at six age levels (4 to 85 years) responded 
to three series of questions: Series I, practice condition--no 
constraints; Series II, specified colors forbidden in replies; Series 
III, like Series II, but with external aids (Color Cards). Results 
supported Leont'ev's developmental trends, indicating that 8- and 9-
year olds were helped by memory aids; younger children and the el-
derly (70-85 years) were hindered by the aids; and older children 
(10-12 years) and young adults did not need them. Reward was found to 
be associated with increased response latencies. Since increased la-
tencies and improved performance were obtained with both rewards and 
aids, the next question was: Does the child's control of behavior de-
pend on using external signs and internalizing them or on the ability 
to inhibit initial responses? The subjects of Experiment 2 were third-
grade children whose responses were artificially delayed for either 
zero or 3 seconds, with and without aids. The results of the second 
study revealed that subjects speeded up their responses and made more 
errors in spite of external aids. The results of both studies were ex-
amined in the context of White's (1965) concept of temporal stacking. 
While rewards may serve to increase response latencies in this task and 
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thereby improve performance, merely slowing subjects' responses through 
an externally imposed temporal delay does not produce the reward ef-
fects observed in the first study. 
4 
Reward Effects and Response Latency in 
the Process of Internalization 
A question that has long intrigued Russian investigators is how 
children come to organize and control their behavior. Ivan Pavlov laid 
the foundation for the study of this phenomenon, which is essentially a 
question of how involuntary behavior is transformed into voluntary be-
havior. His work suggested that voluntary behavior is a result of ver-
bal planning that precedes overt action (Pavlov, 1928/1941) while in-
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voluntary behavior can be considered as non-directive and unintentional. 
Other Soviet researchers extended Pavlov's early studies and suggested 
that the transformation of biological reflexes into voluntary behavior 
is related to the development of attention (Leont'ev, 1932; Vygotsky, 
1929/1979; Yendovitskaya, 1971). 1 
Lev Vygotsky, a Russian psychologist of the 1920's, pointed out 
(e.g., Vygotsky, 1929/1979) the importance of biological, genetic, and 
cultural factors in the development of attention. He proposed that the 
development of voluntary behavior becomes possible only through the in-
dividual's ability to master and control stimuli. According to 
Vygotsky voluntary behavior emerges as a result of the use of various 
external stimuli by adults to guide and control the child's attention. 
In this way, adults give children a means by which they subsequently 
can control their own behavior. Thus, the stimuli originally meted 
out by parents become "internalized" by the child. The process where-
by external stimuli are reconstructed to internal thought processes 
has been called "internalization" by Vygotsky (1930/1978). Galperin 
(1967) described internalization as the process of forming inner mental 
processes--the "inner plane"--through utilization of stimuli from the 
external physcial environment. 
In the late 1920's, A. N. Leont'ev, one of Vygotsky's students and 
collaborators, explored a segment of this internalization process by 
researching the role of external signs in memory as these related to 
the process of transforming external signs into internal ones. He rea-
soned that providing children with an external aid in a task should fa-
cilitate their control of behavior. Consequently, he set up a situa-
tion where he could observe how subjects of various ages utilized ex-
ternal aids to organize their answers and subsequently reduce errors. 
In Leont'ev's original study (1932) the child was placed in a 
situation which required active concentration of attention and memory; 
the child was then offered a number of colored cards (external ob-
jects) which might serve as the "psychological means" to help the child 
in this activity. However, there also was another set of external 
stimuli in the study that Leont'ev did not consider in his interpreta-
tion of the results: "prizes for winning." Thus, the methodology of 
Leont'ev's study involved both material rewards and external aids such 
that it is not clear whether his results were due to the aids or the 
rewards or both. 
The present set of studies was designed both to correct this 
methodological problem (i.e., confounding rewards with aids) and to 
explore further the issue of how external cues become internalized. 
The need to resolve this question stems from more than historical cur-
iosity. The question of how external stimuli relates to the construc-
tion of an internal representation of the world continues to be of 
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interest and concern to present-day investigators, both in and out of 
the Soviet Union. For example, neurophysiological research is intent 
upon exploring the relationship of external and internal events to at-
tention (Pribram & McGuinness, 1980). A recent article by Kopp (1982) 
has indicated that the transition from external to internal control is 
influenced by both maturation and experiential processes, although the 
mechanisms underlying these processes remain to be explored. Several 
modern Soviet researchers have launched investigations into the nature 
of the internalization process. Galperin (1969) and El'konin (1972) 
have stressed the formation of internalized intellectual operations by 
stages. Other aspects of the internalization process in terms of the 
development of complex voluntary actions in the preschool child have 
been studied by Zaporozhets (1955/1957). 
The purpose of the present study was to reexamine the use of ex-
ternal aids more closely with three main questions in mind. First, 
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what is the effectiveness of external aids in remembering rules and 
colors? Second, what is the specific role of rewards in the internal-
ization process? That is, does reward enhance or interfere with the 
process? This question is important, particularly in view of the fact 
that extrinsic incentives have been found in recent years to produce 
adverse effects on human behavior and motivation (see, e.g., Lepper & 
Greene, 1978). Third, do rewards have the same effect at all age levels? 
For example, several recent studies investigating the capacity of ex-
trinsic rewards to undermine intrinsic interest have reported that 
rewards had a positive effect, rather than a detrimental effect, upon 
the interest and performance of young children (Loveland & Olley, 1979; 
McLoyd, 1979; Sarafino & Stinger, 1981). 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed, specifically, to disentangle the ef-
fects of rewards from those of memory aids and examine the effects of 
both on verbal behavior from a developmental perspective. Leont'ev's 
(1932) study was replicated with additional controls for reward ef-
fects. The age range was extended in both directions to include a pre-
school group and an elderly group in an effort to determine reward and 
aid effects more adequately and further identify developmental trends. 
Leont'ev's study. In Leont'ev's investigation, 30 subjects at 
four age levels, ranging from 5 to 27 years, were placed in a game-
like situation, which consisted of either three or four series of 
eighteen questions each, seven questions concerning color (e.g., "What 
color is lettuce?"). All four series were similar in difficulty and 
·each contained an equal number of color questions distributed in the 
same manner within the series. The first series constituted a "train-
ing" series and had no verbal constraints; the second series had two 
verbal constraints (i.e., the child was forbidden to use two colors and 
no color could be repeated); the third series was the same as the sec-
ond, but nine color cards were provided to assist the child in remem-
bering the rules and the colors that had been used. The fourth series 
of questions was similar to the third but essentially was a teaching 
condition, designed for those who could not determine how to use the 
cards. The child was given the opportunity to "win" a certain prize 
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if he/she did not name one of the "forbidden" colors or repeat a color 
name. At the end of each series of questions, the child was questioned 
to check his/her memory for the instructions. Table 1 presents the 
questions used in Leont'ev's original research and those of the pres-
Insert Table 1 about here 
ent study. 
Method 
Subjects. The subjects were 144 predominately white, middle- to 
upper middle-class individuals residing in Stillwater and Bartlesville, 
Oklahoma, both small cities with a high proportion of well-educated 
middle-class, professional people. There were 24 subjects at each of 
six age levels; preschool (mean age 4 years, 8 months), first grade 
(mean age= 6 years, 9 months), third grade (mean age= 8 years, 8 
months), sixth grade (mean age= 11 years, 9 months), college (mean 
age= 25 years, 8 months), senior citizens (mean age approximately 77 
years, 9 months; an exact mean age was not available since several of 
the elderly adults preferred not to give their age). Senior citizens 
averaged 10.46 years of education with a range of 4th grade to one year 
of graduate school. At each level, the subjects were assigned to 
either a reward or nonreward group, with 12 subjects per group. The 
preschoolers were drawn from the university nursery school; the ele-
mentary school children attended public and parochial grammar schools; 
college students were undergraduate and graduate psychology students 
who volunteered to participate; and the senior citizens attended a 
community Senior Citizens Center. The preschool and elementary school 
children who received rewards came from different schools than the non-
reward subjects to minimize communication regarding rewards. Compara-
9 
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bility of the two school systems was estimated by composite percentile 
scores obtained from SRA achievement series given at the third grade 
level. A t-test performed on these data yielded a nonsignificant dif-
ference, ~(19) = 1.76, between the public and parochial schools. One 
Down's Syndrome child and one other child who did not have a functional 
verbal knowledge of colors were dropped from the data analysis of the 
preschool group. 
Materials and design. As in Leont'ev's study, the task consisted 
of three series of eighteen questions; 2 nine color cards (red, blue, 
white, black, green, purple, brown, yellow, and gray) served as the ex-
ternal memory aids for the third series of questions. These were the 
same colors used by Leont'ev. The study followed a 6 (Ages) x 2 (Re-
ward vs. Nonreward) x 2 (Aids vs. No Aids) mixed factorial design in 
which Age, and Reward-Nonreward were between-subjects factors and Aids 
versus No Aids was a within-subjects factor. 
The questionnaires. The questions used in this study were essen-
tially the same as those in Leont'ev's study with slight modifications 
to make them appropriate to the 1980's and to make it possible to use 
the questions with preschool children. In each series, there were 
eleven general information questions that could be easily and quickly 
answered by the subject and seven questions concerning the color of an 
object. As in Leont'ev's study, only the color questions were scored. 
Procedure. The subjects were asked to play a kind of game in 
which they were to answer a set of questions without using certain 
words ("forbidden" colors). All subjects were presented three series 
of questions: (a) a baseline practice condition (Series I), aver-
bal constraint condition (Series II), and (c) an aid condition (Series 
III). Series II and III were presented under either reward or nonre-
ward conditions. The three series of questions were presented in a 
constant order, rather than counterbalanced across conditions; this 
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was done partly because Leont'ev had tested the questions used in each 
series and found them to be of equal difficulty, and partly to keep the 
present replication effort procedurally comparable to the original 
study. The subjects participated individually at their respective 
schools or Senior Citizens Center. 
In Series I, the questions had no verbal constraints, and no aids 
or rewards were used. The purpose of these questions was to establish 
rapport between subject and experimenter, to allow the subjects to gain 
practice with the type of questions to be used in the actual task con-
ditions, and to make certain each individual understood what was ex-
pected. These questions also provided a basis for comparing the ini-
tial performance of reward and nonreward groups under nonreward condi-
tions. The subjects were instructed to answer each question quickly 
and with one word. 
In Series II, the questions had two constraints: the subjects 
were instructed as before, but asked not to name specific colors in 
their replies (e.g., "Don't say blue and red") and also not to name 
the same color twice (e.g., "Don't repeat a color"). 
In Series III, the questions had the same constraints as Series 
II, but the subject was given the .nine color cards to use as aids in 
remembering the two "forbidden" colors and in remembering which colors 
had been used so as not to repeat a color. The instructions to the 
nonreward subjects were: "Take the cards, they will help you." In-
structions to the reward subjects were: "Take the cards, they will 
help you to win.'' No further instructions were given as to the use of 
the aid cards. 
Subjects in the reward group were offered a monetary reward or 
"prize" for Series II and anothet for Series III, provided that all 
questions in a series were answered correctly. The reward consisted 
of ten cents for the preschoolers and first graders, twenty-five cents 
for the third and sixth graders, and one dollar for the college stu-
dents and senior citizens. These variations in the amount of money 
given as a reward were made in an effort to make the reward somewhat 
psychologically comparable across ages. 
Instructions were repeated or paraphrased as necessary to ensure 
that the subjects understood them. After each series, the subjects 
were questioned to determine if they remembered and understood the di-
rections: "Do you think you have them all correct?" "What were the 
rules of the game?" "And, what else?" "Did the cards help you?" "In 
what way?" 
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The elapsed time between the presentation of the question and the 
subject's response was recorded in seconds by a stopwatch for the seven 
color questions in order to assess the relationship between response 
latency and performance. Vygotsky (1930/1978) believed that changes 
in memory and attention could be discerned in terms of the measurement 
of reaction time. For example, a longer reaction time in experiments 
where children utilize external aids indicated that the child was using 
the external means to accomplish the remembering. 
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Results 
Analysis of Error Data3 
Mean error scores for the thirty subjects in Leont'ev's study, all 
under reward conditions, and the present subjects are presented in Ta-
ble 2. Means and standard deviations are presented separately for each 
Insert Table 2 about here 
treatment (Reward vs. Nonreward) and memory aid (Aid vs. No Aid) con-
dition in Table 2 for the present subjects. 
An examination of Table 2 reveals that the developmental trends 
were quite similar in Leont'ev's and the present study, for the age 
groups represented in both studies. The present study showed a lower 
error rate than the original. The Leont'ev study revealed greater dif-
ferences between the aid versus no aid conditions than were found in 
the present study. 
The error scores were analyzed by a 6 (Ages) x 2 (Treatments: 
Reward vs. Nonreward) x 2. (Memory Aid Conditions: Aids vs. No Aids) 
factorial analysis of variance with the last factor being a within-
subjects factor. A significant effect of Age, !(5, 132) = 38.52, £ 
< .001, was revealed. Duncan's comparisons indicated that the pre-
schoolers and first graders and the elderly subjects made signifi-
cantly more errors than the sixth graders and college students. The 
level of significance was set at£< .05 for all Duncan comparisons. 
There was no significant main effect due to the presence or ab-
sence of aid cards; however, the interaction of Memory Aids with Age, 
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F(5, 132) = 2.72, £ < ~2, was significant. Duncan's multiple compari-
sons indicated that memory aids had a significant negative effect on 
the performance of preschoolers, first graders, and the elderly, a sig-
nificant facilitation at the third and sixth grade levels, and no ef-
fect at the college level. 
Rewarded subjects performed better overall than nonrewarded sub-
jects, but this difference fell short of significance, I(1, 132) 
2.87, E < .09. With the adult groups (college and elderly) removed, a 
significant reward facilitation effect was revealed for the four child 
groups, I(l, 88) = 7.55, E < .007. 
Role of Response Latency 
The latency data were analyzed via a three-factor analysis of var-
iance with repeated measures on one measure, where, again, Reward and 
Age were between-subjects factors and Memory Aid Condition was a within-
subjects factor. Separate analyses were performed using correct re-
sponse latencies and error latencies as scores. Correct response la-
tencies were based on the questions correctly answered out of a pos-
sible total of seven questions for each subject. Similarly, the error 
latencies were based on the time to first response for each question 
answered in error. 
Correct response latencies. Numbers of correct responses and cor-
rect response latencies in seconds are shown in Figure 1. Both re-
vealed a systematic increase through the sixth grade. The analysis of 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
variance of correct response latencies revealed an overall Memory Aid 
effect, IC1, 132) = 16.18, E < .001, due to the fact that subjects re-
sponded more slowly with aids than without. This analysis also indi-
cated that Age was significant, I(S, 132) = 4.51, £ <.01. Duncan's 
comparisons showed that the third and sixth graders responded more 
slowly than the preschool and first grade children. It is interesting 
to note that the first graders and the elderly did not differ from 
each other in correct response latencies. 
As found in the analysis of errors, Reward proved co be nonsigni-
ficant, I(1, 132) = 2.76, £ < .09, with all ages included in the anal-
ysis. With the older groups removed (college and elderly), a signifi-
cant effect of Reward emerged, I(1, 87) = 4.92, £ < .02; that is, re-
wards as well as aids, slowed the four child groups' responses. 
Error latencies. Numbers of errors and error latencies are pre-
sented in Figure 2. Error latencies (Figure 2) were consistently 
shorter than correct response latencies (Figure 1). An analysis of 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
variance on error latency data was not feasible because the numbers of 
subjects that made errors decreased as age increased such that only 
one subject in the college group made errors. However, with the older 
groups removed, a marginally significant effect for Aids was revealed, 
I(1, 52) = 3.39, E < .07, due to latencies being longer with aids. 
Sex Effects 
The sex factor was not analyzed in Leont'ev's original study and 
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for that reason the present data cannot be compared to Leont'ev's. 
Thus, sex was not a variable of interest in the present study. 
However, when separate analyses were performed with sex included as 
a factor, there were no significant sex effects in the analysis of 
error scores, and only one significant effect was found in the la-
tency analysis: the triple interaction of Sex, Age, and Treatment 
(Reward vs. Nonreward), f(5, 120) = 2.66, E < .02. Specific com-
parisons indicated that elderly males and sixth grade girls in the 
nonreward group were significantly slower in their correct responses 
than rewarded male college and elderly females. Further, since the 
ratio of males to females was quite unbalanced in some of the pres-
ent age groups, even the single sex effect reported here should be 
accepted with caution. 
Supplemental Analyses 
In order to examine the relationship of errors to speed of re-
sponding, correlations were computed between numbers or errors and la-
tency scores for each subject under No-Aid and Aid conditions. Signi-
ficant correlations were obtained between errors and correct response 
latencies under both No Aid, E(142) =-.51, £ < .01, and Aid, E(142) 
= -.46, E < .01, conditions; and between error and error latencies 
under No Aid, E(142) = .38, £ < .01, and Aid, E(142) = .37, E < .01, 
conditions. These relationships, observed in the combined data were 
also found in separate analyses at each age level, with one exception: 
at the college level under the aids condition, there was a nonsignifi-
cant positive correlation between errors and correct response laten-
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cies. 4 Thus, longer correct response latencies were associated with 
fewer errors, which suggested that accuracy increased when subjects 
took more time to respond. However, increased errors were associated 
with longer error latencies; this relationship may have been an arti-
fact of the small numbers of errors across all ages. 
Qualitative Data 
17 
It appeared that the use of aid cards during the task could be 
categorized into four essential patterns. The first of these was an 
inconsistent use of aid cards. This pattern essentially characterized 
the preschoolers and first graders. Occasionally the young child would 
begin by putting aside the blue and red cards, but would forget that 
she/he had done so. At other times, a child might use the cards 
merely to select a color (e.g., "I think I'll say red"), but the color 
chosen did not necessarily conform to the rules. The second pattern 
involved consistent use of cards with method evident. The third and 
sixth graders would usually spread out all the cards in front of them 
and first put aside the cards for the forbidden colors, and then put 
aside other cards as they used them in the "game." A third pattern oc-
curred where the use of cards was not always evident. Young adults 
looked at the cards, but did not always arrange or manipulate them 
overtly, as was observed with the third and sixth graders. The fourth 
pattern was one of card rejection. With the elderly group, the ma-
jority indicated that they did not wish to use the cards (e.g., "I 
can remember the colors"). However, a few subjects in this group 
did not discover how to use the cards effectively until the end of the 
series of questions. 
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Discussion 
In comparing the present study with Leont'ev's research, develop-
~ental trends remained the same across age, with the exception of the 
elderly group which was not represented in Leont'ev's study. The pres-
ent study showed a lower error rate than the original. 
On the general process of internalization, what emerged was es-
sentially four different patterns, the first three of which were en-
tirely consistent with Leont'ev's (1932) three stages: (1) where they 
cannot utilize the signs effectively; (2) where the external signs us-
age reaches a maximum; (3) where they respond to internally-produced 
stimuli and do not require signs. The present elderly data suggest 
that a fourth stage may occur among the aged in which they attempt to 
respond as though they were in Stage 3, but can no longer do so effec-
tively. 
Overall, in the present study, there was a tendency for the sub-
jects to make more correct responses than errors and a tendency for 
the latencies to increase with age. For the young adults, latencies 
dropped sharply and performance was nearly perfect, suggesting that 
the task was very easy for them. Prior to adulthood, there appears to 
be a trade-off between accuracy and speed, suggesting a potential con-
nection between the present research and work on reflective and impul-
sive response styles (e.g., Kagan, 1966). Errors tended to come from 
making responses relatively fast. This is understandable considering 
that the task required the subject to inhibit responses. Those sub-
jects who were unable to inhibit first responses would be more likely 
to make errors. Longer response times would allow an opportunity to 
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inhibit first-but-incorrect responses. 
The overall effect of reward was to increase latencies and reduce 
errors with or without the aid cards. This raised a question as to the 
development of verbal control and the role of aid cards in that process. 
That is, does the development of voluntary control depend on internal-
izing external signs as Vygotsky suggested, or on the ability of the 
child to inhibit early choices? This latter possibility would seem to 
be consistent in some ways with White's (1965) conception of competing 
responses arranged in zones along a time line. Impulsive behavior 
leads to first-available responses, while restraint is necessary to 
the production of second-available responses. 
If, in fact, rewards really have the effect of slowing down re-
sponses, then reward effects might be produced by devices that merely 
affect response latencies. Could a study be arranged to slow down the 
subject artificially? If so, could we replicate reward effects ob-
served in the present study? Experiment 2 was designed to investigate 
these questions. 
Experiment 2 
In order to explore the role of temporal factors, Experiment 2 
was conducted as a replication of Experiment 1, at one age level (third 
graders). Data from Experiment 1 indicated the third grade (8 to 9 
years) to be a critical time in terms of assimilating external aids. 
Vygotsky also viewed the eight-year old age as being critical for 
study, particularly as related to the internalization of spontaneous 
self-regulatory speech (see, e.g., Zivin, 1979). The procedure for 
Experiment 2 made use of two ·temporal delay intervals--immediate re-
sponse (zero-second delay) and response after a three-second delay. 
These two delay periods, zero and three seconds, were selected be-
cause the overall average difference between reward and nonreward 
groups in Experiment 1 was approximately three seconds. Thus, the 
central question of Experiment 2 was whether a three-second delay im-
posed externally would produce results similar to those found under 
reward. Reward was not manipulated in the second study. 
Method 
The instructions, materials, and procedures were the same as in 
Experiment 1, except for the modifications noted below. 
Materials 
Each of the three questionnaires was increased to twenty-four 
questions (ten questions in each set concerned with color), and twelve 
color cards (the nine colors used in Experiment 1 plus orange, pink, 
and tan) were used with Series III. The length of the questionnaires 
and the number of color questions were increased to reduce the possi-
bility of ceiling effects, since the results of Experiment 1 revealed 
a very high proportion of correct responses. 
Apparatus and Procedure 
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The apparatus consisted of two Hunter Timers (model 1275) and a 
Lionel miniature railroad semaphore powered by a standard six-volt bat-
tery used to signal each subject to respond to the question. At the 
end of the specific delay interval, the signal arm moved up and the 
light changed from red to green. 
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In the zero-second condition, the child's response would commence 
as soon as the question was asked. In the three-second condition, a 
three-second delay was required before the subject could respond to the 
question. In both cases, the subject was instructed: "\Jhen the sig-
nal goes up and the light turns green answer quickly with one word." 
The experimental session began with practice trials to acquaint the 
children with the railroad signal and continued until each child knew 
what to do. The number of practice trials varied from one to three 
per child. 
Subjects and Design 
A total of 63 children, ranging in age from 8 years, 6 months to 
9 years, 11 months with a mean of 9 years (18 boys and 16 girls) were 
drawn from third grade parochial elementary schools in Springfield, 
Missouri, and Bartlesville, Oklahoma. All subjects came from homes in 
predominately white, middle-class communities, with parents generally 
of above-average educational levels. A comparison of SRA achievement 
test scores for the third grade subjects yielded no significant dif-
f b h ' 'l '1 5 erence etween t e two parocnla scnoo s. The children were ran-
domly assigned to the two experimental conditions. The design repre-
sented a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed factorial model. Delay interval (zero-second 
vs. three-second delay) 6 and Sex were between-subjects variables and 
Memory Aid (aids vs. no aids) was a within-subjects variable. 
Results 
The mean numbers of errors and correct responses, and the means 
for correct response and error latencies and their standard deviations 
are presented in Table 3 separately for the Aid and No Aid conditions. 
Table 3 also shows for comparison purposes the data for the third 
Insert Table 3 about here 
grade children in Experiment 1. 7 From Table 3 it can be seen that the 
procedure of Experiment 2 had the effect of speeding up the subject's 
responses and reducing the number of correct responses relative to Ex-
periment 1. 
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Again, separate analyses of variance were performed on correct re-
sponse latencies, error latencies, and numbers of errors. The analysis 
of error data indicated that the zero- and three-second delay groups 
did not differ significantly in numbers of errors. The main effect for 
Memory Aids was significant, f(1, 30) = 5.90, £ < .02, indicating that 
the use of aids produced fewer errors. Not surprisingly, the three-
second delay group responded more slowly than the zero-second delay 
group, but not significantly so. The only significant effect in the 
analysis of correct response latencies was the interaction between De-
lay Interval and Sex, f(1, 30) = 8.26, £ < .007, which resulted from 
the tendency of girls in the zero-second group to respond more slowly 
than boys. No significant effects were found in the analysis of error 
latencies. 
Supplemental Analysis 
To investigate the possibilities of a relationship between speed 
of response and accuracy of response, correlations were computed be-
tween number of errors and latency scores of each subject. Significant 
correlations were obtained between errors and correct response laten-
cies, E(24) = -0.37, £ < .05; and errors and error latency, E(34) = 
-0.48, £ < .OS. Thus, at this age level making errors seems to be re-
lated to responding too quickly. A comparison of the correlations be-
tween number of errors and correct response time for the third graders 
in Experiment 1 with the third graders in Experiment 2 indicated that 
the proportion of correct responses definitely decreased for Experi-
ment 2 children. 
General Discussion 
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The results of the present experiments provide some answers to the 
questions initially posed. The developmental trends in the present 
data generally paralleled those originally reported by Leont'ev, namely 
that the efficient use of aids/external stimuli increased with age. 
However, in contrast to Leont'ev's study, the subjects in the present 
studies did not demonstrate as great a difference between the aid and 
no aid conditions. There is no obvious reason for this difference. 
Leont'ev's and the present research were conducted half a century apart 
in time and, as Wozniak (1972) has pointed out, there are many differ-
ences in research technique and style of conducting experiments in the 
two cultures (Russia and the United States) that could account for dis-
crepant findings. 
The present data contain some interesting implications concerning 
behavioral controls. For example, how shall we interpret the similari-
ties in performance between the first grade and the elderly subjects? 
The perhaps prevailing viewpoint is that observed similarities between 
young children and the elderly are superficial ones, and the underlying 
mechanisms at the two ages are different (Klahr, 1981; Werner, 1961). 
An alternative viewpoint emerging from the present data is that the 
performance of the elderly and young children is similar precisely be-
cause the "deep" or underlying mechanisms are the same. That is, in 
both cases, higher levels of cortical functioning may be absent for 
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two different reasons. In the younger children, the higher mechanisms 
have not yet developed, while in the elderly they may be in the process 
of decline. This suggests, in the case of the elderly, that once later 
maturing, higher cognitive functions begin to erode, the individual is 
forced to utilize those more enduring and ontogenetically prior capaci-
ties that remain. 
Of possible relevance in this context are the findings of Hasher 
and Zacks (1979), who indicated that cognitive processes lie along a 
continuum from "automatic" to "effortful" in terms of the attentional 
capacity required for the task. Automatic processes do not require 
effort, occur spontaneously and unintentionally (Posner & Snyder, 
1975); further, automatic processes are characterized as difficult to 
suppress when aroused, do not result of their own volition in storage 
of new information, may develop (under special conditions) with re-
peated practice (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977); they show little develop-
mental change and are perhaps genetically determined (Hasher & Zacks, 
1979). In contrast, effortful processes (e.g., imagery, rehearsal, 
organization, and memory strategies) are voluntary, decline with age, 
benefit from practice, show developmental change, require considerable 
attentional capacity, and show a wide range of individual differences 
(Hasher & Zacks, 1979). The Hasher and Zacks (1979) finding indicated 
that both the young and elderly had difficulty with processes involving 
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imagery and memory strategies but for different reasons--young children 
because they have not yet developed the skills (e.g., effortful, proc-
esses) and the elderly because the processes are in decline. Thus, 
Hasher and Zacks seem to offer developmental evidence which supports 
the present study findings of a similarity of performance in the young 
and elderly. 
A primary goal of this research was to disentangle the role of re-
wards and aids and examine their effects on verbal behavior. In Experi-
ment 2 it was hypothesized that imposing an external delay would slow 
the subjects' speed of response and possibly decrease errors; if so, 
then delay effects would resemble reward effects. However, the result 
of the artificially imposed delay was to decrease latencies and increase 
errors. Thus, merely manipulating the time factor externally does not 
replicate reward effects. Imposing specific external time constraints 
upon the subject does not appear to be the same as responding more 
slowly for internal reasons. Indeed, when the results of Experiment 2 
are viewed in relation to those of Experiment 1, it would appear that 
the introduction of an external control (miniature railroad signal) ef-
fectively converted the task into a reaction-time task. For this rea-
son, the question concerning the role of response latency, and ulti-
mately the role of rewards in the intenalization process, remains un-
answered. 
We find it interesting to consider the present results in light 
of White's (1965) concept of temporal stacking. White proposed a two-
factor theory consisting of an associative level that develops early 
in life and depends on simple associative learning, and a cognitive 
level that develops later, between 5 and 7 years of age. White con-
26 
sidered these two levels to be "temporally stacked," such that when a 
stimulus is presented, the ontogenetically prior associative level will 
be tapped first and, unless inhibited, will provide a response that may 
not be as effective as one from the later-developing and slower-to-
respond cognitive level. The young child must react at the associative 
level, but the older child and the adult can respond at either level. 
The distinction that White has drawn between these two levels meshes 
with Hasher and Zacks (1979) contention that attentional demands occur 
along a continuum from effortful to automatic processes. This dis-
tinction is also consistent with the regression model which holds that 
the older, more stable, genetically-based processes (e.g., automatic) 
do not change, but that the newer~ more sensitive cognitive processes 
(e.g., effortful) may regress to childlike habits of response. 
In White's view, behavior is organized in a temporally-stacked 
hierarchical structure derived from competing stimulus-response con-
nections. If White's idea were to be expanded to include a level of 
"evolutionary stacking," then what ~vhite has called Levels I and II 
could be considered Levels II anci III; a new Level I would then consist 
of innate behavior. White's concept of temporal stacking, from this 
liberalized perspective, could offer one possible explanation for the 
results of Experiment 2. That is, reward may cause the subject to 
shift from a predominately cognitive modality toward a more associa-
tive one, and thereby influence the way of reacting. The idea that re-
ward might produce such a developmental regression in the subject has 
recently been suggested by Fabes, Moran, and McCullers (1981). Such a 
viewpoint would be consistent also with the idea that the young child 
and the elderly subject may be under control of similar brain mechanisms. 
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There has been little interest in the concept of temporal stacking 
in recent years. However, one can see a logical connection here both 
to Luria's (1966) ontogenetic model of brain development and MacLean's 
(1978) phylogenetic model of the triune brain. Luria has identified 
three major units of the brain which develop in a hierarchical order 
at different times, while MacLean's model consists of three brains in 
one: the reptilian brain, the paleomammalian brain, and the neomam-
amlian brain. Thus, Luria's and MacLean's models indicate that those 
things that occur first in either ontogenetic or phylogenetic develop~ 
ment ought to be "stacked" in first. Anything that is done to the 
individual to inhibit first-stacked responses ought to increase the 
likelihood that later-developing, more mature responses will occur. The 
railroad signal in the present study had the unexpected effect of speed-
ing-up responding and increasing error. Nevertheless this result would 
still be consistent with a temporal stacking and regression conception 
in that faster responding leads to less mature behavior. 
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Many of the references to Soviet literature were first published 
in the 1930's in Russian journals and are just now appearing in the 
English language journals. In some cases, work that was never pub-
lished before is now appearing in English language translation, long 
after the author's death. For example, Vygotsky's definition of in-
ternalization cited here was taken from one of his essays: "Tool and 
Symbol in Children's Development" (1930), which has never been pub-
lished. The use of dual dates in the text and other devices in the 




The fourth series of questions in Leont'ev's study, used only for 
teaching purposes, was omitted in the present study. 
3 
Unless otherwise noted, all data were analyzed via ANOVAS using 
the BMD P2V computer package (Dixon, 1975). 
4 
The same relationship of errors and latency scores as reported 
for aids and no aids was also present for reward and no reward. 
5 
A t-test performed on these data yielded a nonsignificant differ-
ence, t(26) = 1.48, between the two school populations which suggested 
some compatibility between the two types of schools. 
6 
Repeated measures were not used in Experiment 2, since at this 
point it was not known whether the zero-second condition would have 
an interactive effect with the three-second condition; thus, the 
between-subjects design was used to control for this possibility. 
7 
The mean error scores were adjusted so that Experiment 1 data 
could be compared with those of Experiment 2. Specifically, the total 
number of correct responses on the color questions were divided by the 
total number of color questions. In Experiment 1, the total number of 
color questions was 7; in Experiment 2, it was 10. 
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Table 1 
Questions Utilized in Experiment 1 
Series 1: 
and A. N. 
a 
Leont'ev's Study 
Practice condition (No constraints) 
Do you like to draw? 
[Can you draw?] 
What color is a handkerchief? 
[What color is your handkerchief?] 
3. Did you ever go in an airplane? 
[Did you ever go in the tram?] 
(4.) What color is the airplane? 
[what color is the tram?] 
5. Do you like to study? 
[Do you want to study?] 
6. Did you ever go to a meeting? 
[Were you ever at a meeting?] 
7. Do you like books? 
[Do you like reading?] 
(8.) What color is the paper? 
[What color is the paper?] 





Do you play with games? 
[Do you play with toys?] 
Have you seen the ocean? 
[Have you seen the sea?] 
What color is the ocean? 
[What color is the sea?] 
13. Do you ever listen to music? 
[Did you ever listen to music?] 
14. Have you seen vegetables growing? 




What color is lettuce? 
[What color are cucumbers?] 
Do you like dogs? 
[Do you like dogs?] 
What color are cats? 





Table 1 (Continued) 
What 0o you do with a saw? 
[What does one do with a saw?] 
No aid condition ("Forbidden colors" were green and yellow) 
Have you a friend? 
[Have you a playmate?] 
What color is your shirt (blouse)? 
[What color is your shirt?] 
3. Did you ever go on a train? 
[Did you ever go in a train?] 
(4,) What color are the train engines? 
[What color are the railway carriages?] 
5. Do you want to be a bigger boy (girl)? 
[Do you want to be big?] 
6. Were you ever at the movies? 
[Were you ever at the theatre?] 
7, Do you like to play in your room? 
[Do you like to play in the room?] 
(8.) What color is the floor? 
[What color is the floor (generally)?] 
(9.) What color are the walls? 
[And the walls?] 
10. 
11. 




Do you write? 
[Can you write?] 
Have you seen violets? 
[Have you seen lilac?] 
What color is violet? 
[What color is lilac?] 
Do you like cookies? 
[ Do you like sweet things?] 
Were you ever in the mountains? 
[Were you ever in the country?] 
What color are leaves? 
[What colors c~n leaves be?] 
16. Do you swim? 




Table 1 (Continued) 
What is your favorite color? 
[What is your favorite color?] 
What do you do with a pencil? 
[What does one do with a pencil?] 
What do you think? Did you get them all right? What should you not 
have said? And what else? 
Series III: Aid condition ("Forbidden colors were blue and red) 
1. Do you sometimes take walks? 
[ Do you sometimes go for walks in the streets?] 
(2.) What color are the houses? 
[What colors are the houses?] 
3. Does the sun shine brightly? 
[Does the sun shine brightly?] 
(4.) What color is the sky? 
[What color is the sky?] 
5. Do you like candy? 
[Do you like candy?] 
6. Have you seen roses? 
[Have you seen ro·ses?] 
7. Do you like vegetables? 
[Do you like vegetables?] 
(8.) What color are tomatoes? 
[What color are tomatoes?] 
(9.) What color are notebooks? Tablets? 




Have you any toys? 
[Have you any toys?] 
Do you play ball? 
[Do you play ball?] 
What color are balls? 
[What colors are balls?] 
13. Do you live in the city (town)? 
[Do you live in the town?] 
14. Have you watched a parade? 
[Did you see the demonstration?] 
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(15.) 
Table 1 (Continued) 
What color are flags? 
[What color are flags?] 
16. Have you any books? 
(_Have you a book?] 
(17.) What colors are their covers? 
[What color is the book-cover?] 
18. When does it get dark? 
[When does it get dark?] 
What do you think? Did you get them all correct? What should you 
not have said? And what else? Did the cards help? Why 
aLeont'ev's (1932) original questions are given below the present 
study questions in brackets. 
bScored questions are given in parentheses. 
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Table 2 
Mean Numbers of Errors and Standa~d 
Deviations for Each Age Level by Reward 
and Aid Conditions, Shown With Leont'ev's (1932) 
Means for Comparison Purposes 
Present Study 
Reward Nont·eward 
Series II Series III Series II Series III 
A1;l" n (No Aid) S.D. (Aid) S.D. n (No Aid) S.D. (Aid) S.D. Age n 
4-5 years 12 3. 08 1.62 3.25 t.29 12 3.58 1.51 4.5 1.17 5-6 years 7 
6-7 years 12 1. 7 5 1.14 2.17 1.40 12 2.42 1.31 2.83 1.90 
8-9 years 12 1.08 o. 79 0.67 0.98 12 1. 50 1.09 1.08 1.31 8-9 years 7 
I0-12 years 12 0.75 0.62 0.50 1.00 12 1.00 0.95 0.83 1.47 10-13 years 8 
18-30 years 12 o. 50 0.90 o. 17 0.39 12 0.08 0.29 0.33 0.49 22-27 years 8 

















Mean Numbers of Responses and Mean Correct Response Latencies in seconds (Upper Table) 
Mean Numbers of Errors and Mean Error Latencies (Lower Table) 
for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (Adjusted Scores) 
Group 
a Aid No Aid n 
Correct Correct 
Correct Response Correct Response 
Responses so Latency so Responses so Latency so 
O-see 16 7.69 t. 85 5.58 6.42 6.87 !. 78 3.55 4.20 
3-SPC 18 8.22 1. 31 6.22 3.46 7.33 1.03 5.22 2.81 
Nonreward 12 8.45 1.87 10.73 4.84 7.98 1.66 7.74 3.00 
Reward 12 9.05 1.41 9.88 2.95 8.45 1.13 8.94 2.85 
Error Error 
Errors so Latency so Errors so Latency so 
O-see. 16 2.31 1.85 8.84 11.28 3.13 1. 78 (12) 4.35 5. 75 
3-sec 18 1. 78 1.30 9.67 10.29 2.67 1.03 (15) 7.4 7.29 
Non reward 12 (7)b 1.08 l· 31 6.48 4.24 1. 50 1.09 ( 11) 8.60 6.09 
Reward 12 (5) 0.67 0.98 11.97 10.17 1.08 0.79 (9) 9.78 7.0 
aThird-grade children only. 




Figure 1. Correct response data for Series II (No Aids) and III 
(Aids) under reward and nonreward conditions. The upper four curves 
show the mean correct response latencies in seconds (read against the 
,left-hand vertical axis) as a function of age. The lower four curves 
show the mean numbers of correct responses (read against the right-
hand axis) made by each age group. 
Figure 2. Error data for Series II (No Aids) and III (Aids) 
under reward and nonreward conditions. The upper four curves show 
the mean error latencies in seconds (read against the left-hand 
axis) as a function of age. The lower four curves show the mean 
numbers of errors (read against the right-hand axis) made by each 
age group. 
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Historical and Theoretical Perspective of Soviet Psychology 
The purpose of this section is to present the philosophical back-
ground within which Vygotsky's theory of internalization arose, and to 
discuss the concept of internalization as developed by Vygotsky, so that 
the Soviet research concerning this concept and the related American 
research can be evaluated in their proper context. 
Russian psychology has its roots in, and still derives its basic 
tenets from, dialectic materialism: 
"Materialism," that is the assumption that we have exact know-
ledge of a physical and psychological reality, which exists 
independently of man's perceptions of it; "dialectics," that 
is the notion that everything is in flux with no self-existent 
autonomous entities which are unchangeable. (McLeish, 1975, 
p. 264) 
The Russian psychologists have translated into concrete terms cer-
tain well-known philosophical propositions of Marxism-Leninism which 
indicate that the psychological .development of individuals follows a 
path that is social in origin (e.g., Luria, 1979; Vygotsky, 1929). 
They have built their psychology around the Marxist tenet that the 
human psyche is a reflection of an objective reality, in particular, 
the social environment. In Lenin's (1929) words: "Every concrete thing, 
every concrete something, stands in multifarious and often contradic-
tory relations to everything else; ergo it is itself and some other" 
(p. 124). Thus, Lenin (1909) proposed that the psyche is the property 
of the most highly organized form of matter--the brain--and that the 
psyche is a reflection of external reality. 
In order to have a respect for~ and an understanding of, Soviet 
psychology, one must remember that there is a two-fold requirement for 
the psychologist: first, that Soviet psychology be based philosophi-
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cally on dialectical materialism; and secondly, that it be based on Ivan 
Pavlov's (1928) physiology of the higher nervous activity. That is, 
Soviet psychology seems to have as its foundation two basic pillars--
on one pillar rest the teachings of Marx (e.g., 1906-1909), Engels 
(1940), and Lenin (e.g., Lenin, 1929); on the other, the work of 
Sechenov (e.g~, Sechenov, 1863/1942) and Pavlov (e.g., Pavlov, 1928). 
The Russian school of objective psychology essentially derives its 
beginnings from Sechenov (1935/1973). The study of voluntary activity 
can be directly traced to Sechenov's analysis of reflex activity. His 
approach may have been the first plan for an objective psychology, if 
we consider that it was an investigation of the integral reflex-like 
mental process by means of an objective method in a system of inter-
action between organism and environment (Yaroshevski, 1968). From 
Sechenov's work came the foundation for Ivan Pavlov's experiment with 
dogs. Central to Pavlov's approach was the assumption that both animal 
and human behavior are evoked by an elementary system of signals (or 
stimuli) called by Pavlov (1928) the primary signal system. Pavlov 
also talked about a secondary signal system (not verified by Pavlov's 
research) that is based on the primary system and eventually comes to 
maturity in the human. To quote from Luria and Yudovich (1971): 
The transition from the animal world to the stage of man 
signifies the introduction of a new principle of develop-
ment. At the animal stage, the development of higher 
nervous process in each species is the outcome of indi-
vidual experience, but with the transition to man, the 
basic form of mental development becomes the acquisition 
of the experience of other people through joint practice 
and speech. (p. 22) 
Vygotsky entered upon the scene in 1928 with a cultural-historical 
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theory, adapted from Blonsky's statement that the "theory of behavior 
should be a theory of the history of behavior'' (cited in Rahmani, 1973, 
p. 38). Thus, Vygotsky (1929) formulated his primary thesis: 
In the process of developmertt the child not only masters 
the items of cultural experience, but the habits and forms 
of cultural behavior, the cultural methods of reasoning. 
We must, therefore, distinguish the main lines in the de-
velopment of the child's behavior. First, there is the 
line of natural development of behavior which is closely 
bound up with the processes of general organic growth and 
the maturation of the child. Secondly, there is the line 
of cultural improvement of the psychological function, 
the working out of new methods of reasoning, the mastering 
of the cultural methods of behavior. (p. 415) 
Vygotsky extended his theory by incorporating and extending 
Engels' notion of mediation by tools to mediation by signs. For ex-
ample, Engels (1940) writes: 
When after thousands of years of struggle the differen-
tiation of hand from foot, and erect gait, were finally 
established, man became distinct from the monkey and 
the basis was laid for the development of the brain 
that has since made the gulf between man and monkey an 
unbridgeable one. The specialization of the hand--
this implies the tool, and the tool implies specific 
human acitivty, the transforming reaction of man on 
nature, production. (p. 17) 
Vygotsky, along with Rubinstein, played a prominent role in thenew 
psychology movement (beginning in the 1930's and evolving into what is 
essentially the nucleus of the contemporary Soviet approach to thought, 
language, memory, etc.) which attempted to define man primarily as a 
conscious and active being. Their postulates were manifested mainly in 
the field of mental development of the child which was one of the major 
foci of the Soviet psychologists in the 1920's and 1930's. 
Another psychologist, Alexander Luria, had been working at the 
Institute of Psychology in Moscow and met Vygotsky in Leningrad in 1924 
at a psychological Congress. After the meeting, Luria invited Vygotsky 
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to join Leont'ev and himself at the Institute of Moscow. They planned 
the development of psychological science together and talked about what 
direction psychology should take in this cooperative venture. 
When Vygotsky, Luria and Leont'ev joined forces world psychology 
was in a state of confusion. Psychology was divided into two isolated 
fields. In one area, there was the research of Pavlov and Bekhterev on 
the physiological mechanisms that underlie behavior, and on the other, 
the more complex forms of man's conscious mental activity, such as ab-
stract thinking, deliberate remembering, and voluntary attention. 
At this point in time, Vygotsky provided a theoretical perspective 
to the problem. He put forth the idea that even the most complex psy-
chological processes are based on the combination of elementary re-
flexes, but he felt that attempts to reduce mental activity to a system 
of reflexes was not the logical way to proceed (Rahmani, 1973). 
This triad of Russian psychologists, Leont'ev, Vygotsky, and 
Luria (known as the "troika"), have embodied Lenin's and Engels' princi-
ples in expounding their theories and were early advocates of combining 
experimental cognitive psychology with neurology and physiology. They 
have essentially laid the foundation for a unified behavioral science. 
In sum, then, an understanding of Soviet psychology presupposes an 
appreciation of the basic philosophical social positions on which it is 
founded. (Although Soviet psychology functions within the constraints 
of the Bolshevik interpretation, Soviet writings and research can be 
evaluated without reference to their background; nonetheless, they are 
an integral part of the general striving toward the development of a 
materialistic psychology.) There appears to be a distinct interrela-
tion between the philosophical and specific theoretical and experi-
mental approaches in Soviet psychology. Vygotsky's postulates sub-
stantiate this point. The development of his thoughts in terms of 
the role of "signs" in human development directly emerged from his 
goal in attempting to overcome mechanistic tendencies in the Russian 
psychology of the 1920's and formulate a theory based on Engels' 
(1940) proposition that man changes as a result of tool using. Marx 
(1906-1909) also emphasized tool use and wrote: 
An instrument of labour is a thing, or complex of things 
which the labourer interposes between himself and the 
subject of his labour, and which serves as the conductor 
of his activity •.•• The use and fabrication of instru-
ments of labour, although existing in the germ among 
certain species of animals, is specifically character-
istic of the human labour-process, and Franklin there-
fore defines man as a tool-making animal. (pp. 199-200) 
Further, the modification of Vygotsky's theses by Galperin (1969 ), 
Leont'ev (1972/1979, 1981), and Luria (1961) led to the development 
of new theories. 
The Russian school of psychology, then, took its lead from 
Sechenov's work in voluntary activity and inhibition, continued with 
Vygotsky, and was substantiated by Alexander Luria until his death 
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in 1977. Closely linked with this physiological-theoretical-scientific 
framework developed by Luria· and Vygotsky is the question of the 
psychological development of the child. The psychology of development 
is based on Pavlov's principle of the uniting of internal and external 
conditions. Training and education become particularly important in 
the scheme of operations underlying the moral and intellectual develop-
ment of the child. 
The problem of the relationship between thought and speech in the 
organization of behavior constitutes the central area of research for 
Soviet psychology, since communication is the crux of socialization. 
Summary of Soviet Perspective in Contrast to Western View 
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Several areas are primarily focused upon Soviet theory (Payne, 
1968): (1) Soviet theory is first and primarily, particularly since 
the Pavlov movement, a developmental-learning-experimental theory. 
Thus, warm-up and training procedures are central aspects of any exper-
iment. Western psychology, in contrast, has tended to view warm-up as 
a routine brief procedure, aimed at assuring minimal comprehension of 
the task at hand for the subject. In replications of Soviet research 
by American psychologists, differences in warm-up and preliminary train-
ing could prove to be a source of difficulty. (2) Soviet theory is al-
so a theory of language function. The experimenter must consider his 
use of language with the child a significant part of the experiment. 
The experimenter's language in the instruction is as important as the 
child's own language in responding to the task. Western psychology, 
however, has tended to view instructions to the child as something 
given once at the beginning of an experiment as a means of conveying 
at one time all of the information the child will need for the entire 
procedure. Instructions often are lengthy and difficult for the child 
to remember. If internalization of instruction is a crucial factor in 
the development of verbal regulation of behavior, complex instructions 
given only initially might well fail to have the desired effect. The 
examiner's instructions, external to the child, are viewed by Luria 
and others as a conceptual tool which the child can eventually intern-
alize and use as a means of self-control. (3) Lastly, Soviet theory is 
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an adult-interaction theory, and this, coupled with a general orientation 
to the clinical-neurological method, allows freedom for the experimenter 
to explore the behavioral dynamics of an individual in an undefined man-
ner. Western psychologists view this clinical method in the experimental 
situation as a weakness since input to subject is not standardized or 
easily quantified. Statistical treatment of data is just beginning to be 
utilized in Soviet studies. Additionally, Soviet psychologists have lit-
tle to do with and have little appreciation of psychological tests of 
intelligence, aptitude, and achievement, etc., which, in some respects, 
may account for their more qualitative approach in contrast to the more 
quantitative approach of American psychologists (e.g., Reitan & Davison, 
1974). 
There appear to be three established main trends and an emerging 
fourth trend in current Soviet psychology (O'Connor, 1966): (1) Pavlo-
vian studies of conditioning as related to higher central nervous func-
tions; (2) studies of the verbal control of behavior emanating from 
Vygotsky's findings; (3) Georgian "set" theory based on Uznadze's work 
(a special school of personality theory centered around the set as in-
clination directedness, and readiness to perform an act leading to the 
fulfillment of a need); (4) the application of statistical and cybernetic 
techniques. 
Soviet psychologists, in their study of human behavior, lay stress 
on the role of the social environment which is what investigators in 
the West might call social psychology, except there is an empahsis upon 
the historical (developmental) approach, both phylogenetically and 
ontogenetically. Additionally, Leont'ev's theory of activity provides 
the framework within which most of the psychological research is ac-
complished (Wertsch, 1979, 1981). In the Soviet perspective, goal-
directedness plays an important role in the deciphe~ing of behavior. 
Soviet psychologists criticize the American researchers for not con-
sidering the goals in conjunction with the actions of the child. All 
in all, it appears that the direction of psychological research in the 
U.S.S.R. is not too different from our own, except for their emphasis 
on consciousness and higher nervous activity within a developmental 
perspective. 
The Concept of "Internalization" 
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Vygotsky's concept of internalization possibly originiated in the 
French school of sociology, where Durkheim and Mauss (1963) considered 
that the basic mental processes are not the results of the inner spirit 
or of evolution, but rather find their origins in society. This con-
ception suggested that even such simple behaviors as telling time are 
the result of man's social experience and are dependent on social con-
sciousness. This viewpoint meshes with the idea of Fichte (1922), 
that the external world is merely the product of one's ego. More re-
cently, Leont'ev (1972/1974-1975) had indicated that "internalization, 
by which external actions are transformed into internal actions, is 
made possible by the similarity of structure of internal and external 
activities" (p. 21). 
Other authors have examined the problem of internalization or the 
transfer of external stimuli to an internal level. Kretschmer (1925) 
viewed the law of nervous acitivty in terms of the process. Watson 
(1924/1970) hypothesized that thought was a direct conversion of overt, 
external processes to covert, internal ones; that is, "verbal behavior-?> 
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whisper-~ totally unvoiced behavior. Thereafter he carries the world 
around with him by means of this inner organization" (Watson, 1924/ 
1970, p. 234). Piaget (1973) stressed the role of internalization in 
terms of symbolic functions: "Thus the symbolic function makes this 
interiorization of actions possible or at least strengthens it consid-
erably" (p. 74). The question of how this process occurs from the sen-
sory level to the higher mental functions has not been resolved. Tolman 
(1932) has indicated that the effects of external influences depend on 
the psychological intervening variables that are associated with the 
person's inner states. 
In the Soviet realm, the concept of internalization probably had 
its origins in Herbert Spencer's (1895) hypothesis which involved a 
duality of factors: the external influences of the environment and 
their modification by the neuropsychological organization. In Spencer's 
(1895) words: " ••• The conception of life itself, as the continuous ad-
justment of inner relations to outer relations--a conception which was 
found to include at once the phenomena of bodily life and the phenomena 
of mental life--introduces us to an entire agreement between the gen-
eral aspect of mental phenomena as objectively considered, and the gen-
eral aspect of mental phenomena as subjectively considered" (p. 505w). 
Drawing on Spencer's ideas, Sechenov (1935/1973) set the stage for his 
study of mental processes as related to external factors (or the proc-
ess of internalization): 
If Spencer's hypothesis of the duality of the factors of 
evolution is true, then the neuro-psychical organisation 
of man can be influenced, during the whole course of its 
evolution, only by external factors; under the action of 
these, the reactions (and thereby the structure) of this 
qrganisation must change, giving birth to thought in all 
its complexity, i.e., with all its various objects, 
with its progress from the concrete to the abstract, 
from the general to the special, from the sphere of 
sensory facts to that of extra-sensory contemplations, 
etc. Consequently, the possibility of the transforma-
tion of impression into thought (both in form and con-
tents) must be present either in one of the above men-
tioned main factors of mental development of thought, 
or in their interaction. Further, if it is true that 
the process of mental evolution follows the laws of 
organic evolution, then the transformation of sensa-
tion into thought must be limited to a disintegration 
of homogeneous impressions into their elements and the 
re-combination of these elements into groups. In 
other words, either the neuro-psychical organization, 
or the external influence or, finally, the cooperation 
of both factors must contain the conditions that are 
necessary for the analysis and synthesis of whole or 
partial impressions. (p. 420) 
According to Sechenov (1935/1973), then, the muscle serves as a 
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tool connecting the subject with an object in the world, such that sen-
sations of the world are essentially converted into thought. Thus, 
Sechenov demonstrated for the first time in the history of world 
thought, that sensory signals sent by the muscles reflect space, time, 
and movement forms of the world (Yaroshevski, 1968). 
Sechenov's study of reflex activity and subsequently the differen-
tiation of sensation and thought essentially served as the foundation 
for Pavlov's (1928) concept of internal inhibition versus external in-
hibition, which further laid the foundation for Vygotsky's scheme of 
internalization: 
By the great difference in facts we were compelled to 
assume in the work on the cerebral hemispheres two dif-
ferent kinds of inhibition, and we called them "external" 
and "internal." The former appears in our conditioned re-
flex at once; the second develops in time and is gradu-
ally elaborated. (p. 339) 
From the psychological perspective, Pavlov (1928) based all forms 
of behavioral responses on the principle of relations between two op-
posing processes--excitation and inhibition. He indicated that the 
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behavior of the organism is dependent upon the balancing of the proc-
esses of excitation and inhibition to the various objects of the exter-
nal world. 
These concepts of inhibition versus excitation led the concept 
of the "second"-signal system which Pavlov designated as specific to 
man and constituted the symbolic representation of environmental stim-
uli (i.e., language), whereas, in the "first"-signal system environ-
mental stimuli, through conditioning, come to signal other stimuli. The 
sum total of all these relationships, or as Pavlov has called them, 
"signals of signals," constitute the second signal system. 
Vygotsky utilized this duality of factors, as represented by the 
internal environment and external environment and expounded by Sechenov 
and Pavlov, to create his theory of internalization. Whereas Sechenov 
(1935/1973) postulated a genetic approach to psychological processes 
based upon the processes of evolution, Vygotsky decided to go beyond 
the naturalistic study of man's mental processes and to interpret these 
processes as the product of socio-historical development. The idea 
that man is not only a product of his environment, but also an active 
agent in the creation of the environment became the cornerstone of his 
psychological methodology. An important means inthis quantification 
was his theory of internalization which professed that the source of 
man's mental life is external to the individual and consists of the 
"internalization" of signs (e.g., speech) as a means of community in-
teraction. Vygotsky (1960/1979, 1981) indicated that "external" means 
"social" (p. 162). 
Vygotsky has been credited with introducing the psychological con-
cept of internalization into the mainstream of Soviet psychology, al-
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though the hypothesis that thinking essentially consists of an internal-
ization of external acts of behavior was developed by Galperin (1969), 
a member of Vygotsky's school. Also, Rubinstein (cited in Leont'ev, 
1972/1979, 1981) expressed it as follows: ''External causes act through 
internal conditions'' (p. 42). Vygotsky (1929) used the notion of in-
ternalization to mean the internalization of social processes, that is 
social interaction provides the control of what is to be internalized. 
Vygotsky (1960/1979, 1981) formulated the general genetic law of cul-
tural development as follows: 
Any function in the child's cultural development appears 
twice, or on two planes. First it appears on the social 
plane, and then on the psychological plane. First it ap-
pears between people as an interpsychological category, 
and then within the child as an intrapsychological cate-
gory. This is equally true with regard to voluntary at-
tention, logical memory, the formation of concepts, and 
the development of volition. We may consider this posi-
tion as a law in the full sense of the word, but it goes 
without saying that internalization transforms the proc-
ess: itself andchanges its structure and functions. 
Social relations or relations among people genetically 
underline all higher functions and their relationships. 
Hence, one of the basic principles of volition is that 
of the division of functions among people, the new di-
vision into two parts of what is not combined into one. 
It is the development of a higher mental process in the 
drama that takes place among people. Therefore, the 
sociogenesis of higher forms of behavior is the basic 
goal toward which the child's cultural development leads 
us. (p. 163) 
According to Leont'ev (1972/1979, 1981), Vygotsky was led to the 
concept of internalization from his analysis of Engels' (1940) idea 
that human production in terms of labor was mediated by tools. 
Vygotsky (1930/1978b), then, wrote: "The tool's function is to serve 
as the conductor of human influence on the object of activity; it is ex-
ternally oriented; it must lead to changes in objects. It is a means 
by which human external activity is aimed at mastering and triumphing 
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over nature. The sign, on the other hand, changes nothing in the ob-
ject of a psychological operation. It is a means of internal activity 
aimed at mastering oneself; the sign is internally oriented'' (p. 55). 
Bear in mind that although Vygotsky focused upon the significance 
of cultural influences in cognition, he conceived of development as a 
complex intertwining of both biological aspects of behavior and socio-
historical requirements of an individual's culture (1960/1978). In the 
attempt to determine what forms of activity underlie man's mental de-
velopment, Vygotsky specifically focused upon auxiliary means (espe-
cially language) in social interaction. Vygotsky (cited in Cole, 
John-Steiner, Scribner, & Souberman, 1978, p. 127) provided many ex-
amples of auxiliary stimuli, particularly from nonindustrialized soci-
eties: 
Counting fingers was once an important cultural triumph 
of humankind. It served as a bridge between immediate 
quantitative perception and counting. Thus, the Papuas 
of New Guinea began to count with the pinky of their 
left hand, follow through with the remaining left hand 
fingers, then add the left hand, forearm, elbow, shoul-
der, and so on, finishing with the pinky of the right 
hand. When this was insufficient they often used another 
person's fingers, or their own toes, or sticks, shells, 
and other small portable objects. In early counting sys-
tems, we may observe in developed and active form the 
same process that is present in rudimentary form during 
the development of a child's arithmetical reasoning. 
Similarly, the tying of knots as a reminder not to 
forget something is related to the psychology of every-
day life. A person must remember something to fulfill 
some request, do this or that, pick up some object. 
Not trusting his memory and unwilling to go by it, he 
often ties his hanky into a knot or uses a similar de-
vice, such as sticking a little piece of paper under 
the cover of his pocket watch. Later on, the knot is 
supposed to remind him of what he was supposed to do. 
And, this device often successfully carries out that 
function. 
Here, again, is an operation that is unthinkable 
and impossible in the case of animals. In the very fact 
of the introduction of an artificial auxiliary means of 
memor~z~ng, in the active creation and use of a stimulus 
as a tool for memory, we see a principally new and spe-
cifically human feature of behavior. (p. 127) 
Vygotsky applied a series of tasks to people of different ages to 
indicate how an external activity is transformed into internal opera-
tion. "The internalization of socially rooted and historically devel-
oped activities is the distinguishing feature of human psychology, the 
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basis of the qualitative leap from animal to human psychology. As yet, 
the barest outline of this process is known." (1930/1978b, p. 57). 
Vygotsky's theory appeared compatible with the tradition of Marx 
and Engels, in that the mechanism of individual developmental change is 
rooted in society and culture. Although Vygotsky's views were signifi-
cantly more progressive and nearer to a Marxist understanding of mental 
development than were those of the reflexologists and the behaviorists 
in the late twenties, his theories were severely criticized by the 
Scientific-Research Sector of the Academy of Communist Education on 
three counts: "(1) the divorce of higher mental functions from their 
biological hearitage (mediated memory, attention, etc.); (2) the disre-
gard of specific age periods in children's development; (3) an un-
Marxist consideration of the process of historical development, not 
taking into account the concrete character of social formation, class 
struggle, etc." (El'konin, 1966/1967, p. 38). 
In sum, Wertsch (1979, 1981) points out that Vygotsky's theory re-
lies on three main factors: (1) he constantly depends on developmental 
explanation; (2) he develops the theme of the interrelation of cognitive 
functioning and social interaction; and (3) he analyzes the importance 
of the role played by mediational means in his framework. 
Vygotsky's most important contribution lies in his method of ex-
perimental-genetic research, which presented a model for the study of 
human behavior, specifically the mental functions and processes from 
an historical perspective. In order to trace the development of the 
higher mechanisms of attention, the experimental-genetic method was 
used. This method involves an experimental situation in which the 
child is confronted with the task of mastering two sets of stimuli: 
one set is the primary set that has to be mastered and the other is an 
auxiliary set that could serve as a tool for mastering the primary 
set. This kind of experiment can be found in the writings of A. N. 
Leont'ev (e.g., 1932). 
Leont'ev expanded upon Vygotsky's "internalization" theory in 
order to have it more completely mesh with Marx's tenets and he also 
developed the theory of activity. Leont'ev (1972/1979, 1981) declared 
that a social history of the mind should begin with Marx's (1906-1909) 
philosophy that the mastery of a certain class of tools is tantamount 
to the development of a certain group of abilities. It follows, then, 
that since an individual is exposed during the course of development 
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to a world of objects, it is reasonable to assume that he assimilates 
the mental process and abilities realized in the world of objects. The 
development of the mind, then, consists of the internalization of the 
material and the spiritual objective products of human activity. 
Leont'ev (1972/1979, 1981) further argues that " .•. neither the exter-
nal world nor the person is solely responsible for developing knowledge 
about the world" (p. 38). He postulates that the key to the internali-
zation process is the activity in which that person engages. The con-
cept of activity, thus, plays a significant role in Soviet psychology. 
Wertsch (1979, 1981) indicates that Leont'ev's most important contri-
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bution to Soviet psychology is his levels of analysis hypothesis, where-
by human activity can be analyzed in terms of three different levels, 
that is, a level of activity, a level of actions with their associated 
goals, and a level of operations. Hence, Leont'ev is analyzing the 
process, not objects. 
Leont'ev's (1972/1979, 1981) concept of internalization can be 
briefly summarized in terms of the relationship between external and 
internal types of activity: 
Internalization is the term applied to the transition that 
results in the conversion of external processes with ex-
ternal material objects into processes carried out on the 
mental plane, on the plane of consciousness. In the tran-
sition these processes often undergo specific transforma-
tions--they are generalized~ verbalized, abbreviated; 
most importantly, they can be developed further. This 
last factor allows them to exceed the limitations of ex-
ternal activity. (p. 55) 
More recently, Leont'ev (1972/1979, 1981) has indicated that 
"these transitions are possible only because external and internal 
activity share a common structure. To me the discovery of this com-
mon structure represents one of the most important discoveries in 
modern psychology. Internal activity, which has arisen out of external, 
practical activity, is not separate from it and does not rise above it; 
rather it retains its fundamental and two-way connection with it" (p. 58). 
A Review of Soviet Research as Related to Internalization 
Now let us turn to more recent history in terms of the research on 
the process of internalization. Recent research regarding internaliza-
tion has followed Vygotsky's experimental approach, that is, studying 
the mental process by breaking it down into different units or levels. 
For example, Leont'ev (1972/1979, 1981), who has followed up Vygotsky's 
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theory, has indicated that activity consists of three levels: activi-
ties, actions, and operations. These levels allow the researcher to 
analyze units of behavior from these three levels of activity. Western 
researchers have been particularly apt in doing this, but unlike the 
Russians who fit their research into Vygotsky's developmental frame-
work, Western psychologists do not have any one framework within which 
to view their results. Additionally, Western psychologists essentially 
have studied the levels of analysis concerned with operations and have 
tended to exclude the levels of analysis concerned with actions and 
activities (Wertsch, 1979, 1981). Although the Soviet psychologists 
study memory, attention, and motivation as separate factors, they are 
purviewed within the context of internalization theory. According to 
Leont'ev (1959/1964), we can study these processes only if we consider 
that: 
Changes do not occur independently of one another but 
[are] intrinsically connected with one another. In 
other words, they do not represent independent lines 
of development of the various processes (perception, 
memory, thinking, etc.) ..•• For example, the de-
velopment of memory creates an associated series of 
changes, but the need for them is not determined by 
the relationships occurring within the development 
of memorizing itself but by relationships depending 
on the place which memory occupies in the child's 
activity at the given level of its development. (p. 184) 
Thus, the following review will focus on the different units that con-
tribute to the total internalization process with the main emphasis on 
memory and attention. But, bear in mind the "interrelation of the 
development of one facet of mental life with that of its other facets" 
(Smirnov, 1966/1973, p. 319). The question of the interactions of mem-
ory with thought, then, constitutes a very significant task for pscyholo-
gists. First, we shall briefly scan the overall area of Soviet memory 
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research, then turn to specific memory research as related to external 
memonic aids with Leont'ev as the primary investigator. Finally, we 
shall attempt to relate reward to the total process. Smirnov (1966/ 
1973) writes: "There is no doubt that of greatest importance is the 
dependence of mental processes on the external causes which have evoked 
them. But there is also no doubt that the very important role of ex-
ternal effects, if correctly understood, presumes an interrelation of 
the mental processes themselves" (p. 319). 
Memory Studies: A General Overview 
Among the leading contributors to Soviet research regarding memory 
are Leont'ev (1932), Blonsky (1935/1964), Zankov (1951/1957), Smirnov 
(1966/1973), Istomina (1948/1975), and Smirnov and Zinchenko (1969). 
The Soviet view of memory emphasizes the subordination of actions 
to new goals so that the actions become operations in the service of 
accomplishing intentional goals, such as remembering (Meacham, 1977). 
Vygotsky (1960/1979, 1981) views the development of memory as similar 
to the development of the higher psychological functions. According 
to Vygotsky every higher mental process first passes through an ''ex-
ternal" or "social" stage of development, then it is manifested psycho-
logically; that is, it becomes intrapsychological (p. 163). Vygotsky's 
experiments have shown that the development of memory proceeds gradu-
ally undergoing transition from the initial, "natural" stage of memory 
to its higher psychological forms. For example, in one experiment with 
eight-year old children, each child was given several pictures and 
asked to press a specific button for each picture presented. Results 
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showed that the children made many errors since it was almost impossible 
for them to remember which button matched which picture. In a follow-
up experiment to facilitate their remembering, the children were given 
external means. The external aids consisted of another set of pictures 
which had to be associated with the pictures pasted on the correspond-
ing buttons. The children were able to make this association accurately 
since each pair of pictures was related by meaning (e.g., horse to 
sleigh, etc.); however, a younger child might simply assimilate the 
stimulus into his already learned chain of associations. For example, 
if "sleigh" was the reminder, then the child might respond by associ-
ating "snow" with "horse." When the experiments were repeated, the 
child's responses increased in speed. Vygotsky explains this result 
as being due to the fact that the child is no longer using external 
means (e.g., pictures) for his responses. Hence, the child's re-
sponse mechanism has changed; that is, the remembering has been "in-
ternalized." Development thus proceeds from an external operation by 
means of external stimuli that act indirectly (pictures) to an in-
ternal operation which does not require such stimuli (Vygotsky, 1960/ 
1979, 1981). At later ages (e.g., 10 years) then, the children could 
virtually create their own aids so that any auxiliary aid might be ef-
fective in facilitating memory. 
Other researchers, Zaporozhets, Zinchenko, and El'konin (1971) indi-
cated that memory depends on the character of the child's interaction 
with the surrounding environment. In the preschool age, remembering and 
recalling are achieved during the process of socializing with an adult 
and are primarily found in the form of recognition. 
In a series of experiments, Smirnov (1966/1973) compared subjects 
from preschool to adulthood in terms of involuntary and voluntary mem-
ory tasks. (Involuntary memory, as used here, means incidental, i.e., 
the child remembers without setting remembering as a specific goal, 
whereas voluntary memory is intentional.) Smirnov noted a strong 
trend in the direction of decreased relative efficiency of involuntary 
memory with increasing age. Smirnov's explanation was that comprehen-
sion of given material is easier for the older subject; thus, less 
intellectual activity is directed toward understanding and hence less 
effective involuntary memory. 
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As a result of other experiments focusing upon the role of under-
standing and memory, Smirnov (1966/1973) criticizes the idea that young 
children memorize mechanically. He found that the relative advantage of 
meaningful material decreases with age; older subjects are better able 
to give meaning to non-meaningful material. His experimental data sup-
port Leont'ev's contention that the specific activity is the key to 
understanding the process; that is, material directly concerned with the 
basic goal of an action is recalled better than material concerned with 
the condition for attaining a goal (Smirnov & Zinchenko, 1969); it is 
very important to take into consideration the way the subject interacts 
with the information. The idea that material that serves as the goal 
of an action is remembered better than material that is a part of the 
conditions for attaining a goal is based on Smirnov's (1945, 1948) re-
search. (Research by Zinchenko [1962/1979, 1981] resembles American 
studies concerned with the "levels of processing" hypothesis [e.g., Craik 
& Lockhart, 1972]. This research has attempted to show that when verbal 
material is processed to varying "levels," memory retention varies.) 
Children's remembering is considered to be controlled initially 
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by the structure of the external environment and not by activities en-
gaged in for the purpose of remembering (Yendovitskaya, 1971). Children 
can do little to help themselves remember and the child's remembering 
occurs as a direct result of his daily experiences. With increasing 
age the child's remembering becomes defined as a goal within itself 
and comes under conscious control (voluntary memory), first by rely-
ing on external means of remembering and then on more advanced in-
ternal means. For example, the child may initially remember events 
only when questioned by the mother or interacting with her. This per-
iod of dependence upon external stimuli is important in Soviet develop-
mental psychology, for this is the point in time that the child's ac-
tivity can be controlled by the adult and the mnemonic skills specific 
to the culture can be conveyed to the child (Leont'ev, 1959/1964; 
Meacham, 1972; Yendovitskaya, 1971). According to Istomina (1948/ 
1975), memory arises as an involuntary action in the service of other 
goals and in later childhood, functions as a goal in itself. 
The following excerpt from Smirnov and Zinchenko's (1969) outline 
of the cognitive characteristics illustrates the interrelation of 
memory and cognitive development: 
In the first stage they are formed as a special purposive 
action and are not yet generalized; the fulfillment of 
these actions requires especially intensive conscious 
control. In the second stage, as a result of the trans-
fer of actions to material of varying content, they be-
gin to generalize. In the third stage, through further 
use they become, to a certain degree, automatized and 
acquire the form of generalized skills. 
The formation of mnemonic operations differs from 
the formation of cognitive processes in that it is al-
ways one stage behind cognitive processes when the lat-
ler are used as a means of remembering •.•. The initial 
use of a cognitive process for mnemonic ends becomes 
possible only when the individual can exercise a certain 
degree of freedom in operating with it. 
..• (C)ognitive operations which become the means 
toward another activity first develop as goal-ori~nted 
processes and only later assume the characteristics of 
a distinctly intellectual skill. (p. 469) 
In summary, it appears that Soviet researchers emphasize the im-
portance of demands made in the context of social interactions as well 
as the types of activity in which the child is engaged; specifically, 
Vygotsky indicates that the development of memory is qualitative and 
proceeds in stages. In terms of development with preschool and ele-
mentary school children in the recall of pictures/words Smirnov and 
Zinchenko (1969) cited studies which indicated the following age char-
acteristics: 
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(1) Recall increases and moves with age, that is, among preschool-
age children a more significant increase is noted in the period from 4 
to 5 years. In contrast, no significant differences are observed either 
between 3- and 4-year olds or between 5- and 6-year olds. Comparison 
of 8- to 9-year olds and 11- to 12-year olds show that the difference in 
recall was greater than that in comparable performances by 11- to 12-
year olds and 14- to 15-year olds. (2) Not only speed, but also reten-
tion of recall increases with age. (3) Developmental levels in terms 
of recall and reproduction can be delineated as follows: (a) stage 1 
in which children show no purposeful behavior in remembering; (b) stage 
2 in which recall functions as purposeful behavior, that is, child sets 
a goal of remembering and actively attempts to carry out his intention, 
even though he lacks the appropriate means to do it; (c) stage 3 in 
which the child possesses methods which will facilitate recall, but the 
means are still not permanent and his methods mainly consist of verbal-
izing to himself by whispering. 
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Thus, 8- to 9-year olds do not show any substantial reserve of de-
vices and their recall is largely spontaneous. In 11- and 12-year olds, 
analyses of memory processes show that children at this age often use 
mnemonic devices. Fourteen- to fifteen-year olds not only use a greater 
number of devices, but, more significantly, do so with more purpose and 
awareness. In sum, children show an increasing mastery of logical de-
vices or methods of recall. 
The Work of A. N. Leont'ev: Auxiliary Stimuli and Memory 
The development of memory was the special province of A. N. 
Leont'ev, particularly in terms of the use of auxiliary or external 
stimuli. In his early research Leont'ev followed the maxims of 
Vygotsky very closely with respect to the internalization hypothesis 
and the experimental method (Rahmani, 1973). Leont'ev (1932) proposed 
that two forms of memory develop in the context of biological and cul-
tural development: (1) an inferior, natural, nonmediated and involun-
tary memory dependent primarily upon natural processes, and (2) a 
superior, voluntary memory relying on generated, mental mediational 
processes. His studies were designed to test this assumption using 
Vygotsky's method of two sets of stimuli (double stimulation): objects 
to be memorized and mnemonic devices. The following experiments carried 
out by Leont'ev and his students provide good illustrations of the tran-
sition from externally mediated processes to internally mediated proc-
esses. 
In one experiment conducted by Leont'ev (cited in Cole, John-
Steiner, Scribner & Souberman, 1978), subjects ranging in age from pre-
school to adults were asked to memorize fifteen names of objects, while 
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in another condition, they were also asked to choose from a number of 
pictures representing the named objects. The pictures in this case 
served as an external means to remember. Results indicated that the 
young children were unable to utilize the external aids/mnemonic de-
vices since their performance under both conditions was poor. The 
performance of the school children was considerably improved in the aid 
condition, while the adults showed few errors and no difference in the 
two conditions. The results of the adult group were interpreted to 
mean that at this stage the role of external means had been internalized 
in the form of words so that there was no difference between the pres-
ence or absence of the auxiliary stimuli (Vygotsky, 1930/1978c). Ac-
cording to Vygotsky (1930/1978c) the process of mediated memory is so 
fully developed for adults that it can occur with or without aids. 
These results suggest that memory rather than abstract thought is the 
evident characteristic in the early stages of cognitive development. 
Vygotsky (1930/1978c) further explains: "Toward the end of childhood, 
interfunctional relations with respect to memory reverse their direc-
tions. For the young ~hild, to think means to recall; but for the 
adolescent, to recall means to think" (p. 51), 
Another student and researcher, L. V. Zankov (cited in Cole, 
John-Steiner, Scribner & Souberman, 1978) demonstrated that younger 
children, between the ages of 4 and 6 years, must rely on meaningful, 
learned connections between the "reminder" signal and the word to be 
remembered. If the reminders presented were not meaningful as memory 
aids, the children would often not use them, but would transform these 
figures into concrete copies of the to-be-remembered word. For ex-
ample, the figure D. , presented as a reminder of the word "bucket" 
was turned upside down by the children and served as a reminder of the 
word only when the figure really began to look like a bucket. 
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An unpublished study by V. C. Yussevich (cited in Cole, John-
Steiner, Scribner & Souberman, 1978) yielded results similar to Zankov's 
study. The auxiliary stimuli, which were pictures and had no relation 
to the word presented, were seldom used as aids, but the child attempted 
to see the aid as the object to be remembered. For example, when one 
child was asked to remember the word "sun" with the aid of a picture 
showing an axe, she pointed to a yellow spot in the drawing and de-
clared "There it is, the sun." Thus, the child replaced the meaning-
less auxiliary sign with a meaningful sign. What is significant in 
both the Zankov and Yussevich experiments is that the child produced 
the correct word through a mediation process that involved the use of a 
self-discovered, concrete representational cue but could not make use 
of the more abstract, symbolic cue provided by the experimenter. 
Studies of Attention--Auxiliary Aids 
The study of the development of the mental process, attention, 
reveals the same pattern as memory development. Vygotsky (1929/1979) 
pointed out: "When we speak of the cultural development of attention 
we mean evolution and change in the means for directing and carrying out 
attentional processes, the mastery of these processes, and their sub-
ordination to human control" (p. 69). With any of the cognitive proc-
esses studied within Vygotsky's framework, understanding is acquired 
through the study of those behaviors not from within but outside the 
child's personality. And so, it is with attention; social stimuli di-
rect a child's attention. Vygotsky (1929/1979) explains: 
The key to the mastery of behavior can be found in the 
mastery of stimuli; and the cultural development of 
any function, including attention, consists of the fact 
that in the process of joint activity, the social human 
being develops several artificial stimuli. These arti-
ficial stimuli are signs that have the power to direct 
behavior. These signs become the basic means of the 
individual's mastering his/her own behavioral pro-
cesses. (p. 70) 
As a matter of fact, Vygotaky (1930/1978a) posits that attention 
should be the first among the major psychological functions underlying 
the use of tools to be studied. Galperin (1967) has hypothesized that 
voluntary attention evolves in a step-by-step process through the in-
ternalization of external experiences. Vygotsky (1929/1979) writes: 
Titchener•s 1 "primary attention corresponds to our primitive or natural 
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attention; his secondary attention corresponds to our stage of external 
mediation of attention; and, finally, his third stage correpsonds to our 
fourth stage. His analysis lacks only the second, transitional stage, a 
stage that is 'naively psychological'" (pp. 79-80). 
Mozgovoy (1979) has noted that the development of attention is to a 
considerable extent governed by the importance or significance of an ac-
tivity which, in turn, depends on the needs and interests of the indivi-
dual, and also by the organization of the individual's activity, the 
learning of skills and aptitudes, and various other social factors. 
Vygotsky (1929/1979) has posed an interesting question: Why and how 
does our attention, which is initially subordinated to interest, sub-
ordinate interest to itself? At this time in our knowledge, the answer 
to this question remains unclear. In summary of his research findings 
concerning attention, Mozgovoy (1979) makes the following assumptions: 
1. The formation of individual differences with regard to 
particular characteristics of attention takes place 
under a distinct genetic control. 
2. The influence of genetic factors decreases progressively 
with age, evidently as the individual acquires more and 
more command over the voluntary regulation of activity. 
3. Steadiness of attention continues longer than other 
parameters to be dependent on the genotype in ontogeny 
--possibly because of its correlation with the geno-
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typically determined properties of the nervous system. (p.63) 
A. N. Leont'ev (1932) in his studies of voluntary attention and mem-
ory found that children could facilitate the consistency of attention by 
using external aids and that adults could do the same with the employ-
ment of internal aids or mental faculties. For example, in Leont'ev's 
(1932) classic study of the development of voluntary attention, the 
mechanisms of attention are exemplified. In. this experiment, the ''exper-
imental-genetic" method is utilized, where the subject is confronted with 
a situation which requires steadiness of attention on a specific process. 
(A description of this particular experiment appears on pages 10-12 of 
this report.) Essentially the experimental situation consists of pre-
senting the subject with a specific task (e.g., to remember a list of 
words or to answer a list of questions constrained by specific rules to 
be remembered) aided by certain devices (e.g., pictures) that would facil-
itate the performance of the task. The experimenter, then, studies the 
results in terms of whether the subject used the aids/tools, and if so, 
how and in what way his activity changed and how this activity relates 
to his mental processes. 
In sum, from the Soviet perspective, what the child develops in 
terms of memory/attention is a self-controlled system of strategies and 
operations for learning which has been internalized from the external en-
vironment. Vygotsky (1929/1979) stated that the content, structure, and 
functions of voluntary attention are the "result of changes and reorgani-
zations of the whole developmental process under the influence of ex-
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ternal stimulus means •••• Voluntary and involuntary attention are re-
lated to one another just as logical memory is related to recognition 
or as conceptual thinking is related to prelogical thought" (p. 83). 
The Role of Reward 
From Vygotsky's viewpoint, any external stimuli may be considered 
a "second series of stimuli," such as external aids, if they can serve as 
the "psychological means" for an activity. Reward in this context gains 
clarification from a statement made by El'konin (1972): "In other words, 
mental processes (from elementary sensorimotor processes to higher in-
tellectual processes) are dependent on the motives and tasks of the ac-
tivity in which they are involved; they are determined by the place they 
occupy in the structure of the activity (the action or operation)" (p. 
232). This concept of motive implicates the use of external rewards. 
It is after the case that certain conditions in the environment influ-
ence the way an action is carried out without giving rise to consciously 
recognized goals or subgoals. An experiment by Istomina (1948/1975) has 
investigated this issue in a st_udy where the research question was to de-
termine how the motives for the memorization affect the success of re-
tention. A set of two experiments was explored. In one condition, 
preschool children were asked to repeat a number of words after the ex-
perimenter. Thus, memorization was carried on within the context of an 
experiment. In the other condition, the experiment was conducted in 
the course of a play activity, where the children played "store" and 
"buying" for the kindergarten a number of objects. These objects were 
labeled for the child and these labels were approximately the same as 
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were those memorized in the laboratory. Results showed that the effect 
of memorization in the second/natural condition was higher than in the 
first condition. Thus, practice under conditions of play activity was 
more evident than in the laboratory experiment and was especially no-
ticeable in the younger children. Thus, the role of external reward 
may be considered in terms of the motives and tasks of the activity in-
volved. These data, then, show that when children had a motive for mem-
ory which was clear to them, recall \vas more easily attained. Also 
this experiment illustrates how the Soviet researchers conceive of the 
interrelation between cognition and memory. 
For Vygotsky, the chief problem was to study the mental·processes 
themselves and motivation constituted one of these processes. Each of 
the major concepts of cognition, perception, attention, speech, problem 
solving, and motor ability, had to incroporate the notion that, "as 
higher processes take shape, the entire structure of behavior is 
changed" (Luria, 1979, p. 45). Of course, as Wertsch (1979, 1981) says, 
"both neuropsychology and psychophysiology must confr.ont the problem of 
the transaction from the extracerebral to the intracerebral sphere" (p. 
69). 
In summing up, we might pose Vygotsky's (1930/1978b) initial re-
search questions: "Should we conceive of thought or memory as being 
analogous to external activity? Do the means of activity simply play 
the indefinite role of supporting the psychological processes that lean 
on them? What is the nature of the support? What in general does it 
mean to be a means of thought or memory?" (p. 53). The foregoing back-
ground and studies convey some idea as to what Vygotsky intends by the 
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process of internalization ( the process of forming the "inner plane" 
from the "outer plane"), but there are no real answers as yet to these 
questions. Yet, it might be said that individuals do remember with the 
aid of signs, and the development of these signs conveys some notion as 
to the nature of internalization. We can conclude this section by us-
ing Vygotsky's (1930/1978c) pertinent example: 
When a human being ties a knot in her handkerchief as a 
reminder, she is, in essence, constructing the process 
of memorizing by forcing an external object to remind 
her of something; she transforms remembering into an ex-
ternal activity •••• It has been remarked that the very 
essence of civilization consists of purposely building 
monuments so as not to forget. (p. 51) 
A Review of American Research 
In this section, the focus will be directed toward the development 
of external retrieval strategies in terms of the variables of memory, 
attention, organization, external reward, and the theoretical models 
underlying these processes. Thus, an attempt will be made to summarize 
the American literature on cognitive, developmental processes as it re-
lates to the issue of internalization. 
Memory Studies: A General Overview 
In terms of research in a broad sense, memory can be conceptualized 
as a composite of varied cognitive activities such as classifying, re-
hearsing, labeling, visual imagery and sentence elaboration in contrast 
to the Soviet perspective where the development of memory abilities is 
viewed as a consequence of social interactions and thereby dependent 
upon the particular socio-historical situation within which these inter-
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actions occur (Meacham, 1972). The American methodologies used to study 
memory in children have been almost exclusively based upon experimental 
and cross-sectional group data rather than longitudinal studies of indi-
viduals. Response measures have been quantitative in nature, although 
occasionally qualitative aspects of the data also have been considered 
(Todd & Perlmutter, 1980). 
Overall, the results of these experimental studies have indicated 
that young children can encode large amounts of stimulus information 
(Daehler & Bukatkri, 1977; Perlmutter & Myers, 1974), although they 
process more slowly (Morrison, Holmes, & Haith, 1974; Sheingold, 1973) 
and are hampered by inefficient attention and search interference 
(Perlmutter, Hazen, Mitchell, Grady, Cavanaugh, & ylook, 1981; 
Vliestra, 1978). A few studies have been concerned with retention of 
information over somewhat longer time intervals and these results sug-
gest that developmental changes in this activity are accounted for by 
changes in retrieval skills (Brown & Campione, 1972; Daehler & Bukatko, 
1977). Very young children apparently have great difficulty in retriev-
ing information upon demand and do not purposefully make efficient use 
of semantic information for retrieval (Perlmutter & Myers, 1979; Sophian 
& Hagen, 1978). Further, there is scant evidence that preschool chil-
dren utilize rehearsal as a strategy (Perlmutter &.Myers, 1979) and the 
retrieval strategies they do use appear quite ineffective (Alton & 
Weil, 1977; Ceci & Howe, 1978). Thus, young children's memory has been 
characterized as automatic, knowledge dependent, nonstrategic (Myers & 
Perlmutter, 1978) and involuntary (Smirnov, 1966/1973); and developmen-
tal improvements in memory performance have been attributed to the acqui-
sition of voluntary mnemonic strategies. But, recent research indicates 
75 
that memory improvements in the early years are not necessarily attribu-
table to increasing strategy utilization, but rather to changes in the 
type of processing done by children (Myers & Perlmutter, 1978). Results 
of these studies transmit some idea as to the substantial memory develop-
ment over the early years, but essentially very little information as to 
the underlying factors of that development. 
In sum, then, the young child's memory is directed by his/her fund 
of world knowledge and natural activities. After 5 to 6 years, actions 
can be used deliberately/voluntarily as memory strategies with social 
prompts. Finally, there is a significant increase in the store, aware-
ness and spontaneous use of strategies between the ages of 5 and 12 
years (Paris & Lindauer, 1982). 
Now, let us turn to some of the theoretical models that underlie 
memory research, and then turn our attention to more suecific research 
concerning memory, that is, memory and the use of strategies in the 
context of development. 
Theoretical Models Underlying Memory Processes 
The purpose of this section is to present four different models 
which appear to have the most impact upon, and provide frameworks for, 
the interpretation of cognitive development. At the present time there 
is no one theory of memory that is entirely satisfactory. The informa-
tion processing, levels of processing and Piagetian points of view are 
summarized with their implications for internalization/development. 
Information processing models. Information processing models con-
ceive of adult memory as the transfer of information within a cognitive 
construct; that is, memory processing involves the acquisition, stor-
age and the retrieval of information. Further, the information 
processing view of human memory states that information storage in 
the brain involves sequential processes and that there is a short-
term memory which can become a permanent memory (Gazzaniga, Steen, & 
Volpe, 1979). We shall focus upon a particular model in the informa-
tion processing framework, the Atkinson-Shiffrin (1968) model, since 
their modified view is especially pertinent to the present study in 
that it considers the control processes or strategies. To utilize 
the Atkinson-Shiffrin model the child's memory system would be dis-
cussed in terms of capacity, encoding mode, forgetting characteristics 
and control processes or strategies for conveying information between 
the storage systems (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Thus~ according to 
the information processing view of memory, the differences are quan-
titative, not qualitative. According to Matlin's (1983) description, 
as knowledge is acquired, new and old knowledge are synthesized into 
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a chunk, so that each chunk essentially holds more information. Hence, 
in terms of development the capacity of short-term memory becomes 
greater, in both the size and number of chunks. In addition to the 
structural aspects of this viewpoint, an important factor is the con-
trol processes, which are strategies that people learn to utilize 
flexibly and voluntarily. Strategies are important for conveying in-
formation to long-term memory. 
Another variation of the information-processing model is one 
put forth by Hasher and Zacks (1979). Their model essentially rests 
on two basic assumptions. The first is that there is a continuum of 
attentional requirements among encoding processes, with the processes 
at either end of the continuum being labeled as "automatic" and "ef-
fortful." Effortful processes are those which include rehearsal and 
elaborative mnemonic activities which require considerable capacity 
and thus will interfere with other cognitive activities also re-
quiring capacity. They are voluntary, show benefit from practice 
and change over time. In contrast, there are the automatic processes, 
which are involuntary and do not benefit from prac-tice. Certain 
automatic processes are genetically determined, such as spatial, tem-
poral and frequency-of-occurrence information (Hasher & Zacks, 
1979). 
The second assumption is that attentional capacity varies with-
in and among individuals; variation in attentional capacity should 
have major effects on the efficiency with which effortful processes 
occur (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). Their research suggests that the rela-
tively poor performance in memory tasks shown by the young (Brown, 
1975; Flavell, 1977) and the elderly (Botwinick, 1973) could be at-
tributed to the inefficient use of effortful learning processes. 
Levels-of-processing approach. Craik and his colleagues (Craik, 
1973; Craik & Jacoby, 1975; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 
1975; Lockhart, Craik, & Jacoby, 1976) focused upon the processing 
or interpretation of incoming stimulus information with reference to 
the contents. With respect to this model, processing is considered 
to include a series of analyses, beginning with "shallow" sensory 
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processing and progressing to "deeper" abstract and semantic levels. 
Craik and Lockhart (1972) conceived of the memory system in terms of 
the processes that are carried out on material that is to be remem-
bered and de-emphasized the structures of the system. Thus, in their 
model, control processes are emphasized as well as the flexibility 
that humans can utilize in processing information. Memory in this 
system is thought to be a function of the depth or level of meaning 
to which incoming information is processed and can be seen as the 
by-product of depth-of-processing. In this respect, the levels-of-
processing framework concurs with the Soviet view of memory which 
emphasizes remembering as a consequence of meaningful interaction 
with stimulus material. 
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Piagetian model. Piaget and Inhelder (1973) proposed that memory 
should not be regarded as a separate cognitive capacity, but rather 
that it should be a function of intelligence. In Piaget and Inhelder's 
(1973) words: "It follows that the memory in the strict sense is part 
of a general set of cognitive functions, of which the intelligence rep-
resents a higher and balanced form, and that the conservation of mem-
ories rests on special but related schematizations in certain areas, 
but participates directly in that of the intelligence in others'' (p. 
390). Since Piaget's main focus was on the development of intelli-
gence, his work necessarily led him to concentrate on the developmental 
changes in the context of memory rather than on explicit models of re-
call and recognition. However, Piaget does draw some distinction be-
tween recall and recognition aspects of memory. According to Piaget 
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(1968), "recognition can rely on perception and sensorimotor schemes 
alone, while evocation requires mental imagery or language, that is, 
some form of symbolic function" (p. 11). Thus, developmentally speaking 
the young infant (i.e., before one year of age) would not be expected 
to exhibit recall, but would only be capable of recognition. Perlmutter 
and Lange (1978) indicate that perceptual schemata constitute the instru-
ments of recognition, whereas internalized images appear to be instru-
ments of recall. 
Implications for development/internalization. These models, then, 
seem to convey differences, but at the same time can be considered 
complementary to one another. Although Piaget's model appears to be the 
one stressing developmental changes, the others could also be considered 
in relation to age changes. If memory processes are analyzed according 
to the information-processing model, the major changes could be viewed 
in terms of control processes; thus, the children would be seen to 
differ in terms of the strategies they use to control the flow of in-
formation among the component parts of the system (Naus, Ornstein, & 
Hoving, 1978). By the age of 12 or 13 years, children could be viewed 
as possessing a working, flexible store of strategies (Ornstein & Naus, 
1978). While, according to the levels-of-processing model (from a 
developmental perspective), the increased depth of information pro-
cessing could be associated with memory improvement over time. Since 
the level-of-processing model focuses upon the critical issue of the 
interpretation of incoming information as related to the person's seman-
tic knowledge, it would seem that this model is then open to handling 
both controlled (i.e., "deliberate") and automatic processes. Of course, 
if we assume this, then the implication here is that a child's existing 
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semantic knowledge determines what is to be remembered (Naus, Ornstein, 
& Hoving, 1978). This position is significant in that developmental re-
searchers have pointed out the implications for how and what information 
can be remembered (see Chi, 1976; Piaget & Inhelder, 1973). A recent 
study by Peterson (1977) revealed age changes in recognition following 
an orienting task in which subjects were required to make judgements 
about whether stimulus photographs depicted objects that were or were 
not alive or in movement. On the other hand, Peterson found no age 
changes in memory performance when judgements were required concerning 
whether the objects were in color or black and white. Such results as 
these could be interpreted by the depth-of-processing model, since it 
analyzes incoming information with respect to the current knowledge 
fund, while the information processing models would focus upon the flow 
of information determined by processes in the short-term memory store. 
Although the depth-of-processing model considers memory development 
from the point of view of the individual's changing fund of knowledge 
and might seem to be more adequate than the information-processing frame-
work, it should be recognized that there are limitations of both kinds 
of models for memory processes in terms of such developmental questions 
as (1) how is new information integrated with the already stored con-
ten~s of the system? (Naus & Halasz, 1978; Nelson & Brown, 1978); and 
(2) why can't a child utilize knowledge spontaneously when that knowledge 
is available? (Naus, Ornstein, & Hoving, 1978). It would seem that a 
first step in moving toward a developmental model of cognitive processing 
would be to organize programs that would simulate these information-
processing systems, and a second step toward a developmental theory 
would be to explain how a child can move from the simple systems to the 
more advanced systems of performing a given task (Simon, 1979). 
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In sum, from a brief overview of these models, we find that a satis-
factory developmental model of memory has not yet evolved, but aside from 
their weaknesses, the models do act as external memory aids. Gazzaniga, 
Steen and Volpe (1978) summarize the status of the field when they declare 
that the task of delineating memory processes seems more complex than 
ever, in that analyses "may involve uncovering the complete cerebral pro-
cessing system with which humans deal with the environment" (p. 320). 
This opinion is shared by the Soviet view as well as by Paris (1978a) who 
has suggested that the task confronting developmental psychologists is 
to analyze both the external and internal changes in studies of remember-
ing, particularly in terms of specifying the changes in the child and 
the environment that develop the subordination of actions into memory 
processes. What the Soviet, Piagetian and information-processing models 
do share is the similar view that what develops over time is a self-
controlled system of operational strategies. Tulving and Madigan (1970) 
put forth one suggestion as to future studies in memory: "Why not start 
looking for ways of experimentally studying, and incorporating into theo-
ries and models of memory, one of the truly unique characteristics of 
human memory: its knowledge of its own knowledge" (p. 477). 
Kail and Hagen (1982) argue that the developmental literature is in 
need of research in which multiple models of processes are precisely de-
lineated. According to Kail and Hagen (1982) the changes observed in in-
fancy and early childhood probably cannot be attributed to control pro-
cesses, but possibly to changes in the structure, to which Piaget would 
agree. At the preschool period it could be postulated that the changes 
in memory, and the changes found during the grade school years mesh well 
with the pronounced appearance of control processes (e.g., strategies) 
as indicated by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) and Hasher and Zacks (1979). 
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Memory Strategy Studies 
In this section we shall focus upon the studies concerned with the 
development of specific strategies, namely those external strategies 
that are "internalized," complying with the Soviet perspective that 
"the very essence of human memory consists of the fact that human 
beings actively remember with the help of signs" (Vygotsky, 1930/1978c, 
p. 51). According to Vygotsky (1929) "the child is able to acquire 
cultural methods of remembering such as tying knots in string or tearing 
bits of paper. This external activity subsequently can become in-
ternal activity" (p. 423). The internalization of so-called tools of 
the culture is probably similar to what Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) 
had in mind when they coined the term control processes and indicated 
that these are the strategies that people learn to use flexibly and 
voluntarily and develop over time. More general liter?ture reviews on 
children's development and use of strategies can be found in Brown 
(1975, 1978), Hagen, Jongeward and Kail (1975) and Kail (1979b). 
The strategies in question involve the large and diverse range of 
conscious activities a person may choose as the means to remember an 
activity. Flavell (1977) mentioned examples of external strategies as 
verbally rehearsing a telephone number while waiting to use the phone, 
taking lecture notes, underlining key expressions in a textbook, noting 
an appointment on the calendar. Flavell (1977) tended to favor the use 
of external memory aids over unaided internal memory. He indicated 
that children tend to think that written notes and other people are 
useful aids. Vygotsky (1929) viewed auxiliary stimuli as quite di-
verse, ranging from tools of the culture into which the child is born 
to the language used in interaction with the child as well as those 
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means produced by the child himself. 
From a developmental standpoint, the most researched and striking 
characteristic of the young child's memory performance is the failure 
to initiate and utilize memory strategies in a spontaneous manner in 
order to enhance encoding and retrieval information (Paris, 1978b). 
Nevertheless, those memory skills requiring ''deliberate strategies'' 
such as the use of external aids and organization are the very ones 
that produce the most profound changes during the grade school years 
(Brown, 1975). Luria (1973) has indicated that children at about the 
age of 9 or 10 years begin creating and using reminders to aid memory. 
Meacham and Dumitru (1976) have found that 5-year olds do not take ad-
vantage of external retrieval cues to facilitate their prospective 
remembering, whereas older children are able to choose an appropriate 
cue for further action. Several studies have shown that providing 
children with external memory aids, such as visible records of past 
solution attempts, may facilitate solution of problems (e.g., Eimas, 
1970; Roodin & Gruen, 1970; Sieber, Kameya, & Paulson, 1970). One 
important characteristic of an adult who is attempting to recall is 
that he will often direct his memory search by restricting the range of 
responses. In this regard, he uses internal as well as external cues 
that are likely to remind him of pertinent information (Kobasigawa, 
1977). 
In general, research has revealed significant developmental 
changes in children's memory strategies when (1) the information is 
new or unfamiliar, (2) the task involves intentional memorization as 
the goal, (3) encoding and retrieval strategies are required to or-
ganize the information, (4) modification of study or recall behavior 
is necessitated by changing task demands (Flavell, 1977; Morrison, 
Holmes, & Haith, 1974). In brief, a limited performance is expected 
of young children in tasks whenever self-guided strategies, plans and 
reflection might be utilized to facilitate behavior as an aid to mem-
ory. Myers and Perlmutter (1978) concluded from their study of memory 
development in the age range of 2 to 5 years: 
There was little evidence of planful, deliberate strategic 
deployment of memory processes or age-related increase in 
strategic utilization in the age range studied. Probably 
as the naturalistic memory demands on the child become 
more extensive he develops deliberate, then planful ways 
that permit him to control and utilize the full gamut of 
memory operations potentially available. (p. 215) 
Now, let us turn to some specific studies illustrating the char-
acteristics and development of the use of external strategies. There 
is a critical question of why young children, who appear capable of 
using strategies when offered them, fail to come up with strategies on 
their own. Mischel (1974) and Mischel and Patterson (1978) in their 
experiments found that some young children do spontaneously come up 
with a variety of strategies, but most fail. Kail (1979b) offers the 
84 
explanation that individual differences in memory may reflect a general 
strategic factor; that is, some children may use strategies consistently 
and activate them well, and hence remember accurately; other children 
of the same age may utilize strategies inefficiently or not at all and 
thus remember inaccurately. Another reason for children's failures 
may be that they are not aware that any one particular strategy would 
be more effective than another (Yates & Mischel, 1979). A study by 
Ritter, Kaprove, Fitch and Flavell (1973) is pertinent. In this exper-
iment it was shown that 3~-year old children could utilize visible ex-
ternal picture cues for the purpose of retrieval when explicitly in-
structed to "do anything you want to help" (p. 315). This question of 
the use of strategies was explored with 3~- to 5~-year old children in 
an experiment which involved six pictures of different persons (e.g., 
football player) and six small toys (e.g., football); thus, each of 
the pictures of a person was associated with a toy. After the child 
had matched the six objects with the six persons, the experimenter 
placed one set of the pictures face down on the floor and removed all 
of the toys and left the set of pictures on the floor. The child was 
asked to remember the names of the toys just taken from the room. The 
pictures on the floor could be utilized as retrieval cues for the re-
call of the names of the toys~ Results indicated that approximately 
75% of the older children (4~ to 5~ years) used the retrieval aids 
under prompt conditions. Additionally, 30% of the younger children 
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did not use the cues after a demonstration. It appears that some pre-
school children,can benefit from using external objects as cues for re-
call in a simple recall situation. 
Kobasigawa (1974) conducted a similar study in which three experi-
mental groups of 6-, 8-, and 11-year old children were shown 24 picto-
rial items representing 8 cate,gories. In contrast to the Ritter et al. 
study, explicit instructions were given to one group during the presen-
tation that indicated the relationships between the cue and each of the 
three items; for example, a child might see a bear, a lion, and a 
monkey together with the retrieval clue of a picture of a zoo. One 
group of children were asked to recall the names with no cues; their 
recall was low. The other group of subjects were given cue cards and 
were asked to name the items that had been associated with each card; 
children's recall at all ages were accurate. A third group were given 
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the cue cards, face down, and instructed to use the cards if they 
thought they would be helpful. The results for this group indicated 
that the younger children (first graders) rarely spontaneously used 
the cue cards, and when they did, they generally recalled only one 
item for each card. The oldest children (sixth graders) put the cards 
to good use and increased their recall with twice as much accuracy as 
the youngest children. In sum, all the children, regardless of age, 
seemed to benefit from the retrieval cues when required to use them. 
However, only the older children used the retrieval cues spontaneously. 
Kobasigawa (1974) analyzed the cue task in the following manner: 
A successful performance (high recall score) under the 
cue condition depends on S's ability to integrate spon-
taneously at least the following three task components: 
(1) to recall the small blue picture; (2) by looking at 
the cue; and (3) to continue the procedure until all or 
most of the items related to that cue have been retrieved 
.... (p. 132) 
Scribner and Cole (1972) conducted a study in which cued and con-
strained conditions were involved in free recall with 5-year old 
children. In terms of the cued condition, subjects could recall the 
items in any order they desired, but the organized nature of the lists 
was identified and subjects were instructed that they would remember 
more if they recalled items from the same category together. Results 
indicated that cueing instructions had no effect upon the performance 
of the preschoolers; however, constrained recall instructions led to 
enhanced recall and category clustering. Scribner and Cole (1972) ex-
plained that the better performance under constrained (relative to 
cued) recall instructions was due to the use of more efficient re-
trieval strategies, although it is to be recognized that constrained 
recall may have influenced the manner in which children organized or 
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encoded the list, and they also suggested that the inferior performance 
of the cued groups may be attributed to the child's inability to deter-
mine the functional significance of the cues during recall. 
Research by Williams and Goulet (1975) improved upon the preced-
ing study by employing a control group (i.e., no instructions) in addi-
tion to the cued and constrained groups under free recall with pre-
school children. Their results suggested that the poor recall in 
young children may be due not to a failure to detect the categorized 
nature of the list but rather to an inability to utilize the cueing 
information in order to generate an effective memory strategy. 
Another experiment revealed the most intriguing finding that cue-
ing on recall from categorized word lists seemed to facilitate the re-
call performance of the 5-year olds more than 8-year olds (Eysenck & 
Baron, 1973). They explain their results in terms of the retrieval 
deficit hypothesis which suggests that the low levels of recall evi-
denced in young children could be attributed, in part, to difficulties 
in retrieval rather than that of strategy alone. 
Research with internalization of external cues in related areas 
such as delay of gratification and self-control strategies indicates 
that providing a cue as to when to produce a verbal response will in-
crease the efficiency in verbalization. In a study by Carter, 
Patterson and Quasebarth (1979) it was found that when preschoolers 
were given a temptation-inhibiting verbalization, those given either 
an external cue ("When Mr. Clown box tries to distract you") or an in-
ternal cue ("When you think to look at Mr. Clown box") as to when to 
make the verbal response, displayed greater self-control than children 
given the verbalization, without such cues. Thus, as children develop, 
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they become more capable of employing plans to regulate their behavior. 
However, both the cues utilized in this study would be considered ex-
ternal cues by Vygotsky. 
In another study, Mischel, Mischel and Hood (1978) asked children 
whether they would find it easier to wait if the rewards were covered 
or if they were left in the child's view during the delay interval, 
and whether they thought about the consummatory or nonconsummatory as-
pects of the reward. The results indicated that preschool children did 
not appear to think about the advantages of covering the reward and of 
thinking about the nonconsummatory aspects of the reward; their choices 
were essentially random. In contrast, the third graders, and espe-
cially sixth graders, gave many more correct replies than would be ex-
pected by chance. This experiment suggests that the young child's 
failure to employ effective strategies may be due to the fact that the 
young child may not be able to delineate effective from ineffective 
strategies even when the experimenter asked the subject to do so. 
In terms of self-control strategies as applied to natural settings 
such as a school situation, we can turn to a study by Sagotsky, 
Patterson and Lepper (1978). These researchers studied elementary 
school children's self-control as related to an individualized, self-
paced mathematics program where the children were asked to use a simple 
self-control strategy, that is, these children were to self-monitor 
their behavior by recording instances of off-task behavior (e.g., 
talking, playing around) during the mathematics period and to use each 
recorded instance as a cue to return to work. Results showed that the 
children using the self-monitoring strategy had greater increases both 
in study time and in academic achievement than those children who util-
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ized no strategy or were asked to set appropriate study goals for them-
selves. 
What is intriguing about the successes of children mentioned in 
the few studies regarding self-control is that they conform to 
Vygotsky's concept of internalization; namely that the successes were 
attained not by changing the physical aspects of the world but by mani-
pulating it in thought. Thus, the key to enhanced durability and in-
ternalization of many strategies is awareness of the strategy's benefits 
and not just awareness of the technique's existence. Borkowski, Levers 
and Gruenfelder (1976) demonstrated that children 4 to 7 years of age 
were most likely to learn and generalize a strategy after viewing a 
successful demonstration. 
In terms of cross-cultural studies, Cole and Scribner (1977) note 
that uneducated people from non-Western cultures rely on external or 
culturally specific memory aids (e.g., poems, songs, knot-tying, carved 
sticks) and do not benefit from training on internal memory skills. 
Cole and Scribner (1977) indicate that the reason for these production 
deficiencies in other cultures is the unnaturalness of the tasks and 
strategies, where the value of the strategy is not apparent and where 
the goal of remembering for its own sake is unfamiliar. 
In sum, then, preschool children's memory is usually guided by 
their world knowledge and natural activities. After 5 to 6 years of 
age, actions can be employed deliberately as memory strategies with so-
cial prompting. Yet practice, schooling and training may be required 
for the internalization of sophisticated mnemonic techniques. A dra-
matic increase in children's repertoires of available strategies, 
awareness and spontaneous access to skills occurs from 5 to 12 years 
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of age (Paris & Lindauer, 1982). 
Research described so far indicates a consistent developmental 
progression (Flavell, 1977; Kail, 1979a), which is in line with what 
Vygotsky (1929/1979) and Leont'ev (1932) describe in terms of the 
stages of internalization. Kail (1979a) specifies the development lev-
els as follows: ''(1) infrequent use of strategies among 6-year olds; 
(2) a transitional stage from 6 to 9 years; and (3) reasonably mature, 
sophisticated uses of strategies beginning at about 10 years" (p. 32). 
In sum, the young child appears quite inadequate with respect to 
memorization; however, research findings suggest that young children 
might be trained to use strategies effectively. The question remains 
as to why young children do not utilize cues spontaneously to aid re-
trieval. Another question may be raised: To what extent do our con-
scious intentions and strategies control the way information is proc-
essed in our minds? One is not always able to adapt thought processes 
to the strategies required by the task. Anderson and Bower (1973) 
point out that a "strategy-free system must be coupled with other 
strategy-dependent systems" (p. 55). A detailed analysis of the de-
velopment of the young child's strategic talents is in order for future 
research (Brown & Deloache, 1978; Kail, 1979b). 
In the kind of study with which we are concerned, the task con-
sists of the child's ability to utilize a given mnemonic strategy to 
facilitate retention (e.g., retrieval, encoding or future retrieval). 
When the child is aware of the means, the goals, and the relationships 
between behavior and memory, he has attained intentional memory. 
Events can, then, be encoded or retrieved from memory by virtue of the 
child's automatic comprehension processes, and memory that results from 
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these situations may be interpreted according to the quality of proces-
sing analysis performed on the event (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) rather 
than by reference to mnemonic strategies. 
Paris (1978a) discusses the difference between deliberate and spon-
taneous aspects of memory or what the distinction may be between self-
generated and externally imposed means and goals in children. He 
points out that the child's ability to adopt someone else's means and 
goals for remembering may tell us something about children's limita-
tions in learning or efficiency in skill usage, but it may not tell us 
much about how children ordinarily select ways of operating upon infor-
mation to gain their own goals or how they ordinarily select their own 
goals. He advises that further research regarding developmental memory 
should be expanded to investigate age-related changes in perceived 
means and goals so that children's abilities to coordinate their own 
means with their own goals can be evaluated. In this way, the neces-
sary and automatic prerequisites of remembering can be assessed as well 
as the sufficiency of externally provided means. We need to determine 
when children can vary their behavior systematically as the task para-
meters change (e.g., less time, more time, more items, feedback, larger 
payoffs, different purposes). The manipulation of conditions that 
elicit different means and goals by the child in the face of changing 
task demands may illuminate how children modify their behavior to 
achieve efficient memory. 
Another direction for research may be to identify motivational 
changes in children's remembering. How do children regard the task, 
situation, and mnemonic skills presented to them or generated by them? 
What are the conditions that determine means-goals relationships? 
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Attention Strategy Studies 
A similar developmental pattern is observed in the area of atten-
tional strategies as in the section concerned with memory strategies. 
That is, selective attention could be characterized as shifting from 
external stimuli to internally regulated logical search behavior which 
includes the control of the strategies utilized (Wright & Vliestra, 
1975). Attention, of course, looms as an important variable in the 
development of memory since it is an integral part of learning. "At-
tention can hardly be called a faculty of the mind. It is rather a 
condition of intellectual operations. Clear thoughts, distinct feelings, 
deliberate volitions are impossible without attention" (Dexter & Garlick, 
1902, p. 29). Vygotsky (1929/1979, 1981) writes: "The history of 
attention in the child is the history of the levels of the organization 
of his/her behavior" (p. 191). 
Research on the development of attention concludes that older 
children are more flexible and systematic than younger children with 
respect to the particular demands of each task. As to specific re-
search Hagen and Hale (1973), Pick and Frankel (1973) find that when a 
task calls for attending to relevant material and disregarding irrele-
vant material, selective attention increases with age. Developmentally, 
Hagen and Hale (1973) summarize the research by indicating that, in 
general, the recall of the central stimuli increases through the ele-
mentary and high school periods, while at the same time, recall of the 
incidental stimuli stays about the same or increases a little up until 
ages 11-12 and then shows a decrease. How is this apparent lack of 
selection in terms of attention explained? According to Kahneman 
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(1973) and Navon and Gopher (1979) developmental differences in atten-
tion could result from a tendency by young children to direct a portion 
of their attentional capacity to the processing of irrelevant informa-
tion. Thus, this theoretical position assumes that one has a limited 
amount of capacity that one can distribute among stimuli flexibly and 
deliberately. Lane and Pearson (1982) suggest that one reason 
children's attentional processes may be somewhat less flexible than 
that of adults is that the children tend to direct proportionately 
more attention to the irrelevant stimuli at the expense of relevant 
stimuli. Another reason advanced for differences in the child's and 
adult's attentional capacity is that children have more difficulty in-
hibiting responses to the irrelevant stimuli than do adults (Lane & 
Pearson, 1982). Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) and Stroop (1935) have 
hypothesized that interference based on the presence of irrelevant 
stimuli can occur due to response competition rather than to capacity 
limitation. This position has some semblance to what Pavlov (1928) 
said many years ago about the process of external inhibition: 
External inhibition is a complete analogue of that inhibi-
tion which was recognised long ago in the lower parts of 
the central nervous system when a newly arriving reflex 
inhibits one already present and active. It is evidently 
the expression of a ceaseless conflict among the different 
sorts of external and internal stimulations which determine 
which shall become at the given moment of predominant 
significance for the organism. (p. 244) 
Hasher and Zacks (1979) have further clarified these foregoing supposi-
tions with their framework of effortful versus automatic processes which 
yielded findings that variation in attentional capacity did effect the 
efficiency with which effortful processes occur, but in contrast, auto-
matic processes did not show similar effects because of their minimal 
94 
drain on attentional capacity. Hence, the act of maintaining attention 
for a task requires effort, which suggests that on-task attention can 
reduce the probability that other stimuli will interfere (Posner & 
Snyder, 1975). Posner and Snyder (1975), thus, believe that the main 
importance of a strategy which directs attention to an input channel or 
memory pathway is not merely to facilitate the selected item (benefit) 
but mainly to reduce the chance of interference from the external en-
vironment (cost); thus, the strategy constitutes a trade-off in terms 
of the distribution of attentional efforts. 
In general, then, the younger child may find it difficult or im-
possible to engage in specific types of mental processes (e.g., the 
effective use of strategies) or acquire concepts of a specific level 
of complexity due to the fact that his current attentional or short-
term memory capacity is not developed (Flavell, 1982). It is postu-
lated that as he grows older, this capacity will gradually increase, 
and the increase will in turn make possible new and higher levels of 
cognition and knowledge. At this point in time there is considerable 
controversy as to the exact nature of the child's capacity limitations. 
Exactly how much the child's processing capacity limitations actually 
restrict the range of problems with which the child may deal is an 
unresolved question. 
With this background in mind, let us turn to some specific studies 
dealing with attentional strategies which may demonstrate the role of 
external signs in attention and memory. There are, of course, far 
more studies of children's attention than can possibly be reviewed 
here. Rather than presenting a comprehensiye review of memory and at-
tention, the pertinent research on the question of how attention re-
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lates to the use of the internalization of strategies within a develop-
mental context will be provided. Most of the studies in this area util-
ize the incidental-central paradigm. (For example, the experiment in-
volves introducing irrelevant stimuli into a task and then observing 
how well the subject attends to the central task in the presence of 
possible distractors, i.e., incidental stimuli). The classical study 
in this area is one by Hagen (1967) whose research with children 6 to 
13 years of age indicated that the first improvement in memory occurs 
partly because of the child's increasing ability to attend to specific 
cues and to ignore others. This general finding was supported by the 
result that central memory scores correlated positively with incidental 
memory scores at the younger ages, but negatively at the older ages, 
lending credence to the fact that older children tend to be more effi-
cient than younger children at selectively attending to the central 
variables and excluding the irrelevant information. 
In two memory studies (Hagen & Frisch, 1968; Maccoby & Hagen, 
1965) where a distractor task had been employed with children, a detri-
mental effect on central task performance was found, but this effect 
was not found in a study with adult subjects (Hagen, Meacham, & 
Mesibov, 1970). Thus, adults' memory performances appeared to be rel-
atively unaffected by the presence of incidental stimuli (Hagen et al., 
1970). It appeared that imposed irrelevant stimuli, such as piano 
notes or pictures, interfere with the performance of the younger, but 
not the older, individuals. An explanation advanced was that the 
younger child appeared to be dependent upon immediate stimuli in the 
environment, possibly because he did not yet have well-developed strat-
egies for dealing with the specific task at hand. The older subject 
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apparently possesses these strategies and can filter out the imposed 
irrelevant stimuli, unless they interfere directly with the utilization 
of strategies. 
A more recent study of selective attention by Miller and Weiss 
(1981), where the incidental learning paradigm was utilized for children 
from grades 2, 5, and 8, indicated that the greatest increase in 
selective attention came between grades 2 and 5. In contrast, the 
greatest improvement in performance for the incidental learning task 
occurred for grades 5 and 8. Strategies of attention and performance 
on the learning task were not significantly related. These results 
support the finding that there are developmental changes in selective 
attention or efficient performance on the incidental learning task. 
The authors interpret the differential results in terms of age to 
mean that possibly second graders do not understand the goal of the 
task since they remembered only one of two sets of drawings. Another 
explanation was the possibility that second graders actually realize 
the value of gathering relevant information, but have specific char-
acteristics which limit them in demonstrating their knowledge. In 
regard to the finding of a lack of a direct relation between strat-
egies of attention and performance on the incidental learning task, 
explanations are offered in terms of competing responses and meta-
cognitive deficiencies. Thus, this study points out the fact that 
there are factors in addition to selectivity of attention that must 
be considered in the research of attentional strategies. For ex-
ample, Hale (1979) indicates that there are developmental changes in 
the dispositions to pick up more useful information from stimulus 
components and to assimilate attention into the task requirements. 
Older children are found to regulate their strategies to the task goal 
more easily and quickly than young children and also understand not 
only how to attend selectivity but also when it is to their advantage 
(Hagen & Hale, 1973). 
97 
Hagen's (1972) research on selective attention indicated that 
there was a limited channel capacity which did not increase with age. 
Under overload conditions, older subjects were more efficient at di-
recting more of their attention to the task at hand. While, of course, 
there is a limit to how much a child can handle, Hagen (1972) believes 
that it is not just because this limit is exceeded that "selective" 
attention occurs. Rather, external demands interact with the subject's 
state at the particular time, a hypothesis that fits well with the 
Soviet view as to what happens in the means-goal situation. That is, 
a particular task set is imposed by some external source (i.e., a 
parent, a teacher, or an experimenter); this set is received differ-
ently by children of different ages. Older children better understand 
the nature of the demands placed on them and also have available appro-
priate strategies to deal with them. As Hagen and Kail (1975) con-
elude, "selectivity in attention of children . clearly comes about 
through the employment of task-appropriate encoding strategies rather 
than through the use of increasingly finer perception discriminations 
of the stimuli themselves" (p. 172). Thus, selective attention is 
found to be one component in the strategies for facilitating memory de-
velopment (Hagen & Stanovich, 1977) and is representative of the cogni-
tive skills that underlie development during childhood. This conclusion 
meshes with Vygotsky's summary statement about memory: II • what 
changes is the interfunctional relations that connect memory with other 
functions" (1930/1978c, p. 49). 
Organizational Strategies 
The attention and strategy variables bring us to the ability of 
the child to organize (or the attempt to bring order and patterns to) 
these variables for use. Wertsch (1979, 1981) says that "the most im-
portant point in development is: children organize stimuli in order 
to achieve their response" (p. 182). Essentially, studies have shown 
that people tend to organize items spontaneously, even when they have 
not been directed to do so. Bousfield (1953) presented people with a 
list of 60 nouns with 15 nouns from each of 4 categories: animals, 
names, professions, and vegetables. The result suggested that people 
tended to group the words into categories to recall the words. 
Some investigators have measured response times during recall as 
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an indicator of organization. Kobasigawa and Orr (1973) recorded the 
time between successive recall of two items from the same category and 
compared it with the time between successive recall of any t•o items 
from different categories. Kindergarten children showed within-
category intervals that were shorter than between-category intervals 
under conditions that produced a high amount of list organization, but 
no differences in lengths of intervals when list organization was low. 
Consistent with these results, Gelfand (1971) reported a relationship 
between response latencies and clustering scores in adults' free recall. 
Another study by Goldberg, Perlmutter, and Myers (1974) with 2-year olds 
indicated that the interval between responses was briefer when items 
were members of the same conceptual category than when items were unre-
lated. These studies give credence to the phenomenon of organization, 
even in very young children, although its most appropriate measurement 
may not be ascertained as yet. Ornstein (1972) states: "The more or-
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ganized •.• the memory .•. the shorter the experience of duration" 
(p. 87). 
Organization strategies, such as grouping and categorization, are 
frequently ~sed by adults, as we saw above. However, young children do 
not tend to group similar elements together to aid memory. Moely (1977) 
designated the following developmental features as to how younger chil-
dren differ from older children: (1) younger children have a tendency 
to process the meaningful features of items; (2) they base their grouping 
on the number of established concept categories in evidence; and (3) upon 
the nature of features used to group items. For example, a young child 
may respond to the shape of pictures rather than their meaning. Finally, 
even if children do pay attention to an item's meaning, they may group 
items in the same category if they go together. For example, a desk 
might go with a father if the father typically uses the desk. 
An additional reason that young children do not use organizational 
strategies might possibly be attributed to the lag between the develop-
ment of semantic abilities and the use of these abilities in organiza-
tional strategies. For example, in a study by Moely, Olson, Halwes, and 
Flavell (1969) where children were asked to study and rearrange pictures 
from four categories (animals, clothing, furniture and vehicles), younger 
children seldom moved the pictures next to other similar pictures, but 
older children frequently organized the pictures in terms of categories. 
Other groups of children were specifically instructed to organize the 
pictures. Thus, the training enhanced organizational strategies and 
hence recall, even in the younger children. Other researchers (e.g., 
Moynahan, 1973; Tenney, 1975) hypothesize that young children do not 
realize the value of organization as a tool for recall. 
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What can be said, in sum, about organizational strategies? Recent 
information-processing models (Klahr & Wallace, 1976), Soviet accounts 
(Leont'ev, 1972/1979, 1981), and mediational developmental theorists 
(White, 1965) have all focused upon deliberate methods of attending to 
information and reorganizing it into meaningful, useable units. These 
models suggest that with development this skill can become progressively 
differentiated and integrated. 
In conclusion, evidence is accumulating that appears to be consis-
tent with Leont'ev's theory of the development of internalization. For 
example, Kreutzer, Leonard, and Flavell (1975) found that kindergarten 
children were more likely to indicate that they could use external 
means of memorizing such as writing a telephone number, than internal 
means, such as rehearsing. These children also indicated a readiness to 
rely on other people to facilitate their own remembering. Flavell (1977) 
reported that older children are more likely than younger children to 
use internal rather than external means. 
Harris (1982) in his research with internal and external aids sug-
gested that external aids are more dependable than internal ones for 
both older and younger subjects, but little is known as to the use of 
internal aids versus external aids in practical, everyday life situa-
tions. How do external aids become internal aids? Analyses of both ex-
ternal and internal changes seen while observing children's remembering 
will allow us to determine developmental changes in the process of in-
ternalization. In spite of the differing research methodologies and 
variables studied, we find that the one common thread that weaves con-
sistently throughout this section on memory strategies is that memory 
is dependent not only on other cognitive variables such as attention 
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and organization, but on environmental/cultural variables as well. 
The Role of Reward 
"Motivation is not only a function of the perceived probability of 
success and incentive value of an immediate task, but also a function 
of the probability of success and incentives of future goals and tasks, 
the attainment of which are contingent upon successful completion of 
the immediate task" (deCharms & Muir, 1978, p. 94). In this section 
we shall focus briefly upon the interaction of various factors men-
tioned in the foregoing definition with an emphasis upon "the second 
series of stimuli" which might serve as the "psychological means" for 
this activity. In other words, we shall consider reward as an external 
stimulus which might be assimilated within the cognitive processes in 
either a negative or positive manner with special attention to devel-
opmental aspects. 
The research of Harry Harlow (1950) has shown that monkeys will 
manipulate puzzles without any external reinforcement, until the puz-
zles are baited with a raisin reward. Having experienced baited puz-
zles, the monkeys lose interest in unbaited puzzles. This result 
caused deCharms (1968) to ask whether an external reinforcer, when 
added to an ongoing, intrinsically motivated activity, would reduce the 
subsequent probability of the response when rewards are no longer pre-
sent below the initial unreinforced level. 
Answers to this question have been reflected in recent studies. 
These research studies have shown that the offer of extrinsic rewards 
can produce adverse effects upon human motivation and performance 
(see deCharms & Muir, 1978; Lepper & Greene, 1978, for recent reviews). 
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Most of this research has been concerned with the detrimental effects 
of extrinsic rewards on subsequent (unrewarded) intrinsic interest in 
an activity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Deci, 1975; Lepper, Greene, & 
Nisbett, 1973). However, there is a further issue of a detrimental ef-
fect of reward that is appearing currently in the literature. This is 
the detrimental effect of an expected reward on performance (Condry, 
1977; Kruglanski, Friedman, & Zeevi, 1971; Levine & Fasnacht, 1974; 
McGraw, 1978). 
In some of the reviews that have been concerned with the detri-
mental effects that extrinsic rewards have on performance and intrinsic 
interest, there is a suggestion that the two effects are casually re-
lated (Condry, 1977; Krugl~nski, Friedman, & Zeevi, 1971) or might be 
related (Lepper & Greene, 1978). The strongest evidence for this re-
lationship has been put forth by the research of Kruglanski et al. 
(1971), showing that th~·Offer of an extrinsic incentive produced per-
formance declines on tests of verbal creativity and then showed that 
intrinsic interest as measured by questionnaires, was also lower among 
the subjects who had been offered an extrinsic incentive. The explana-
tion advanced for the performance-interest relation was that intrinsic-
extrinsic interest differences between groups were present at the time 
of task engagement and that the more intrinsically oriented subjects 
did better at the cost of verbal creativity, because "intrinsically 
motivated individuals .. exhibit superiority on those aspects of 
performance contingent upon preoccupation with the task, as opposed to 
concentration upon attaining the goals" (p. 607). 
Deci (1975) postulated that if an extrinsic reinforcer is per-
ceived as controlling behavior, the person's intrinsic motivation for 
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a task will be reduced. Informational reinforcers will not be seen as 
externally controlling. Deci demonstrated that tangible positive re-
ward (money) reduced initially intrinsically motivated behavior with 
college students on both laboratory and more natural settings. 
Kruglanski, Riter, Amitai, Margolin, Shabtai, and Zaksh (1975) 
measured rated task interest, rated task preference, and task resump-
tion. Where money was inherent to the activity (stock market games) 
payment increased intrinsic motivation. When task activity was only in-
strumental to gaining money, payment decreased intrinsic motivation. 
Calder and Staw (1975) hypothesized that intrinsic motivation is 
undermined by extrinsic rewards only when the task is intrinsically in-
teresting to begin with. They manipulated both intrinsic (dull vs. in-
teresting tasks) and extrinsic (payment vs. nonpayment) factors and 
measured task satisfaction. Findings indicated that extrinsic rewards 
increase intrinsic motivation in the face of a dull task. 
Riess and Sushinsky (1975) proposed that a salient reward "can 
elicit many responses that interfere with play" during the reward 
period and that subsequently "children will be less interested in play 
activities to the extent that responses are elicited that interfere 
with play behavior prior to" the discontinuance of the reward 
(p. 1118). 
Viesti (1971) focused upon the effect of monetary rewards on an 
insight learning task. Results indicated that performance on insight 
tasks was not affected by external contingneices. 
In a series of studies with preschoolers, Lepper and Greene (1973) 
have shown how doling out rewards can have negative effects. In one 
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study (Lepper & Greene, 1975) the first group of children were rewarded 
for working on several puzzles, and the second group of children re-
ceived no reward for manipulating the same puzzles. Later, when all 
the children were free to play with puzzles or not, as they chose, 
those children who had come to expect a reward for their efforts spent 
only half as much time with the puzzles as did the others who had been 
self-motivated from the beginning. Lepper and Greene interpreted their 
findings to mean that play had been transformed into work for the 
children as a result of the rewards. 
One recent study (Reed, Cogan, & Landers, 1981) with 5- and 6-
year old boys and girls used the manipulation of flavor as a reinforce-
ment predicting cue to separate motivational and cue properties of in-
centive. The results showed that the presence of the reinforcement 
predicting cue resulted in interference when it contributed reward-
relevant but solution-irrelevant information. Learning was facilitated 
when the reinforcement predicting cue contributed useful information in 
complex discrimination tasks. 
Another study (Sarafino & Stinger, 1981) rewarded one group of 
kindergarteners and fourth graders with a nickel and another group with 
praise for giving "funny endings" to riddles. The results showed that 
reward increased the number of endings the children gave. However, 
fourth graders who received praise took more riddles home than those 
who received money. Thus, presenting a "prize" or money to children 
and adults can change task performance, but reward has been found not 
to change that behavior in a predictable manner. 
In terms of studies specifically concerned with the effect of 
reward upon memory, the following studies might be mentioned. For ex-
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ample, Thorndike and Forlano (1933) conducted experiments where boys 
(10-16 years) were given increasing monetary rewards for selecting an 
increasing number of correct answers from a group of multiple-choice 
questions. Results indicated that an increase of the reward for a 
correct answer increased learning but, afterward, even had a negative 
effect. Other studies (Russel and Farber, 1948; Sears, 1937) have in-
vestigated failure upon memory. Russel and Farber's (1948) study in-
volved a memory task when the subjects who had failed in reproduction 
immediately after memorization showed better results one week later 
than the subjects who had shown good results previously. In attempts 
to interpret these results, McGeoch and Irion (1961) pointed out the 
close association between the effects of competition, success and fail-
ure, and the level of motivation in the subjects. As further explanation 
of the interplay of factors, Bower (1970) comments that "the important 
ingredient in memory appears to be the cognitive constructive activity 
itself, not just the motivation or reward" (p. 504). Miller, Galanter 
and Pribram (1960) confirm this point by saying: "It is the execution 
of the plan, not just the intent to execute it, that is important for 
the memory" (p. 130). Of course, the important ingredient for memory 
may well be the cognitive constructive activity itself, but it must 
also be remembered that the quality of this cognitive construction is 
subject to developmental principles, and reward may not even be a 
factor that can be cognitively assimilated at certain ages. For ex-
ample, in a recent study regarding development of memory, Myers and 
Perlmutter (1978) tested recall in children. These children were 
shown nine unrelated common objects. After the experimenter presented 
each item and named it, the children were told that they could keep all 
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the objects that they correctly recalled. In spite of the tempting in-
centive, recall was poor. Myers and Perlmutter (1978) discussed many 
reasons for the children's superior performance on recognition tasks 
versus recall tasks. They explain that recall--but not recognition--
may require more active rehearsal strategies and more thorough searches 
of memory. Thus, younger children may recall fewer items because they 
do not have effective memory strategies. 
Diggory (1972) says that under extrinsic reward young children 
(preschoolers) are generally more responsive (behavior increases) to 
praise and attention, whereas older children may be more responsive to 
the intrinsic reward of being correct. Vygotsky would interpret this 
change in the planning and directing function (served by the reward) as 
the result of moving from the "interpsychological" (between people) to 
the "intrapsychological" (within the child) plane of functioning (1930/ 
1978b, p. 57). 
White (1970) has indicated that older children no longer require 
external rewards, but their reward is the information that they have been 
correct; they adopt an internal standard of performance. This explana-
tion fits in with Vygtosky's tenet that cultural aspects are gradually 
internalized to organize cognitive processes. 
Current theory and data (i.e., Deci, 1975; Kruglanski, 1975; 
Lepper & Greene, 1978) indicate that the capacity of extrinsic incen-
tives to undermine intrinsic motivation may be influenced by the method 
of reward administration (contingent or noncontingent). A study by 
Fabes, Moran and McCullers (1979) suggested that the method of reward 
administration may not be critical to obtaining detrimental effects of 
a reward on immediate task performance. This result would be consistent 
with a statement made by Lepper and Green (1978) that immediate task 
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performance and intrinsic motivation, though obviously related to each 
other, may not be governed by precisely the same factor. 
The findings of Mischel and Baker (1973) show that different modes 
of presenting rewards (i.e., real vs. symbolic) may either enhance or 
inhibit self-control and suggest that the specific ways in which re-
wards are construed may have crucially different effects on behavior. 
Mischel (1973) indicated that a stimulus may have a motivating, con-
summating, arousal function as an informational (cue) function. In 
one study (Mischel & Baker, 1973) the experimenter directed the children 
to think about the reward objects which confronted them in either con-
summatory or nonconsummatory ways during a specified delay interval. 
That is, in the consummatory condition, the child was asked to focus 
upon the most delicious qualities of the reward which faced him (e.g., 
chewy, sweet taste or a marshmallow). In the nonconsummatory condition, 
the child was told to think about rewards as inedible objects (e.g., 
marshmallows as puffy, white clouds). The results indicated that the 
children were able to wait twice as long if they mentally pictured 
rewards in a nonconsummatory manner, which suggests that mental repre-
sentation more distant from physical reality facilitated their progress 
toward the goal. 
In another study (Patterson & Carter, 1978), attentional deter-
minants of preschool children's self-control were compared in two kinds 
of experimental situations. In one situation children waited for de-
layed rewards and in the other they worked for delayed rewards; both 
groups did so either in the presence or absence of the reward objects. 
Results showed that children in the waiting condition might become 
frustrated as they attended to the motivational properties of rewards, 
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but evident rewards for children in the working condition might actu-
ally tend to energize and facilitate their activity toward the goal. 
Thus, presence of reward objects limited self-control when it involved 
merely passive waiting, but when active work was called for, the re-
wards energized performance. These results tend to support the Soviet 
research of memory which contends that an important condition for in-
voluntary memorization is action integrated with the objective of mem-
orizing (Smirnov, 1966/1973). 
Presenting a "prize" or money to children and adults can change 
task performance, but reward has been found not to change that behavior 
in a predictable manner. That is, sometimes reward facilitates perform-
ance, other times there is no change, and in still other situations the 
presence of reward seems to interfere with performance. How do we 
resolve the positive and negative findings in terms of research with 
intrinsic rewards? 
There are several formal theoretical models that we may draw upon 
in the research literature to explain reward effects. One such theo-
retical model is the traditional Hull (1956) stimulus-response learning 
theory formulation, which predicts that an increase in incentive 
motivation causes the most readily available responses to be elicited. 
Responses are more readily available for simple tasks, whereas in 
complex tasks, the most available responses lead to errors. There are 
some problems with this traditional learning theory in that most of 
the support for this model has come from animal studies. 
Another theoretical position proposed in recent years is the dis-
traction hypothesis, espoused by Janet Spence (1970, 1971), which 
centers on attention and assumes that the inferior performance of the 
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reward group is due to distracting their attention from the task stim-
uli. This model presently is unable to handle the detrimental effects 
of a promise of reward. 
Recently, McGraw (1978) has proposed a two-factor model which pre-
dicts when rewards might be expected to interfere or enhance immediate 
performance. The first factor, the attractive-aversive dimension, is 
concerned with the subject's initial perception of the degree of at-
tractiveness of the task. Rewards appear to be detrimental when the 
task is initially attractive; rewards are found to be enhancing when 
the task is initially perceived as unattractive or boring. The second 
factor, the algorithmic-heuristic dimension, is concerned with the nature 
of the solution strategy demanded by the task. In algorithmic tasks, 
the subject usually can proceed toward problem solution in a direct, 
straightforward, almost automatic manner. In heuristic tasks, the 
solution is not evident; insight and discovery are usually required to 
discover it. McGraw's model predicts a detrimental effect of rewards 
on performance with attractive heuristic tasks (algorithmic-heuristic 
dimension), but an enhancing effect in algorithmic tasks. All combina-
tions of aversive tasks (attractive-aversive dimension) lead to the 
prediction that rewards should enhance performance. This model has 
been tested by some research (McGraw, 1978; McGraw & McCullers, 1974; 
McGraw & McCullers, Note 1; Moran, 1975; Moran, McCullers, & Fabes, 
Note 3; Moran & McCullers, Note 2). 
A fourth model for dealing with the adverse effects of rewards on 
performance makes use of a developmental regression (Fabes, Moran, & 
McCullers, 1981). The research of McCullers and his colleagues suggests 
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that in addition to motivation, rewards may also adversely affect cog-
nition, attention, creativity, and the perception, organization, and 
integration of information. In terms of the regression model, rewards 
are seen to shift the subject's functioning to a more primitive devel-
opmental level. That is, the subject shifts from a predominately cog-
nitive mode toward a more physical and emotional way of responding. 
This concept of regression may provide a better understanding of why 
rewards should facilitate performance in some situations but not in 
others. 
A recent unpublished study (Moran, 1978) involving subjects at 
three age levels (5, 10 and 19 years) and matched on ability level, in-
vestigated reward effects in terms of Wechsler Intelligence Scale sub-
tests. Nonreward subjects were administered all subtests under stand-
ardized instructions, while reward subjects were given two subtests 
under nonreward conditions and the remainder under reward conditions. 
On more algorithmic subscales, reward improved performance in high 
ability students at all three age levels. Average ability adults, on 
the other hand, performed significantly better under reward on these 
tasks. On heuristic tasks, reward had a detrimental effect on the per-
formance of both high and average ability adults, had little effect on 
fourth graders, and facilitated the performance of the preschoolers. 
The data appeared to be explained most easily in terms of the develop-
mental regression model, suggesting that reward may lead to a greater 
degree of diffuse responding in young children and to more rigid func-
tioning in adults. 
In view of the fact that McGraw's (1978) study revealed that re-
ward's effect on performance varied with the cognitive requirements of 
the task, it will no longer be sufficient to say that extrinsic in-
centives have a detrimental effect because they set off a self-
attributional process that alters one's source of motivation from 
intrinsic to extrinsic (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 1971), or because 
they distract (e.g., Spence, 1970), or because they cause subjects 
to adopt an instrumental, goal-oriented strategy (Condry, 1977; 
Kruglanski, 1978; Lepper & Greene, 1978). The foregoing results will 
not serve as explanations since they fail to explain why self-
perceptions in a task, or distraction, or goal orientation should 
have a detrimental effect on one type of problem but not on another. 
More knowledge is needed of the range of tasks over which one finds 
a detrimental effect of reward on performance in order to better des-
cribe the reactions of the extrinsically motivated subject. 
Concluding Comment on Rewards 
The brief review of these studies was not meant to suggest that 
external rewards, particularly monetary rewards, have no place in 
our society. The point here is that external rewards should be used 
with caution. Parents and teachers should be aware of the nature and 
effects of extrinsic rewards in the education and socialization of 
children. Locke (1693) phrased it nicely when he advised: 
Rewards, I grant, and Punishments must be proposed to 
children if we intend to work upon them. The Mistake, 
I imagine, is that those that are generally made use 
of, are ill chosen. The Pains and Pleasures of the 
Body are, I think, of ill consequence, when made the 
Rewards and Punishments, whereby Men would prevail on 
their Children: For as I said before, they serve but 
to increase and strengthen those Inclinations which 
'tis our business to subdue and master. (p. 11) 
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Memory Strategy Studies in the Elderly 
There is some evidence that memory strategies differ for young and 
old people. Why are the memory strategies of older people different 
from the memory strategies of younger people? Some studies have shown 
that memory for pictures declines faster than memory for words 
(Winograd & Simon, 1980), and so visual images may be more difficult 
for the elderly. Further, it is possible that some strategies, such as 
organization, are encouraged in formal education so that the elderly no 
longer need these active learning strategies once they have left school 
(Smith, 1980). 
A number of studies have pointed to the fact that older subjects 
are less adept at using verbal and imaginal mediators to improve their 
memory. In one study Hulicka and Grossman (1967), using a paired-
associate learning task with old and young subjects, issued no special 
instructions to one group and instructions to use mediators for the 
second group. Results for the group with no instructions indicated 
that the older subjects showed a lesser tendency to use the mediators 
spontaneously than the young; however, the older subjects did benefit 
from mediation instructions. Hence, the elder group were able to per-
form the mental operations required for the formation of a mediator, 
but did not typically carry out the operations. Chown (1961) has indi-
cated that this may be due to increasing cognitive rigidity or perhaps 
decreased "depth of processing" (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) in the elderly. 
An example of the development of memory in old age is put forth by 
Reese (1976). When the author's mother realized that her memory was 
failing, she began to use written notes as memory aids, however, her 
strategy became inefficient since she wrote many of the notes in code 
and then forgot the code. An additional problem could arise when one 
forgets where one placed the notes. 
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This story illustrates two characteristics about memory strategies 
in the elderly: (1) The strategies may not have been previously exper-
ienced in earlier stages of development and (2) they may not have been 
utilized efficiently (Reese, 1976). Thus, the problem may be in using 
inefficient retrieval strategies. In the preceding example, the re-
trieval cue used may, like a string tied around a finger, revive only 
the memory that something was to be remembered, and not the content 
that was to be remembered, a production inefficiency. A study by 
Hultsch (1975) illustrated that the problem with the elderly is one 
of retrieval not of storage. His study examined age differences in 
cued and noncued recall of lists of words in young and old adults and 
found that both trace-dependent and cue-dependent forgetting occurred 
more often in the old than in young adults. 
There is increasing evidence that the spontaneous unprompted use 
of mnemonic devices in acquisition increases with age in children (e.g., 
Canestrari, 1968; Hulicka & Grossman, 1967; Hulicka, Sterns, & Grossman, 
1967). These studies may provide data as to an explanation for any re-
tention deficit in either the young or the elderly if the assumption is 
made that mediated habits are "protected" from interfering activities, 
are more resistant to interference from competing habits, or are simply 
better learned than those acquired rotely (Kausler, 1970). This sup-
position is supported by Hasher and Zacks' (1979) model of effortful 
versus automatic processes which suggests that automatic processes occur 
without intention, without necessarily giving rise to awareness and 
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without interfering with other processes; while the effortful processes 
are those that are susceptible to interference and subsequently influ-
ence cognitive processes. Thus, variation in attentional capacity 
should have more effect upon the efficiency with which effortful proc-
esses occur than with automatic processes. Deficits in their perform-
ances should then be seen in instances of reduced cognitive capacity. 
On the other hand automatic processes, because of their minimal drain 
on capacity, should not be similarly affected by a change in cognitive 
capacity. Their results then suggested that, in fact, effortful proc-
esses appeared to be more susceptible to interference than the automatic 
processes. 
The implications from the foregoing research are that suscepti-
bility of interference has a different meaning for th~ young and for 
the elderly. For example, young children may not have acquired the 
higher-order rules or strategies (inhibiting skills) but such rules 
or strategies may actually dominate the behavior of the aged. In the 
young child the relative lack of inhibitory skills suggests a suscepti-
bility to associative interference (White, 1965), while in the elderly 
apparent susceptibility to interference is assumed to reflect general-
ized (or overgeneralized) tendencies to inhibit the effect of prior 
learning, whether observed in the laboratory or in the natural environ-
ment (Goulet, 1973). 
As in childhood, the age differences seem to reflect changes not 
in capacity, but rather in control operations. Unlike the child, how-
ever, the old already have the required memory processes, and if it is 
assumed that the age differences reflect age changes, then the old al-
ready had the required strategies in their organization. Yet, the 
old exhibit production inefficiencies and deficiencies. The problem 
lies in how to explain these. Reese (1976) advances the explanation 
that these strategies have become functionally less available because 
of disuse. Though, once well established, they have become less well 
established and hence exhibit the deficiencies like any strategy that 
is not well established. 
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In general, it has been found that age differences are less evi-
dent when subjects are provided specific learning instructions 
(Canestrari, 1968; Hulicka & Grossman, 1967; Hultsch, 1971; Perlmutter, 
1978, 1979). These findings suggest that older adults spontaneously 
use effective acquisition strategies less than younger adults, even 
though such strategies are available to them. Other characteristics 
of the elderly, such as time for performing, motivation and cautious-
ness, also~hould be considered in their performance in an experimental 
situation. Thus, when enough time for response is available, perform-
ance of older adults is only slightly worse than that of younger adults 
(Arenberg, 1965; Canestrari, 1963; Eisdorfer, Axelrod, & Wilkie, 1963; 
Monge & Hultsch, 1971; Taub, 1967). Differences in motivation have also 
been thought to contribute to the differences on experimental learning 
tasks; some researchers assume that older adults are not as motivated as 
younger adults, but Botwinick (1978) has indicated that older adults are 
more involved in experimental situations than are younger adults. Fi-
nally, in regard to cautiousness, it. is thought that older adults are 
more cautious than younger adults. Research suggests that older adults 
make more errors of omission but rarely errors of incorrect responding 
(Eisdorfer, Axelrod, & Wilkie, 1963; Korchin & Basowitz, 1957). 
In sum, then, of the elderly we find that essentially there is a 
116 
decline in the utilization of memory strategies including focused at-
tention which c~uld be assumed to be due to an inefficiency in control 
process not capacity. Reese (1976) indicates a decline would result 
from production deficiency or production inefficiency, increasing with 
age. Pavlov (1941/1963) summarized the disposition of the memory system 
in the elderly by stating: 
The mechanism is exactly the same, varying only in degree, 
arising in old age as the excitatory processes of the cor-
tex naturally decrease. In the brain which is yet strong 
the external and internal stimulations concentrate to some 
degree (extremely only exceptionally) in a definite cortical 
point or region, accompanied of course by negative induction, 
but thanks to the strength of the cortex it is not complete 
and at some distance inhibition is extending. Therefore 
together with the chief excitation another one is acting to 
a certain degree to evoke the corresponding reflexes, es-
pecially the old established so-called automatic ones. 
Ordinarily in our behavior we react not singly, but com-
pletely, to fit the ever present contents of our environment. 
In old people the matter is altogether different. Concen~ 
trating on one stimulus we exclude by negative induction 
other collateral and simultaneous stimuli because they often 
do not suit the circumstances, are not complementary reactions 
in the given setting. 
Let me give a minor incident of tpis. I look at some 
object which I need, take it and do not see anything touching 
or near it--this is why I unnecessarily strike against sur-
rounding objects. This is erroneously called senile distrac-
tion, on the contrary it is concentration, involuntary, 
passive, defective. Thus the old man, dressing and at the 
same time thinking about something or talking to someone, 
goes out without his cap, takes the wrong article, leaves 




We began the research by asking the general question--How is an 
internal process able to represent an external object? In other words, 
how are external strategies transformed into internal, mental actions 
or how do children master their environment? This issue is important 
since it enables the child to structure new solutions internally. 
Thus, as Leont'ev (1972/1979, 1981) had indicated, in the transition from 
external processes to internal ones, "these processes moving outward to 
inward, thus, constitute the process of internalization. Thus, the 
process of internalization is not the transferal of an external activ-
ity to a preexisting, internal plane of consciousness: it is the proc-
ess in which this internal plane is formed" (p. 57). 
In order to gain some insight into the internalization process, 
we briefly reviewed the philosophical foundations and systems to deter-
mine how they evolved into the Soviet psychology of the present. Then, 
we briefly reviewed Soviet and American studies in memory. We began 
with a consideration of memory processes, because Vygotsky (1930/1978c) 
indicated that it is central to the social origin of signs as well as 
to the development of thought processes. Since a complete review of 
research in memory processes would be overwhelming, we concentrated 
upon those components--attention, organization, and strategies--which 
were deemed to have the most significant relationship to memory, thought 
and behavior. The following is a brief synopsis of the major ideas from 
the Soviet and American research in these areas. 
Soviet research in memory extends over an extensive range of 
mental variables--involuntary and voluntary memory, memory for iso-
lated words, numbers, and objects of textual material and particu-
larly the training/teaching of memory abilities in young children. 
All of these research areas are studied within the socio-historical 
framework which emphasizes the motivational context within which mem-
ory might occur (e.g., work or play) and analyzed in terms of means-
ends relationships formulated among various operations or abilities 
and the action of remembering (Smirnov, 1966/1973). 
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Soviet results in memory research have indicated that young 
children's memory is involuntary--dependent upon comprehension proc-
esses which are automatically stimulated by real-world cues and ex-
perience--and nonstrategic. Memory development, then, moves from an 
involuntary, nonstrategic process to one that is voluntary and stra-
tegic. According to Soviet researchers (e.g., Smirnov, 1966/1973), mem-
ory development may proceed as follows: the earlier processes are built 
upon repetitive, social interaction, which later became nonconscious 
or automatic and hence allow the child to deal effectively with the 
subject at hand. These automatic systems may only be brought into 
consciousness, when perhaps deficiencies occur in their particular 
function (e.g., Vygotsky, 1934/1962). Let us take an example which 
Leont'ev (1972/1979, 1981) uses to illustrate this point: shifting 
gears in an automobile essentially becomes automatic, but when con-
fronted by some failure in the shifting system, particular representa-
tions of actions and memories are brought into play and reconstruction 
or repair proceeds. Thus, these conscious factors permit the indivi-
dual to react reflectively rather than automatically. In the words 
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of Vygotsky (1930/1978c): "In the elementary form something is re-
membered; in the higher forms humans remember something" (p. 51). 
In terms of more specific components such as attention and strat-
agies and motivation, Vygotsky states (1929/1979), "Voluntary attention 
begins with external phenomena, and is gradually transformed into an 
internal operation" (p. 77). More specifically, Vygotsky (1929/1979) 
advanced the following understanding of the processes of voluntary 
attention. 
Therefore, we can say that voluntary attention •.• is the 
process of mediated attention that has gone underground. The 
path of this process falls completely under the general law 
of the cultural development and formation of higher forms of 
behavior. This means that the content, structure and func-
tions of voluntary attention are not simply the result of the 
natural, organic development of attention. Rather, they are 
the result of changes and reorganizations of the whole process 
under the influence of external stimulus-means. (pp. 82-83) 
Finally, with respect to motivational factors, Soviet experiments 
(e.g., Smirnov, 1966/1973) indicated that a motive (e.g., praise, money) 
of and in itself does not determine completely either the nature of the 
activity or its productivity and that the degree of their influence 
depends on the activity which moves man to action. The same motive in 
different subjects can evoke entirely different responses. Smirnov and 
Zinchenko (1969) describe memory performance as a function of the ac-
tivity of the subject rather than as a reflection of various stimulus 
materials and their presentation. 
Smirnov and Zinchenko (1969) state that all the investigations in 
memory point to one and the same thing: 
.. With age the role of the second signal system, emerging 
in studies on recall of verbal and abstract material, with use 
of verbal supports, increases, as a result of which the dif-
ference between retention of the two types of material 
and between the two types of support gradually dimin-
ishes; however, even in adults visual material is re~ 
membered more efficiently than verbal-abstract material, 
and visual supports display a more active effect than 
verbal supports. The best retention is observed in the 
joint operation of both signal systems. (p. 484) 
In sum, Soviet psychologists (e.g., Luria, 1966/1980) consider 
that the higher human cognitive processes (e.g., memory, attention, 
etc.) are complex reflex processes, social in origin, mediate in 
structure and conscious and voluntary in type of function. 
American researchers have come to conclusions similar to the 
Soviet results. In general, findings have indicated that older 
children are more likely than younger children to employ appropriate 
memory strategies. However, young children are able to use their 
strategies when the experimenter provides assistance. Thus, young 
children appear'to have what is called a "production" rather than a 
mediation deficiency (see Flavell, 1970; Ornstein, 1978). Memory is 
one of the functions known to decline with age (Botwinick, 1973). 
In free-recall tasks, elderly subjects use organizational strategies 
less frequently or less efficiently than do younger adults (Craik & 
Masani, 1967; Denney, 1974; Hultsch, 1971, 1974). Similarly, older 
subjects report the use of mediational techniques in paired-associate 
experiments less frequently than do younger adults (Hulicka, Sterns, 
& Grossman, 1967). All of the decrements may be conceived of as 
"effortful" processes and hence would conform to the Hasher and Zacks 
(1979) framework which indicated that the young and elderly will show 
a decline deficit on those tasks that require substantial capacity 
(e.g., "effortful" processing). 
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Where does reward enter the picture as related to memory processes? 
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In other words the question of whether adequate performance of a task 
is dependent upon the comprehension of the end-state or is dependent 
upon increased maturation should be carefully considered. Bower (1970) 
has suggested that the "important ingredient appears to be cognitive 
constructive activity itself, not the motivation or reward" which en-
hances memory (p. 504). Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960) have also 
put forth the same thought: "It is the execution of the plan not just 
the intent to execute it that is important for memory" (p. 130). Of 
course, Bower's focus upon activity agrees with the Soviet theme which 
states that "material is remembered most effectively when it is con-
nected with the goal of an activity. Reaching a goal of an activity 
provides the most effective research format" (Zinchenko, 1962/1979, 
1981, p. 339). 
In spite of the differing methods and theoretical bases and cul-
tures, and in spite of the narrowness of scope of some of the studies 
(the research summarized was limited in its perspective since it did 
not always relate the memory process to cognitive development), the 
essence of these studies points to the fact that we cannot study mem-
ory, attention, organization and reward without specifying the changes 
in the child and the environment that promote the subordination of 
actions in memory operations. In other words or in Soviet terms, we 
need to analyze both the external and internal changes of the indivi-
dual. 
The main factor that emerges in terms of both American and Soviet 
studies is that we cannot merely study the memory performance, but 
must also consider the processes involved and the context in which 
they occur. Hence, our real task lies ahead of us, that is, to investi-
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gate and differentiate the external and internal conditions involved in 
the development of mental structures. 
Finally, one commonality that appears to pervade both the American 
and Soviet studies is that developmental changes, particularly between 
2 and 5 years, do not appear to be due to increasing strategy utiliza-
tion, but to an increasing growth in world knowledge (Myers & Perlmutter, 
1978). Thus, one possible factor in considering the precursors for mem-
ory development is an automatic or spontaneously functioning system, 
which also could be tied to other frameworks (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 
1979; Pavlov, 1928; Atkinson-Shiffrin, 1968). The generalization 
might be made, then, that as the child's cognitive capacity to gene-
rate his own memory strategies develop, the necessity for strong ex-
ternal stimuli support is correspondingly reduced. The child, thus, 
becomes more dependent upon his own mental faculties rather than stim-
uli from the external environment. Brown (1975) may be correct in 
suggesting that the factor responsible for memory improvement may be 
in the "knowing" component itself. 
To summarize, we find a close intertwining relationship between 
memory, attention, and organization with memory viewed as developing 
from the internalization or inhibition/control of behavior. This in-
ternalization is important since it frees the child from overt re-
sponding and allows the child to reflect internally upon new solu-
tions. Thus, American and Soviet studies are similar in their results 
with the exception of the Soviet research looking more closely at the 
nature of the activity. With this in mind, we arrive at the question 
as to how we can facilitate and improve our research; possibly by con-
sidering a new framework of cognitive processing (e.g., the Soviet 
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view), which considers the interaction of both internal and external 
environments. 
Prospects 
Where are all the experimental models and research findings lead-
ing us in terms of the process of internalization as exemplified by 
Vygotsky? Vygotsky (1930/1978b) indicated that we have barely begun 
to investigate the internalization process. Are these studies leading 
us in the right direction? What is needed in the future? What issues 
need to be clarified? Newell and Simon (1972) stated that "the goal 
of understanding human performance requires an analysis of strategies 
useful in particular task environments" which may relate how strategies 
change and build upon automatic processes (p. 82). If we are going to 
understand the total situation, we must also analyze how the task vari-
ables are assimilated or internalized into the inner environment. First 
in line is the need to generate a framework for evaluating the full 
variety of memory behavior. For this, we could turn to Soviet theory 
(e.g., Vygotsky, 1934/1962) which indicates that an individual's cog-
nitive system plays as important role in determining performance as 
does information provided from the environment. As Luria (1976) ob-
served "psychology comes primarily to mean the science of the socio-
historical shaping of mental activity and of the structures of mental 
processes which depend utterly on the basic forms of social practice" 
~· 164). The control and processing of external stimuli have implica-
tions for internal processing. We need to concentrate on both internal 
and external processes. 
In conjunction with Vygotsky's experimental-genetic approach, other 
factors such as how stimuli, instructions and contexts influence the 
subjects' use of external stimuli should be evaluated. Levels-of-
processing literature (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972) as well as 
Leont'ev's (1972/1979, 1981) levels of analysis in terms of activity 
indicate that there are profound effects of varying instructions. 
Reese (1976) indicates that there is a need to use research designs 
that disentangle the age, cohort and time of measurement effects. 
124 
It appears that if we are to continue accumulating knowledge about 
developmental changes in memory, we must begin setting up longitudinal 
investigations of the development of "automatic" processing versus 
"effortful" processing across the entire life-span from infancy 
through old age as well as to investigate which factors are respon-
sible for the shift from automatic to effortful processes. 
From Luria's (1979) viewpoint, what is needed "is a strategy that 
combines artificial laboratory models with more natural kinds of ob-
servations," based largely on Vygotsky's theory of development (p. 
119). This kind of an approach to research could have far-reaching 
implications for the investigations of social relationships, par-
ticularly in the domain of the development of conscience and self-
control. In addition, the effects of training/teaching memory strat-
egies should be considered since research suggests that strategies 
might be taught. 
In conclusion, then, it must be noted that the research and 
models reviewed in this section are integrally linked to the indi-
vidual's total cognitive development, although increased cognitive 
development doe~ not really explain memory changes. It is also im-
portant to consider that the areas discussed--memory strategies, at-
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tention, organization and reward--did not, by any means, cover all the 
areas that might have been considered. At this point we are at a loss 
to explain what variables contribute to the age-linked changes in mem-
ory performance, but we will begin to understand memory changes if we 
analyze the individual and cultural contexts in which these changes 
occur. Vygotsky (1929) has noted that the acquisition of knowledge 
of the culture is of the essence in the internalization process. The 
growing child's increase in knowledge may be one of the contributing 
factors in the development of memory. As Flavell and Wellman (1977) 
write: 
Older individuals presumably store, retain, and retrieve 
a great many outputs better or differently than younger 
ones. They will do so simply because developmental ad-
vances in the content or structure of their semantic or 
conceptual systems render these outputs more familiar, 
meaningful, conceptually interrelated, subject to in-
ference and gap filling, or otherwise more memorable 
for them. (p. 4) 
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Titchener (1915) has written: "In summary, then, attention ap-
pears in the human mind at three stages of development: as primary 
attention, determined by various influences that are able to produce 
a powerful effect upon the nervous system; as secondary attention, 
during which the centre of consciousness is held by a certain percep-
tion or idea, but is held in face of opposition; and lastly as de-
rived primary attention, when this perception or idea has gained an 
undisputed ascendancy over its rivals. The attentive consciousness 
is at first simple; it then becomes complex--reaching indeed, in cases 
of hesitation and deliberation, a very high degree of complexity; and 
then it simplifies again. Looking at life in the large, we may say 
that the period of training or education is a period of secondary at-
tention, and that the following period of achievement and mastery is 
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TEST QUESTIONS: EXPERIMENT 2 
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Table 4 
Series II and Series III Test Questions: Experiment 2 
I'ISTRUC':'IONS: '!'his time we will play the same game, b•.1t a llttle 
differently; these are the rules: 
1. "You can say each color only once." (No color 
name can be used twlce.) 
2. "Green and yellow cannot be used at all." 
(forbidden colors) 
Series II (No aid) 
"'llhen the signal goes up and is green, answer 
as quickly as J"U can." 
1. Have you a f'riend? 
(2.)a What colJr is your shirt (blouse)? 
3. Did you ever go on a train? 
(d.) what color are the train engi~es? 
S. Do you want to be a bigger boy (girl)? 
6. Were you ever at the movies? 
7. Do you like to ? lay in your ':'Oom? 
(8.) 1/hat color is the floor? 
( ?. ) What co lor are the walls? 
10. Do you ••ri te? 
11. ~ave you seen •riolets? 
(12.) What color is violet? 
13. Do you like candy? 
1 4. Were you e•.•er in the mountains? 
( 15.) What color are leaves? 
16. Do you swim? 
( '7.) //hat is your favorite -:olor? 
13. ;·/hat do you do with a pencil? 
19, Do you like pears? 
( 20.) "llhat color are apples? 
21. ~o you like to play? 
(22.) What color are trees? 
23. Do you go to school? 
( 24.) \>hat co lor a"e desks? 
1-lhat C.o yo•.1 think? Did. you get t 11em all right? 'tlhat should you not have 
sa:d? And what else? 
aScored questions are given in p~renthese~. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
l1b'l'RUC'l'IONS: 1) Y-,u can Ray a color only once. 
2) This time :you canna~ say blue and red. 
3) Y:>u can '~se ~hese cards; they may help you. 
4) When the signal goes up and is green, answer as 










Do you sometimes take walks? 
What color are the houses? 
Does the sun shine br1ght ly? 
What color is the sky? 
Do you like candy? 
Have you seen roses? 
Do you like vegetables? 
( 8.) What <:olor are tomatoes? 
















'lave you any toys? 
Do you play ball? 
\ihat colors are balls? 
Do you live in the c~~y (town)? 
Have yo:J. watched a. parade? 
What color are flags? 
'lave you any books? 
Hhat colors are their covers? 
When does it get dark? 
Do you like to go to the store? 
'-/hat color are bags? 
Do you dress yourself? 
What color are socks? 
Do you draW? 
'lihat color are paints? 
Hhat do yo•~ think? D~d you get them a:l correc-t? Wha1: should yc".J. n·Jt ·~ave 






Figure 3. Stimuli for Series III questions: Experiment 1. 
Figure 4. Stimuli for SerieR III questions: Experiment 2. 
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EXPLANATORY NOTE 
The color card stimuli illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 were con-
structed from sheets of ordinary construction paper, manufactured by 
Bradner Central Company, Chicago, Illinois, 60606. The stimuli are 
reproduced in the photographs at the actual size used in the studs 
(3 x 5 inches). Figure 3 presents the nine color cards used in 
Study I; the colors, front to back, are: red, purple, ~' black, 
blue, white, brown, yellow, and green. Figure 4 presents the 12 
color cards used in Study II; the colors, back to front, are the 
same as shown in Figure 3 plus tan, pink, and orange. Although 
these figures are color photographs, the colors vary slightly from 





SUMMARY TABLES OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE 
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Table 5 
ANOVA for Error scores: Experiment 1 
SOURCE SUM OF DEGREES OF MEAN 
SQUARES FREEDOM SQUARE 
MEAN 810.03125 1 810.03125 
CON 5.28125 1 5.28125 
A 354.03125 5 70.80625 
CA 15.53125 5 3. 10625 
ERROR 242.62500 132 1 .83807 
R 2. 17014 1 2. 17014 
RC 0.28125 1 0.28125 
RA 12.80903 5 2.56181 
RCA 3.78125 5 0.75625 
2 ERROR 124.45833 132 0.94287 
























ANOVA for Correct Response Latency: 
Experiment 1 
SOURCE SUM OF DEGREES OF MEAN 
SQUARES FREEDOM SQUARE 
MEAN 561084.72323 1 561084.72323 
CON 2544.81701 1 2544.81701 
A 20820.04915 5 4164.00983 
CA 7263.95221 5 1452.79044 
ERROR 121810.36911 132 922.80583 
R 9449.68778 1 9449.68778 
RC 131.08504 1 131.08504 
RA 4033.36944 5 806.67389 
RCA 1843.53055 5 368.70611 
2 ERROR 77076.42202 132 583.91229 
























ANOVA for Error Scores 
Without Oldest Groups: Experiment 1 
SOURCE SUM OF DEGREES OF MEAN 
SQUARES FREEDOM SQUARE 
MEAN 720.75000 1 720.75000 
CON 15.18750 1 15.18750 
A 239.70833 3 79.90278 
CA 2.43750 3 0.81250 
ERROR 176.91667 88 2.01042 
R 0.33333 1 0.33333 
RC 0.52083 1 0.52083 
RA 7.87500 3. 2.62500 
RCA 1.18750 3 0.39583 
2 ERROR 103.08333 88 1.17140 
























ANOVA for Error Latency 
Without Oldest Groups: Experiment 
SOURCE SUM OF DEGREES OF MEAN 
SQUARES FREEDOM SQUARE 
MEAN 28892.68861 1 28892.68861 
CON 519.20435 1 519.20435 
A 2908.29819 3 969.43278 
CA 220.57915 3 73.52638 
ERROR 15613.15165 52 300.25292 
R 850.69456 1 850.69456 
RC 152.33824 1 152.33824 
RA 1042.95910 3 347.65303 
RCA 377.29486 3 125.76495 
2 ERROR 13056.41151 52 251 .08484 

























ANOVA for Correct Response Latency 
Without Oldest Groups: Experiment 
SOURCE SUM OF DEGREES OF MEAN 
SQUARES FREEDOM SQUARE 
MEAN 407400.16081 1 407400. 16081 
CON 5396. 13583 1 5396. 13583 
A 16211. 14885 3 5403.71628 
CA 2722.86538 3 907.62179 
ERROR 95385.54521 87 1096.38558 
R 10067.95634 1 10067.95634 
RC 347.54333 1 347.54333. 
RA 2557.33118 3 852.44373 
RCA 911.05128 3 303.68376 
2 ERROR 67047.00731 87 770.65526 












































ANOVA for Correct Response Latency by Sex: Experiment 1 
SUM OF DEGREES OF MEAN F 
SQUARES ·FREEDOM SQUARE 
437426.70491 1 437426.70491 504.81 
154.91830 1 154.91830 o. 18 
16554.82026 5 3310.96405 3.82 
912.71530 t 912.71530 1.05 
12897.72556 5 2579.54511 2.98 
181.90726 1 181.90728 0.21 
5528.57674 5 1105.715.35 1. 28 
11525. 11924 5 2305.02385 2.66 
103982.58379 120 866.52153 
8111.47795 1 8111.47795 13.72 
6,48121 1 6.48127 0.01 
2303.24693 .5 460.64939 0. 78 
1516. 10035 1 1516. 10035 2.57 
2353.31327 5 470.'66265 0.80 
15.39827 1 15.39827 0.03 
2049.23087 5 409.84617 0.69 
2000.92532 5 400. 18506 0.68 























ANOVA for Error Scores by Sex: 
Experiment 2 
SOURCE SUM OF DEGREES OF MEAN 
SQUARES FREEDOM SQUARE 
MEAN 379.78538 1 379.78538 
CON 2.85318 1 2.85318 
SEX 0.87013 1 0.87013 
cs 4.37860 1 4.37860 
ERROR 86.23750 30 2.87458 
R 10.35939 1 10.35939 
RC 0.21363 1 0.21363 
RS 2. 16278 1 2. 16278 
RCS 0.37634 1 0.37634 
2 ERROR 52.70417 30 1.75681 

























ANOVA for Correct Response 
Latency by Sex: Experiment 2 
SOURCE SUM OF DEGREES OF MEAN 
SQUARES FREEDOM SQUARE 
MEAN 2056.72928 1 2056.72928 
CON 5.65601 1 5.65601 
SEX 33.52547 1 33.52547 
cs 116.68450 1 116.68450 
ERROR 423.63058 30 14.12102 
R 55.81359 1 55.81359 
RC 18.44073 1 18.44073 
RS 6.65599 1 6.65599 
RCS 15.53395 1 15.53395 
2 ERROR 581 . 17653 30 19.37255 

























TABLES OF CELL MEANS 
173 
174 
LIST OF SYMBOLS FOR CELL MEANS 
A = Age: 
9 = preschool 
1 = first grade 
2 = third grade 
3 = sixth grade 
4 = college 
5 = elderly 
CON = Reward/No Reward 
1 = Reward 
2 = No Reward 
E1 Mean number of errors in no aid condition 
E2 = Mean number of errors in aid condition 
R = Aid/No Aid 
1 = No Aid 
2 = Aid 
CELl MEANS FOR 
CON = . 1.0000 
A = . 1.0000 
R 
E I I I. 75000 
E2 2 2. 16667 
MARGINAl. I. 95833 
COUNT 12 
CON = .. 2.0000 
A = .. 4.0000 
R 
E I I 0.08333 
E2 2 0.33333 
MARGINAL 0. 20833 
COUNT 12 
SfANDARD DEVIAfiONS FOR 
CON = . 1.0000 
A = . 1.0000 
R 
E 1 1 I. 13818 
E2 2 I .40346 
CON = ... 2.0000 
A - • 4.0000 
R 
E I I 0. 28868 
E2 2 0.49237 
Table 13 
Cell Means and Standard Deviations 
For Error Scores: Experiment 1 
1-ST DEPENDENT VARIABLE . 1.0000 . 1.0000 . 1.0000 . 1.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 
.. 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 4.0000 • 5.0000 • 9.0000 . 1.0000 
I .08333 0.75000 0.50000 I. 75000 3.08333 2.41667 
0.66667 0.50000 0. 16667 2.83333 3. 25000 2.83333 
0.87500 0.62500 0.33333 2.29167 3. 16667 2.62500 
12 12 12 12 12 12 
MARGINAl 
• 2.0000 • 2.0000 
• 5.0000 • 9.0000 
1.58333 3.58333 1.59028 
2.00000 4.50000 1.76389 
1. 79167 4.04167 1.67708 
12 12 144 
1-ST DEPENDENT VARIABLE . 1.0000 . 1.0000 • 1.0000 . 1.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 
• 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 4.0000 • 5.0000 • 9.0000 . 1.0000 
0.79296 0.62158 0.90453 I .05529 1.62135 1.31137 
0.98473 1.00000 0.38925 1.11464 1. 28806 1.89896 
,.. 2.0000 • 2.0000 
• 5.0000 • 9.0000 
1.24011 1.50504 
























Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Error Latency: 
Experiment 1 
Reward No Reward 
Series II Series III Series II Series III 
A8e na No Aid S.;p. n Aid S.D. n No Aid S.D. Aid S.D. 
4-5 years 12 17.33 12.06 (12) 25.08 24.52 12 17.92 20.67 20.67 9.33 
16-7 years 12(11) 20.45 12.12 (10) 37.7 25.16 12(11) 18.50 19.50 26.3 13.86 
8-9 years 12 (9) 15.44 14.76 (4) 21.6 22.9 12(11) 14.0 3.74 8.52 7.90 
10-12 years 12 (8) 7.58 8.07· (3) 31.6 36.14 12(9) 8.33 10.84 . 10.6 8.20 
18-30 years 12(4) 3.58 7.61 (2) 10.0 3.89 12 (1) 0.17 0.58 4.5 1.7 
64-85 years 12 9.25 8.09 (12) 27.0 15.76 12 (9) 11.08 9.60 31.56 17.45 




CEll MEANS FOR 
CON . . 1.0000 
A . . 1.0000 
R 
E1 I I. 75000 
[2 2 2. 16667 
MARGINAL I. 95833 
COUNI 12 
SlANOARO DEVIAIIONS fOR 
CON . . 1.0000 
A . . 1.0000 
R 
E I 1 1. 13818 
E2 2 1.40346 
Table 15 
Cell Means and Standard Deviations 
For Correct Response Latency: Experiment 1 
1-Sl DEPENOENl V~IHAeLE 
. 1.0000 . 1.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 
• 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 • 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 3.0000 
1.08333 o. 75000 3.08333 2.41667 1.50000 1.00000 
0.66667 0.50000 3.25000 2.83333 1.08333 0.8:1333 
0.87500 0.62500 3. 16667 2.62500 1.29167 0.!1166'1 
12 12 I? 12 12 12 
1-ST DEPENDENT VARIABLE . 1.0000 . 1.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 
• 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 • 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 3.0000 
0.79296 0.62158 1.62135 1.31137 1.08711 0.95346 



















CEll MEANS FOR 
CON = . 1.0000 
A . 1.0000 
R 
El I I. 75000 
[2 2 2. 16667 
MARGINAL 1.95633 
COUNT 12 
SlANOARO DEVIATIONS FOR 
CON = . j .0000 
A = . 1.0000 
R 
E 1 I I. 13616 
E2 2 1.40346 
'{able 16 
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Error Scores 
Without Oldest Groups: 
Experiment 1 
1-ST DEPENDENT VARIA~L£ 
. 1.0000 . 1.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 ... 2.0000 "' 2.0000 • 2 0000 
• 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 
1.08333 0.75000 3.08333 2.41667 1.50000 1.00000 3.593:13 
0.66667 0.50000 ::1.25000 2.83333 1.08333 0.83333 4.50000 
0.87500 0 62500 3. 16667 2.62500 1.29167 0.!1166'1 4.04167 
12 12 I? 12 12 12 12 
1-ST DEPENDENT VARIABLE . 1.0000 . 1.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 
.. 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 • 1.0000 .. 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 
0.79296 0.62158 1.62135 1.31137 1.08711 0.95346 1. 50504 









CELL MEANS FOR 
CON ' . 1.0000 
A " . 1.0000 
I> 
ERI I 19.11111 
ER2 2 41.55556 
MARGINAL 30.3333:1 
COUNT 9 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR 
CON = . 1.0000 
A = . 1.0000 
R 
ERI I 12.73229 
ER2 2 23.34048 
Table 17 
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Error Latenc.y 
Without Oldest Groups: 
Experiment 1 
1-ST DEPENDENT VARIARLE 
. 1.0000 . 1.0000 . 1.0000 .. 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 
• 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 
10.50000 19.00000 17.33333 17.90000 10.27143 10.75000 17.91667 
24.50000 11.00000 25.08333 28.00000 9.09143 13.75000 20.66667 
17.50000 15.00000 21.20833 22.95000 9.68143 12.25000 19.29167 
4 2 12 10 7 4 12 
1 ·51 DEPENDENT VARIABLE . 1.DDDD . 1.0000 . 1.DDDD • 2.o000 + 2.0000 ' 2 .DODD • 2.0000 
• 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 . 1.0000 .. 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 
4.93288 12.72792 12.05543 18.96459 8.297~ 11.52895 20 67259 









CELL MEANS FOR 
CON = . 1.0000 
A = . 1.0000 
R 
CRI 1 42.08333 
CR2 2 67.00000 
MARGINAL 54.54167 
COUNT 12 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR 
CON = . 1.0000 
A = . 1.0000 
R 
CRI 1 18.47582 
Cll2 2 40.70515 
Table 18 
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Correct Latency 
Without Oldest Groups: 
Experiment 1 
1-ST DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
. 1.0000 . 1.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 .. 2.0000 • 2.0000 
• 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 3.0000 .. 9.0000 
53.75000 39.66667 36.58333 33.45833 40.52500 ~4.00000 22.27273 
63.33333 66.66667 44. 16667 43.58333 58.93333 64.08333 21.09091 
58.54167 53. 16667 40.37500 38.52083 49.72917 54.04167 21.68182 
12 12 12 12 12 12 II 
1-ST DEPENDENT VARIABLE . 1.0000 . 1 .. 0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 
• 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 3.0000 • 9.0000 
21.54119 11.22767 3G.25781 27.28091 24.40704 28.2~391 21.14280 










Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Correct Response Latencyby Sex: Experiment 1 
CELL MEANS FOR 1-ST DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
CON = * 1.0000 * f .0000 * 1.0000 * f .0000 * 1.0000 * 1.0000 • 1.0000 * 1.0000 A = * 1.0000 • 1.0000 * 2.0000 • 2.0000 * 3.0000 • 3.0000 • 4.0000 • 4.0000 
SEX = • 1.0000 • 2.0000 * 1 .0000 * 2.0000 • 1 .0000 • 2.0000 • 1.0000 • 2.0000 
R 
CR1 1 45.62500 35.00000 58.00000 50.71429 46.00000 36.50000 35.18182 12.00000 
CR2 2 66.62500 67.75000 51.20000 72.00000 49.50000 75.25000 42.90909 28.00000 
MARGINAl 56. 12500 51.37500 54.60000 61.35714 47.75000 55.87500 39.04545 20.00000 
COUNT 8 4 5 .7 4 8 11 1 
CON = * 1.0000 • 1.0000 .. 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 * 2.0000 
A = • 5.0000 • 9.0000 * 9.0000 • 1.0000 • 1 .0000 • 2.0000 * 2.0000 • 3.0000 
SEX = • 2.0000 * 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 1.0000 
R 
CR1 1 32.33333 44.66667 33.88889 39.64286 24.80000 53.55000 27.50000 57.75000 
CR2 2 28.00000 59.00000 39.22222 35.42857 55.00000 65.20000 52.66667 78.75000 
MARGINAl 30. 16667 51.83333 36.55556 37.53571 39.90000 59.37500 40.08333 68.25000 


















Table 19 (Continued) 
CON " • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 
A s • 4.0000 • 4.0000 • 5.0000 • 5.0000 • 9.0000 
SEX . • 1.0000 • 2.0000 • f .0000 • 2.0000 • 1 .0000 
R 
CRf 1 36.28571 38.86000 33.22222 62.66667 28.00000 
CR2 2 39.00000 37.12000 39.22222 95.00000 33.40000 
MARGINAL 37.64286 37.99000 36.22222 78.83333 30.70000 
COUNT 1 5 9 3 5 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR 1-ST DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
CON = • 1.0000 • f. 0000 • 1.0000 • f .0000 • f .000() 
A = • f .0000 • f .0000 * 2.0000 • 2.0000 •• 3.0000 
SEX = * f .0000 • 2.0000 * 1.0000 * 2.0000 * 1 .0000 
R 
CRf f 18.23605 19.37352 22.93469 21.77701 8.83176 
CR2 2 34.64076 57.22106 14.95660 25.46239 24.25558 
CON = • f .0000 • f .0000 • 1.0000 * 2.0000 • 2.0000 
A = • 5.0000 • 9.0000 * 9.0000 • f .0000 • 1 .0000 
SEX = • 2.0000 • 1.0000 • 2.0000 * 1.0000 • 2.0000 
R 
CRt 1 35.21837 57.50072 30.79547 33.76724 13.25519 
CR2 2 16.00000 10.53565 23.88398 21. 10179 64.99615 
CON = • 2.0000 * 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 • 2.0000 
A = * 4.0000 • 4.0000 • 5.0000 • 5.0000 • 9.0000 
SEX = • 1.0000 • 2.0000 * 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 1.0000 
R 
CRt 1 13.31308 17.39822 16.77631 13.57694 29.49576 







12.42857 44. 13854 
7 144 
• 1.0000 * 1.0000 * 3.0000 * 4.0000 
• 2.0000 • 1.0000 
11.41428 15.05203 
62.84164 18.11328 
* 2.0000 * 2.0000 
• 2.0000 • 2.0000 
• f .0000 • 2.0000 






























Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Error Scores 
By Sex: Experiment 2 
CEll MEAHS FOR 1-Sl DEPENDlNT VARIABLE 
MARGINAL 
CON = • 3.0000 • 3.0000 • 4.0000 • 4.0000 
SEX = . 1.0000 • 2.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 
R 
[ 1 1 2.33333 3.60000 2.70000 2.62500 2.88235 
[2 2 2. 16661 2.40000 2.00000 1.50000 2.02941 
MARGINAL 2.25000 3.00000 2.35000 2.06250 2.45588 
CUUN"I 6 10 10 8 34 
SIANDARil DEVIATIONS FOR 1-ST DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
CON = • 3.0000 • 3.0000 • 4.0000 • 4.0000 
SEX 0 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 . 1.0000 • 2.0000 
R 
E 1 1 1. 75119 1. 71270 0.94H68 1.18773 





Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Correct Response 
Latency by Sex: Experiment 2 
CELL MEANS FOR 1-ST DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
MARGINAL 
CON . • 3.0000 • 3.0000 • 4.0000 • 4.0000 
SEX D • 1.0000 • 2.0000 • 1.0000 • 2.0000 
R 
CRI t 5. 11667 2.62000 5.07000 5.97500 4.57059 
Cll2 2 9.65000 3.92000 11.52000 7.10000 6.15000 
MARGINAl. 7.38333 3.27000 5.29500 6.53750 5.36029 
COUNT 6 tO 10 8 34 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR 1-ST DEPENDENJ VARIABLE 
CON . • 3.0000 • 3.0000 • 4.0000 • 4.0000 
SEX . • t .0000 • 2.0000 • I .0000 • 2.0000 
II 
Ckt I 5.70944 2.94196 I .60489 3.82120 




















RAW DATA KEY 
Experiment 1 
Subject Number 
Reward/No reward treatment: 
1 = Reward 
2 = No reward 
Age: 
9 = preschool 
1 = first grade 
2 = third grade 
3 = sixth grade. 
4 = college 
5 = elderly 
Number of errors in no aid c;oil.dition (E) 
Total latency in seconds per subject to answer 7 ques-
tions in no aid condition (TR) 
Correct response latency in seconds per subject for 
total number of questions to be answered correctly in 
no aid condition (CR) 
Error latency in seconds per subject for total number 
of questions answered incorrectly for no aid condi-
tion (ER) 
Number of errors in aid condition (E) 
Total latency in seconds per subject to answer 7 ques-
tions in aid condition (TR) 
Correct response latency in seconds per subject for 
total number of questions answered correctly in aid 
condition ( CR) 
Error latency in seconds per subject for total number 
of questions answered incorrectly in aid condition (ER) 
Column 
12 = Sex: 
1 = female 















RAW DATA KEY 
Experiment 2 
Subject Number 
Time interval condition: 
3 = O-see 
4 = 3-sec 
Age (3rd grade) 
Number of errors in no aid condition 
Total latency in seconds per subject for no aid condi-
tion (TR) 
Correct response latency in seconds per subject for 
total number of questions answered correctly for no 
aid condition (CR) 
188 
Error latency in seconds per subject for total number 
of questions answered in error for no aid condition (ER) 
Number of errors in aid condition 
Total latency in seconds per subject for aid condi-
tion (TR) 
Correct response latency in seconds per subject for 
total number of questions answered correctly for aid 
condition (CR) 
Error latency in seconds per subject for total number 
of questions answered in error for aid condition (ER) 
Sex: 
1 = female 
2 =male 
189 
Table 2 2 
Raw Data: Experiment 1 
Column 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
• 1 1 9 4 43.0 14.0 29.0 1 88.0 78.0 10.0 2 
2 1 9 5 29.0 7.0 22.0 3 22.0 13.0 9.0 2 
3 1 9 5 37.0 13.0 24.0 5 41 .o 13.0 28.0 2 
4 I 9 3 27.0 14.0 13.0 3 58.0 48.0 10.0 1 s 1 9 4 77.0 53.0 24.0 2 25.0 17.0 8.0 2 
6 I 9 4 28.0 9.0 19.0 5 47.0 20.0 27.0 2 
7 I 9 5 53.0 9.0 44.0 3 85 0 69.0 16.0 1 
8 1 9 1 121 .0 111 . 0 10.0 5 159.0 60.0 99.0 1 
9 1 9 1 100.0 97.0 3.0 3 79.0 53.0 26.0 2 
10 1 9 2 26.0 20.0 6.0 3 86.0 59.0 27.0 2 
11 1 9 1 33.0 29.0 4.0 2 74.0 52.0 22.0 2 
12 1 9 2 73.0 63.0 10.0 4 67.0 48.0 19.0 2 
13 1 1 1 79.0 69.0 10.0 2 99.0 46.0 53.0 1 
14 1 1 1 73.0 53.0 20.0 0 80.0 80.0 1 
15 1 1 2 20.0 15.0 5.0 2 89.0. 61.0 28.0 2 
16 1 1 1 71.0 68.0 3.0 3 153.0 105.0 48.0 1 
17 1 1 2 53.0 27.0 ~6.0 3 59.0 36.0 23.0 1 
18 1 1 0 55.0 55.0 1 59.0 56.0 3.0 1 
19 1 1 3 76.0 36.0 40.0 4 96.0 13.0 83.0 1 
20 1 1 1 96.0 61 .0 35.0 1 160.0 150.0 10.0 2 
21 1 1 3 54.0 21 .0 33.0 0 112.0 112 .o 1 
22 1 1 1 56.0 36 .. 0 20.0 3 116.0 85.0 31.0. 1 
23 I 1 2 51.0 36.0 15.0 3 107.0 39.0 68.0 2 
24 1 1 4 46.0 28.0 18.0 4·-51.0 21 .o 30.0 2 
25 1 2 2 039.0 029.0 010.0 1 084.0 076.0 008.0 .2 
26 1 2 1 068:o os3.o 015.o o 068.0 068.0 2 
27 1 2 1 045.0 042.0 003.0 0 107.0 107.0 2 
28 1 2 1 067.0 057:0 010.0 1 068.0 065.0 003.0 2 
29 1 2 1 077.0 073.0 004.0 0 066.0 066.0 1 
30 1 2 2 057.0 032.0 025.0 0 055.0 055.0 1 
31 1 2 0 095.0 095.0 1 054.0 044.0 010.0 2 
32 1 2 1 044.0 039.0 005.0 2 105.0 046.0 059.0 1 
33 1 2 0 087.0 087.0 0 061.0 061.0 1 
34 1 2 0 044.0 044.0 0 042.0 042.0 2 
35 1 2 2 076.0 059.0 017.0 3 056.0 028.0 028.0 1 
36 I 2 2 085.0 035.0 050.0 0 102.0 102.0 2 
37 1 3 1 063.0 035.0 028.0 2 034.0 028.0 006.0 2 
38 ·1 3 1 034.0 024.0 010.0 0 219.0 219.0 2 
39 1 3 1 034.0 024.0 010.0 1 099.0 083.0 016.0 2 
40 1 3 0 038.0 038.0 3 132.0 059.0 073.0 2 
41 1 3 1 051.0 044.0 007.0 0 Q85.0 085.0 1 
42 1 3 0 049.0 049.0 0 031 . 0 03 1 . 0 1 
43 1 3 1 056.0 046.0 010.0 0 090.0 090.0 2 
44 1 3 0 058.0 058.0 0 062.0 062.0 2 
45 1 3 0 030.0 030.0 0 034.0 034.0 2 
46 1 3 1 068.0 056.0 012.0 0 044.0 044.0 1 
47 1 3 1 038.0 035.0 003.0 0 038.0 038.0 1 
48 1 3 2 048.0 037.0 011.0 0 027.0 027.0 2 
49 1 4 3 021.0 012.0 009.0 0 028.0 028.0 2 
50 1 4 0 02 1 . 0 02 1 . 0 0 030.0 030.0 ' 51 1 4 1 025.0 022.0 003.0 0 073.0 073.0 1 
52 1 4 1 035.0 030.0 005.0 0 023.0 023.0 1 
53 ' 4 0 032.0 032.0 0 036.0 036.0 1 54 1 4 0 031.0 031.0 0 039.0 039.0 1 
55 1 4 0 064.0 064.0 1 043.0 033.0 010.0 1 
56 1 4 1 060.0 034.0 026.0 0 048.0 048.0 1 
57 1 4 0 063.0 063.0 1 090.0 080.0 010.0 1 
5s' 1 4 0 025.0 025.0 0 033.0 033.0 1 
59 1 4 0 040.0 040.0 0 046.0 046.0 1 
190 
Table 22 (Continued) 
Column 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
60 4 0 025.0 02!5.0 0 011 .o 031.0 1 
61 5 2 089.0 064.0 025.0 2 OA1.0 054.0 037.0 1 
62 5 3 021 .0 012.0 009.0 4 040.0 028.0 012.0 2 
63 5 2 075.0 066.0 009.0 5 057.0 013.0 044.0 1 
64 5 1 076.0 073.0 003.0 3 057.0 044.0 013.0 2 
65 5 2 035.0 032.0 003.0 3 081.0 048~0 033.0 1 
66 5 2 047.0 039.0 008.0 2 093.0 068.0 025.0 1 
67 1 5 1 036.0 033.0 003.0 3 075.0 042.0 033.0 1 
68· 1 5 0 039.0 039.0 2 039.0 031.0 008.0 1 
69 1 5 2 028.0 022.0 006.0 2 060.0 033.0 035.0 1 
70 1 5 1 074.0 049.0 025.0 3 073.0 048.0 025.0 1 
71 1 5 1 034.0 026.0 008.0 1 041.0 038.0 003.0 1 
72 I 5 4 024.0 012.0 012.0 4 068.0 012.0 ~56.0 2 
1 2 9 5 39.0 10.0 29.0 5 78.0 Js.o 43~0 f 
2 2 9 3 22.0 10.0 12.0 3 60.0 42.0 18.0 1 
3 2 9 2 38.0 20.0 18.0 4 79.0 52.0 27.0 1 
4 2 9 4 159.0 eo.o 79.0 5 . 52.0 20.0 32.0 1 
5 2 9 6 24.0 5.0 19.0 6 23.0 3.0 20.0 2 
6 2 9 5 22.0 4.0 18.0 7 20.0 20.0 2 
7 2 9 5 18.0 6.0 12.0 3 28.0 14.0 14.0 2 
8 2 9 4 17.0 10.0 7.0 4 25.0 14.0 11.0 2 
9 2 9 3 35.0 29.0 6.0 5 26.0 13.0 13.0 2 
10 2 9 3 27.0 20.0 7.0 4 36.0 18.0 18.0 1 
. -11 2 9 1 27.0 25.0 2.0 4 24.0 12.0 12.0 2 
12 2 9 2 36.0 30.0 6.0 4. 29.0 9.0 20.0 2 
13 2 1 2 43.0 32.0 11 .o 3 66.0 28.0 38.0 2 
14 2 1 3 76.0 33.0 43.0 0 167.0 167.0 2 
15 2 1 4 22.0 10.0 12.0 4 35.0 10.0 25.0 2 
16 2 1 5 31.0 11.0 20.0 4 34.0 15 .o 19.0 2 
17 2 1 2 31.0 24.0 7.0 6 37.0 3.0 34.0 1 
18 2 1 2 46.0 38.0 8.0 2 80.0 55.0 25.0 2 
19 2 1 1 35.0 30.0 5.0 1 57.0 54.0 3.0 I 
20 2 1 2 59.0 40.0 19.0 2 73.0 45.0 28.0 1 
21 2 1 2 49.5 33.5 16.0 3 96.0 38.0 58.0 1 
22 2 I 3 88.0 18.0 70.0 4 69.0 40.0 29.0· 1 
23 2 I 3 29.0 18.0 11 .0 5 31.0 10.0 21.0 1 
24 2 1 0 114.0 114.0 0 58.0 58.0 1 
25 2 2 2 043.0 025.0 018.0 1 043.0 039.0 004.0 2 
26 2 2 3 038.0 015.0 023.0 2 038.0 015.0 023.0 2 
27 2 2 0 089.0 089.0 0 074.0 074.0 1 
28 2 2 1 061.0 046.0 015.0 1 061.0 046.0 015.0 "' " 29 2 2 1 081.0 076.0 005.0 1 081.0 076.0 005.0 1 
30 2 2 2 052.0 046.0 006.0 3 052.0 046.0 006.0 1 
31 2 2 4 037.0 018.0 019.0 0 119.0 119.0 2 
32 2 2 1 030.0 012.0 018.0 0 048.0 048.0 2 
33 2 2 1 052.0 049.0 003.0 4 052.0 049.0 003.0 2 
34 2 2 1 047.9 039.2 8.0 0 098.2 098.2 1 
35 2 2 1 054.0 052.1 001.9 1 065.5 058.9 07.64 1 
36 2 2 1 056.2 19.0 37.2 0 038.1 38. 1 1 
37 2 3 2 024.0 018.0 006.0 1 047.0 043.0 004.0 2 
38 2 3 1 034.0 030.0 004.0 1 091.0 081.0 010.0 2 
39 2 3 2 056.0 027.0 029.0 0 048.0 048.0 1 
40 2 3 2 054.0 026.0 028.0 5 043.0 006.0 037.0 2 
41 2 3 1 030.0 025.0 005.0 1 031.0 027.0 004.0 1 
42 2 3 0 059.0 059.0 0 120.0 120.0 1 
43 2 3 0 056.0 056.0 0 123.0 123.0 2 
44 2 3 0 047.0 047.0 2 066.0 053.0 013.0 2 
45 2 3 2 051.0 033.0 018.0 0 051.0 051.0 2 
46 2 3 2 035.0 025.0 010.0 0 035.0 035.0 2 
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Table 22 (Continued) 
Column 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 - 10 11 12 
47 2 3 0 120.0 120.0 0 120.0 120.0 1 
48 2 3 0 062.0 062.0 0 062.0 062.0 2 
49 2 4 0 035.0 035.0 0 025.0 025.0 2 
50 2 4 0 036.0 036.0 1 052.0 048.0 004.0 1 
51 2 4 1 060.0 058.0 002.0 1 045.0 042.0 003.0 1 
52 2 4 0 041 .0 041 .0 0 032.0 032.0 1 
53 2 4 0 047.0 047.0 0 059.0 059.0 1 
54 2 4 0 069.0 069.0 0 033.0 033.0 2 
55 2 4 0 034.0 034.0 1 064.0 057.0 007.0 2 
56 2 4 0 023.0 023.0 0 02 1 . 0 02 1 . 0 1 
57 2 4 0 024.0 024.0 0 040.0 040.0 1 
58 2 4 0 025.0 025.0 1 035.0 031 .0 004.0 1 
59 2 4 0 024.0 024.0 0 045.0 045.0 2 
60 2 4 0 032.3 032.3 0 025.6 025.6 2 
61 2 5 2 089.0 061.0 028.0 0 106.0 106.0 2 
62 2 5 2 061 .0 045.0 016.0 3 092.0 058.0 034.0 1 
63 2 5 4 025.0 012.0 013.0 4 068.0 012.0 056.0 1 
64 2 5 0 050.0 050.0 1 129.0 069.0 060.0 1 
65 2 5 2 051 .0 044.0 007.0 3 049.0 026.0 023.0 1 
66 2 5 2 031 .o 015.0 016.0 2 042.0 036.0 006.0 1 
67 2 5 0 050.0 050.0 2 073.0 050.0 023.0 2 
68 2 5 3 066.0 040.0 026.0 5 047.0 030.0 017.0 1 
69 2 5 2 029.0 017.0 012.0 3 070.0 035.0 035.0 1 
70 2 5 1 033.0 021 .0 012.0 0 064.0 064.0 1 
71 2 5 0 055.0 055.0 0 023.0 023.0 1 
72 2 5 1 080.0 077.0 003.0 1 159.0 129.0 030.0 2 
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Table 23 
Raw Data: Experiment 2 
Column 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 -8· . 9 LO• 11 12 
03 4 2 3 9.2 6.9 14.7 1 12.2 12.7 7.0 1 
04 4 2 2 6. 1 7.0 2.5 0 5.5 5.5 1 
06 4 2 2 5.0 5.5 3.0 3 8.6 7.4 11. 3 2 
07 4 2 4 5.9 7 5 3.5 2 4.3 4.6 3.0 1 
08 4 2 1 8.3 5.0 38.0 1 5.0 4. 1 13.0 1 
09 4 2 2 3.0 3.0 3.0 2 3.0 3.0 3.0 2 
10 4 2 1 3.7 3.8 3.0 3 13.3 15.5 8.0 2 
19 4 2 4 3.0 3.0 3.0 2 3.3 3.75 1. 5 2 
20 4 2 2 9.4 7.7 20.0 1 3.5 3.6 3.0 2 
11 4 2 3 4.0 3.0 6.3 1 4.2 3.8 8.0 1 
12 4 2 4 120.0 14.0 5.5 0 9.6 9.6 2 
13 4 2 4 3.0 3.0 3.0 4 3.7 3.7 3.75 1 
14 4 2 2 7.2 4.0 20.0 3 3.5 3.7 3.0 1 
15 4 2 2 6.9 7.8 3.0 1 7.0 4.8 27.0 2 
16 4 2 2 9.5 5.0 27.5 3 5.6 5.9 18.66 1 
17 4 2 4 5.5 3.0 9.250 9.2 9.2 2 
18 4 2 3 5. 1 4.9 5.661 6. 1 6.4 3.0 1 
05 4 2 3 4.2 4.4 3.3 4 5. 1 4.8 5.5 1 
01 3 2 5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3 5.95 6.6 4.3 2 
02 3 2 1 3.0 3.0 3.0 0 17.4 17.4 1 
03 3 2 1 11.9 9.5 41.0 1 5.75 6. 17 2.0 1 
04 3 2 2 1.6 1. 8 0.5 5 4.05 5.2 2.9 1 
05 3 2 4 0.75 0.92 0. 5 6.- 1.4 0.5 2.0 2 
06 3 2 5 5.4 8.2 2.601 3.6 3.9 0.5 2 
07. 3 2 1 2.8 2.0 10.0 2 10. 1 7.9 19.0 2 
08 3 2 4 6.35 0.75 14.754 12. 15 19.9 0.5 1 
09 3 2 2 4.65 5. 1 2.753 2.65 2.5 3.0 2 
10 3 2 6 0.5 0.50 0.503 0.5 0.5 0.5 2 
11 3 2 4 2.5 0. 75 10.251 0.85 0.5 4.0 2 
13 3 2 4 1. 7 0.58 3.384 0.80 1 .0 0.5 2 
14 3 2 5 1 .o 1.0 1.0 3 3.5 4.78 0.5 1 
15 3 2 4 3.9 1 .0 9.751 13.45 14.90 0.5 2 
16 3 2 1 1. 47 14.7 14.0 0 4.60 4.6 
17 3 2 1 8.85 6.8 27.0 0 9.50 0.95 2 
Table 24 
a Raw Scores for Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2 Adjusted 
Column 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
SUil.IEGT NO. CON A'lE ERRORfl TR CR F;R EllROR3 Til. t;__R ER SF. X 
3 ;> 5 0.5 0.5 o.s 3 5-?5 6.6 4.3 2 
2 3 2 1 ).0 3.0 J. 0 0 17.~ 17.4 
3 ;> 1 11,q 9·5 41.0 1 5.7) 6.17 :>.o 
4 2 3 9.2 6.9 14.7 1 12.? 12.7 7.0 
4 J 2 1 1.6 1.8 0.5 5 4.05 5.2 2.9 
4 4 2 2 6.1 7.0 2.5 0 5-5 '}.5 
5 ~ 2 4 o. 75 0.92 0.5 6 1.4 o.s 2.0 2 
4 2 3 4.2 4-4 J. 3 4 5.1 4.8 5- ~· 
5 3 2 5 5.4 8.? 2.60 1 3.6 3-9 o.s 2 
G 4 2 2 s.o 5-5 }.0 3 8.6 7.4 11.3 2 
1 3 2 1 2.8 2.0 10.0 2 10.1 7-9 1?.0 2 
7 4 2 4 ).') 7-5 J-5 2 4.3 4.6 ).0 
8 3 2 4 6.35 0.75 14.75 4 12.15 19.'1 0.5 
fl 4 ;:> 1 8. 3 5-0 J8.o 1 s.o 1\.1 1 }.0 
'l 3 2 2 1.~>s 5.1 7.75 ~ 2.65 2.5 J.O ? 
9 4 7 2 J.O 3.0 J.O ? ~-0 J.O ].0 ;> 
10 3 ? 6 0.5 o.so 0.)0 3 0.5 0.5 Q.5 2 
10 4 ? 1 3-7 ].8 ).0 .l 1).3 15.5 fl.() 2 
11 3 ? 4 2·5 0.75 10.25 1 0.85 0.5 4.0 2 
11 4 2 J 4.0 3.0 6 .• 3 1 4.2 3.8 a.o 
!;' 4 7 4 120.0 14.0 5-5 0. 9.6 ').6 2 
1 .l 3 7 4 1.7 o.ss J. ,g ~ o.Bo 1.0 0.5 2 
1 J 4 7 4 1.0 3.0 l.O 4 ).7 ). 7 J-75 
tt;[lhe mean f!rror nr:ore-£1 Wf:"re ad.juAted r-o that. !'::xpP.rimt'"nt 1 d.,t~ r.'luld be comparPd with th0rH~ of 
Experiment 2. :Jpecifi.;:;al J,v, t.hP. total number of corr~ct re~;ponr;~s on the color quef;tiom~ wen~ d1virJed 
by th~ total nllmht?r of C'1lor qur>~tinn:q iii f_;.Xjlf!rimPnt I, thP f.ottll numh("r 'lf Q'JP.r.;tion!?' W::t"' 71 10 
I-' F.xp~riment 2, it wa~ 10. 
\.0 
w 
Table 24 (Continued) 
Column 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
S1lllJil<1l' ~10. CON AGE EI!I!O>c:; '!:..!! 'ill. Ek [,;!lHOIIS '!'!! GH ~ s~~x 
14 4 2 ;J I , • > 4.0 20.0 .l ),') 3.7 \.0 
1' ) 4 2 2 6.'1 7.8 \.0 1 ·1.0 4.8 27.0 2 
1b 4 2 2 9.) 5.0 27.') 3 ) .. ', ).9 18.66 
n 4 2 4 5.5 3.0 9.25 0 9.2 9.2 2 
18 4 2 3 ). 1 4-9 5.66 1 6.1 6.4 ).0 
1') 4 ? 4 3.0 3.0 3.0 ~ 3.3 ). 75 1.) 2 
20 4 2 2 9-4 1.1 20.0 1 3.) 3.6 3.0 2 
2) I 2 :CO ).')7 ' 5.80 ) ,[) 1 012.0 12.67 oo8.o 2 
~) .' 
., 2 06. 14 ).0 •).0 1 06. 14 06.50 004.0 2 
26 I 2 1 0). 71 8.83 01).0 0 0').71 9-71 2 
26 2 2 3 05.43 01.7') 7. 7 2 03.28 05.00 o·1 .67 2 
n 1 2 1 06.~} 0/.00 003.0 0 1).28 15.2Ll 2 
n .! 2 0 0'} . ., 1 ').')1 0 16.86 16.86 
28 1 2 1 09 .5'1 ').50 010.0 1 '). '11 10.83 003.0 2 
21:l " 2 1 08.71 7.67 01).0 1 18.00 17.33 01).0 2 
2') 1 2 1 11.00 12.17 004.0 0 09.43 9.43 
29 < 2 1 
07 ·"' 
12.67 005.0 1 10.57 11.00 00).0 
.lO 1 2 L Otl.14 6.40 12.5 0 07.86 7.86 
30 2 2 2 11. )'I ').20 j.O 3 1).00 1.).25 00).0 
31 1 2 0 1 ). 51 13.57 1 07.71 '!. 33 010.0 2 
)1 2 2 4 07.43 1>.00 4. 7'! 0 n.oo 11.00 2 
.l2 1 2 1 Oo.:!o o.'jO 00).0 
., 1 ~). 0 u•). 20 . ').) 
32 2 2 1 05.tl2 12.00 018.0 [) 06.1:l6 6.136 2 
3.l 1 2 0 12.43 12.43 0 08./1 l:l.'/1 




Table 22 (Continued) 
Column 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
sun~. gQ!!. ~ !ill!!Q!ill TI! £!!. llii 
34 I 2 0 6.28 6.26 
.34 :! 2 1 6.85 6.65 8.0 
35 I 2 2 10.66 11.80 8.5 
35 2 2 1 7.70 8.69 1.9 
)6 1 2 2 12. 14 1.0 25.0 
)6 2 2 0 08.02 ).1"/ 19.0 
14 ) 2 5 1.0 1.0 1.0 
15 ) 2 4 3.9 1.0 9,75 
16 ) 2 I 1.47 I '•· 7 14.0 











































Correlations Between Error Scores anJ Correct Response 
Latencies for Aid and No Aid Groups by Age: Experiment 1 
Note. E ; Erroru, TR Total rcuponBe latency, en f:oncet resllUIISc latency, EH ; "rrur laLcncy 
>\ "·~. ()'; 




Tahle 25 (Conti.nued) 
No AJ<l 
~e Gr~lj'----------- _______ 
l11xth r lR Cll Ell 
gra•lc J • 5 6 
E •. J I .0000 
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£R 6 (l .SOfi6- 0 6:lfi4l"ck 0 OHI 1.0000 
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E J 1.0000 
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